United Nations Manual On Anti-Corruption Policy

Vienna, May 2001
Centre for International Crime Prevention
DRAFT

United Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy

Vienna, June 2001
CICP-16

This document has not been officially edited

DRAFT
United Nations Manual On Anti-Corruption Policy *_/

*_/
Prepared by the Global Programme against Corruption, Centre for International Crime Prevention,
Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, United Nations Office at Vienna.

Table of Contents

PART 1: TYPES, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION.........................1
I. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................2
A. Background....................................................................................................2
B. Lessons Learned.............................................................................................2
II. TYPES OF CORRUPTION...............................................................................7
A. Introduction....................................................................................................7
B. Bribery...........................................................................................................9
C. Embezzlement, Theft and Fraud..................................................................11
D. Extortion......................................................................................................12
E. Exploiting a Conflict of Interest/Influence Peddling, Insider Trading........12
F. Offering or receiving of an unlawful gratuity, favour or illegal commission.
13
G. Favouritism, nepotism and clientelism:.......................................................13
H. Illegal Political Contributions.....................................................................14
I. Money Laundering.......................................................................................14
PART 2: POLICIES AND MEASURES.................................................................15
III. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH...................................................................17
A. Introduction..................................................................................................17
B. The Integrated Approach.............................................................................17
1. Evidence based.........................................................................................17
2. Non-Partisan............................................................................................18
3. Transparent..............................................................................................18
4. Inclusive...................................................................................................18
5. Integrated.................................................................................................19
6. Comprehensive........................................................................................20
7. Impact oriented........................................................................................20
C. Action Research or Learning by Doing.......................................................21
D. UN’s Global Programme against Corruption.............................................21
E. GPAC’s Country Assessment.......................................................................23
F. UN’s Anti-Corruption Tool Kit....................................................................24
IV. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION – ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY
MECHANISMS FOR THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPT PRACTICES....................................27
A. Elimination of Abuse of Discretion..............................................................27
B. Procedural Complexity................................................................................27
C. Lack of Transparency in the Allocation of Public Resources......................28
D. Employee motivation....................................................................................29
E. Result based management............................................................................30
F. Internal reporting procedures......................................................................31
G. Disqualification............................................................................................31
H. Codes of Conduct.........................................................................................32
I. Disclosure of Assets.....................................................................................33
V. ENFORCEMENT- PROCEDURES FOR THE DETECTION, INVESTIGATION AND
CONVICTION OF CORRUPT OFFICIALS.........................................................................35
A. Covert and consensual nature of corruption...............................................35
B. Other sources of Information.......................................................................35
C. Prosecution and Investigations....................................................................36
D. Auditing authorities.....................................................................................37
E. Disclosure statutes.......................................................................................38
F. Means of countering intimidation................................................................38
G. Defining tasks...............................................................................................39
H. Case selection strategies..............................................................................41
I. Integrity-testing............................................................................................43
J. Publicity and the news media......................................................................44
K. Dealing with the subject of investigation.....................................................45
L. Witnesses......................................................................................................46
VI. INSTITUTION BUILDING – STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK........................................................................................47
A. Introduction..................................................................................................47
B. Organizational structures............................................................................49
C. Exclusivity of anti-corruption jurisdiction...................................................50
D. Anti-Corruption Agencies............................................................................50
E. Judicial Sector.............................................................................................52
1. Championing Multi-party Politics:..........................................................52
2. Organizational and Administrative Control Issues:.................................53
3. Substantive law-related aspects of institutional performance..................54
4. Procedural Law-related aspects of institutional performance:.................54
5. Political Interference and Judicial Effectiveness.....................................54
6. Social Control Mechanisms.....................................................................55
F. Strengthening Local Governments...............................................................55
G. Social Controls and Anti-Corruption Measures..........................................56
VII. AWARENESS RAISING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION........................59
A. Introduction..................................................................................................59
B. Public Sector (executive) Measures.............................................................60
C. Legislative Measures...................................................................................60
D. Private Sector Measures..............................................................................60
E. Civil Society Measures.................................................................................61
F. Media Training............................................................................................61
G. Integrity Steering Committees and Operational Boards.............................61
VIII. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS...............63
A. Introduction..................................................................................................63
B. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime..................................63
C. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption COUNCIL OF EUROPE..........64
D. Civil Law Convention on Corruption..........................................................65
E. Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)............................................66
F. The twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption...................67
G. Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials...............................................67
H. Convention of the European Union on the protection of its financial
interests................................................................................................................68
I. Protocol on the Convention on protection of the European Communities’
financial interests.................................................................................................68
J. Second Protocol on the Convention on the protection of the European
Communities’ financial interests.........................................................................69
K. Convention of the European Union on the fight against corruption involving
officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States................69
L. Joint Action of 22 December 1998 on corruption in the private sector by the
Council of the European Union...........................................................................70
M. Inter-American Convention against Corruption......................................70
N. OECD-Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions....................................................................72
O. Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions....................................................................73
P. Future Convention against Corruption.......................................................73
IX. NATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS..........................................................75
A. Criminal Law...............................................................................................75
1. Sanctioning of corruption and related acts...............................................75
2. Confiscation of the proceeds of corruption..............................................76
B. Laws to facilitate the detection of corruption..............................................77
1. Collaboration of offenders.......................................................................77
2. Money laundering statutes.......................................................................78
3. Limitation of bank and professional secrecy as well as the introduction of
adequate corporate laws...................................................................................78
4. Access to information legislation.............................................................79
C. Administrative Law......................................................................................79
X. CURBING ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS AND THE REPATRIATION
OF ASSETS.............................................................................................................81
A. Introduction..................................................................................................81
B. Lack of political will....................................................................................82
C. Legal framework..........................................................................................83
1. Legal Problems encountered....................................................................84
2. Solutions and Limitations of the TOC Convention in the context of the
recovery of assets.............................................................................................85
D. Technical Capacities....................................................................................86
E. Resources.....................................................................................................87
F. Prevention of future victimization................................................................87
XI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION...........................................................89
A. Introduction..................................................................................................89
B. Why Bother to Measure?.............................................................................89
C. Service Delivery Surveys (SDS)...................................................................91
D. Some results of the SDS...............................................................................92
E. Different Types of Monitoring at the international level............................92
F. Challenges measuring the impact of anti-corruption strategies..................93
G. Integrated Country Assessments..................................................................94
PART 3: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS....................................97
XII. CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................................99
A. Introduction..................................................................................................99
B. History has revealed the following valuable facts.....................................100
C. Overriding Lessons....................................................................................101
D. Recommendations......................................................................................102
1. It is important to involve the victims of corruption...............................102
2. Sequencing of Reform...........................................................................102
3. Strength and Credibility of Anti-Corruption Watchdog Agencies........102
4. Strategic Partnerships.............................................................................102
5. Partnerships to Facilitate Recovery of Illicit Assets..............................103
6. Partnership to Strengthen Checks and Balances....................................103
7. Partnerships to implement existing International Legal Instruments....103
8. Partnerships to develop a legal instrument against corruption..............103
9. Identifying and recovering stolen assets is not enough.........................103
10. Increased enforcement of Money Laundering Legislation and
Regulations....................................................................................................103
XIII. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES.........................................................105

1
PART 1:
TYPES, CAUSES AND EFFECTS
OF CORRUPTION
2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) has prepared this United
Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy, in accordance with Economic and Social
Council Resolutions 1995/14, 1996/8 and 1998/16, and General Assembly
Resolutions 51/59 and 54/128. It serves as a policy guide for governments in their
anti-corruption efforts. The Manual is supplemented by and should be read in
conjunction with the United Nations Anti-Corruption Tool Kit, its operational
counterpart. Despite divergencies across legal system, international cooperation is
crucial and will be enhanced by the elaboration of a new United Nations Anti-
Corruption Convention.
Since the Manual on Practical Measures against Corruption was first was published in
19921 by the CICP, in cooperation with the US Department of Justice, the world has
witnessed an unprecedented increase in awareness raising by governments and
international agencies regarding the extent and the negative effects of corruption. In
recent years international organizations, governments, and the private sector have
come to view corruption as a serious obstacle to democratic government, quality
growth, and national and international stability. There is now an increased interest in,
and need for, anti-corruption policies and measures that have proven effective.
B. Lessons Learned
During the past 10 years, policymakers and scholars have devoted increasing attention
to the causes and impact of corruption on public and private socio-economic affairs.
As a way of summarizing the issue, the most relevant applied policy studies show that
corrupt practices are encouraged by the following factors: 2
• High levels of politicization in public institutions coupled with the existence of
state agencies that operate within an informal clientelistic framework on a
standard basis;
• The lack of free access by citizens to government-related public information;
• The lack of systems to assure relative transparency, monitoring and accountability
in the planning and execution of public sector budgets coupled with the lack of
social and internal control mechanisms in the hands of civil society and
autonomous state auditing agencies respectively;.
• The lack of public sector mechanisms able to channel the social preferences and
specific complaints of the population to the agencies involved in those complaints;

1
International Review of Criminal Policy, Special Issue, Nos. 41 and 42, New York 1993,
ST/ESA/SER.M/41-42; United Nations Sales Publication, Sales No. E.93.IV.4.
2
For a review of these factors refer to Refer to (i) Petter Langseth, 2000. Integrated vs Quantitative
Methods, Lessons Learned; 2000 (presented at NORAD Conference, Oslo, 21 October 2000). (ii)
Alberto Chong y César Calderón. 1998. “Institutional Efficiency and Income Inequality: Cross
Country Empirical Evidence” Mimeograph, World Bank, Washington, D.C.; (iii) Edgardo Buscaglia.
1998. “Law and Economics of Development” in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. London and
Boston: Edward Elgar Press. (iv) Alberto Ades y Rafael di Tella. 1996. “The Causes and
Consequences of Corruption: A Review of Recent Empirical Contributions”, IDS Bulletin 27.
3
• The lack of social and internal mechanisms applied to the quality control of
service delivery;
• Excessive red tape and procedural complexities at all levels of government;
• The abuse of discretion and uncertainty in the application and interpretation of
regulations and laws within the administrative public sector domain;
• The lack of internal systems to assure relative transparency, monitoring and
accountability in the design and execution of public policies.
• The lack of social control mechanisms aimed at preventing grand corruption
schemes usually seen when the state’s policies are “captured” by vested interests;
• Poor motivation in public sector personnel due to the lack of a merit-based system
used to hire, promote, and remove employees at the local and central levels of
government;
• Lack of employees’ participation and knowledge of the public institutions’
decision-making criteria;
• The absence of results-based management in public service delivey;
• An ineffective judicial sector, including here the police, the prosecutor;s offices
and the judicial branch.
At the same time, some of the most important policy lessons learned in the course of
the last decade include:
• Economic growth is not enough to reduce poverty.3 Poverty alleviation will not
occur without a broader, integrated strategy that focuses on qualitative (integrated)
rather than quantitative development strategies including anti corruption policies
and measures both in “North and the South”.
• The misuse of power for private gain seems to be endemic and ubiquitous.4 It not
only involves public officials abusing their positions, but includes other private
individuals and organizations connected to the public sector such as procurement-
related firms, power brokers, and influence peddlers” who take advantage of any
opportunity to make easy money.
• Curbing systemic corruption is a challenge that will require strong measures,
greater resources and more time than most politicians and “corruption fighters”
will admit or can afford. Very few anti-corruption policies, measures and/or tools
launched today are given the same powerful mandate and/or financial support as
the often-quoted ICAC in Hong Kong5.

3
“Why quality matters,” The Economist, 7 October 2000.
4
Jeremy Pope, (2000) Transparency International, The TI Sourcebook, Berlin, October 2000.
5
Petter Langseth (2001), The Value Added by Partnerships in the Fight Against Corruption, OECD’s
third Annual Meeting of the Anti Corruption Network for Transition Economics in Europe, Istanbul,
March 20-22, 2001
4
• If left unchecked, corruption will only increase and make the poorest even poorer.
Corrupt transactions are entered into consciously. Profit and opportunity are
weighed against the risks of being detected and the likelihood and extent of any
punishment. Where risks and punishment are minimal and rewards are greater,
corruption is likely to increase. Corruption can be initiated from either side. Those
offering bribes may do so either because they want something to which they are
not entitled and therefore need the official to “bend the rules,” or because they
believe the official will not give them their entitlements without some form of
inducement. Officials may solicit bribes in order to supplement their salaries or to
raise their standards of living. Therefore, both the bribe “giver” and the bribe
“taker” must be addressed in the “North”6 as well as in the “South”.
• Raising awareness without adequate enforcement may lead to cynicism among the
general population and actually increase the incidents of corruption. Citizens who
are well informed through the media about types, levels and the location of
corruption but who have few examples of reported cases where perpetrators are
sent to jail, might be tempted to engage in corrupt acts where “high profit and no
risk” appears to be the norm. It is therefore essential for any anti-corruption
strategy to balance awareness raising with enforcement. The message to the public
must be that the misuse of public power for private gain is: (i) depriving the
citizens of timely access to government services; (ii) increasing the cost of
services; (iii) imposing a “regressive tax” on the poorest segments of the
population; (iv) curbing economic and democratic development; and (v) a high
risk low/profit activity (e.g. corrupt persons are punishable by jail sentences and
fines). The challenge is how to best communicate this message to the population
at large.
• Development agencies, NGOs and the private sector from countries in the “North”
can either be part of the problem or part of the solution. Recent corruption cases
involving the World Bank7, the United Nations8 and other multilateral and
bilateral organizations provide evidence that misuse of public power for private
gain can occur in any society or organization where there are insufficient checks
and balances. Credible reporting of these cases, both in the North and the South,
should help to “level the playing field” by facilitating the investigation and
prosecution of corruption whenever it is found.
• A country’s national institutions do not work in isolation. Those that do will fail.9
A transparent system must possess checks and balances that are designed to

6
One key objective of the OECD Convention is to criminalize bribing of public officials in the South
by private companies in the North.
7
Stephen Fidler, “Corruption leads to freeze on trust funds World Bank five european governments act
after organisation's staff were found to have received kickbacks”, Financial Times; Feb 7, 2001

Mark Riley and Andrew Clennell (2001), UN staff accused over refugee bribes,
http://www.smh,com.au/news/oio222/pageone

Jeremy Pope, (2000) The TI Sourcebook, October 2000
8
Richard C. LaMagna, (1999) “Changing a Culture of Corruption, and Independent Commission
Against Corruption”, Operations Department Review, 1998-1999
9
Richard C. LaMagna, (1999) “Changing a Culture of Corruption, and Independent Commission
against Corruption”, Operations Department Review, 1998 –1999
5
achieve a balance between independence and accountability among the various
arms and agencies of government. Additionally—conflicts of interest must be
eradicated in the public sector . Checks and balances dispers power and limit
opportunities for conflicts of interest. This concept, which describes a modern
system of government, has been referred to as “horizontal accountability.” The
dispersal of power, enhanced institutional independence of each branch of
government and increased degrees of accountability make it more difficult for a
well-placed politician to distort the system.
• Social control mechanisms are needed in the fight against corruption.10 These
mechanisms must not only include strategic anti-corruption steering committees
but also operational watchdogs working within government institutions composed
of civil society and government officials working together. These operational
mixed watchdog bodies must cover monitoring and evaluation of local and central
government affairs such as budget-related policies, personnel-related matters,
public investment planning, complaint matters, and public information channels.
• Public trust in anti-corruption agencies and in their policies are essential if the
public is to take an active role in monitoring the performance of their government.
In a survey conducted by the ICAC, in 1998, 84% (66% in 1997) of the
interviewees stated that they would be willing to submit their name when filing a
complaint or blowing the whistle on a corrupt official or colleague It is even more
impressive that this trust relationship that has been built up systematically over 25
years has not changed much since Hong Kong joined China in 1996. If anything,
when surveyed about what they fear most by joining China, the public in Hong
Kong considered increased corruption to be one of the major threats. Without
public confidence in the anti-corruption policies and measures, complaints
systems will fail, investigative media reports will remain unsuccessful and anti-
corruption trails will be futile in the absence of witness testimony.
The linkages among public sector governance, institutional propensity towards
corruption, and institutional performance are also relevant for policy making. The
hypothesis is that governance related factors such as transparency (e.g. quality of the
flow of information); degree of public officials’ participation in decision making;
administrative discretionality (i.e. lack of decision-making criteria); procedural
complexity in budget, personnel, and service delivery; systematic consultation with
users; accountability systems prevailing in each agency; and the level of resources all
have an impact on the institutional performance of each public institution at the
central, regional and local levels. In some cases, the impact on institutional
performance operates through the impact of governance on corruption.
What emerges from past experiences shows that corruption is dynamic and has
various cross cutting dimensions, therefore, the most appropriate approach to curb it
must also be dynamic, integrated and holistic. Therefore, this Manual adopts a
modular approach that draws from a broad set of anti-corruption policies and
strategies covering in a comprehensive manner the areas of prevention, enforcement,
institution building, the repatriation of illicitly transferred funds, awareness raising
and monitoring types, levels and causes of corruption as well as the successes and
failures in the fight against corruption. These anti-corruption strategies are highly

10
Edgardo Buscaglia (2001), Access to Justice and Poverty:. Paper Presented at the World Bank
Conference on Justice, St. Petersburg. Russia. July, 2001
6
flexible and may be utilized at different stages and levels, and in a variety of
combinations according to the needs and context of each country/sub-region.
The Manual is complimented by an Anti- Corruption Tool Kit which, following a
more hands-on approach, offers detailed guidance for the implementation of the single
strategies. However, in order to improve both the overall policy framework and
strategy as well as the single anti-corruption tools, CICP is adopting a systematic
action learning process to identify best practices. Through this process the most
successful policies and tools will be identified and refined.
Each of these responses has its particular strengths, weaknesses and limitations. None
can succeed in isolation. However, synergies can be created among the various
functions, and mutual support can be provided when the responses are sufficiently
synchronized and follow an adequate sequence.
All the proposed measures should eventually accumulate in a National Integrity
System providing quality services, sustainable development and the rule of law for the
benefit of all citizens.
7
II. TYPES OF CORRUPTION
A. Introduction
Before one can successfully identify viable anti-corruption strategies, the environment
in which they will be applied needs to be assessed. Identification of what is corruption
and what should be considered corruption is key for any successful integrity program.
A debate concerning definitions of corruption has been conducted extensively. Part of
the difficulty in finding universal definitions is that such labeling will vary from
country to country and from culture to culture. Sometimes, substantial variations exist
within the same country. In this regard, a 1997 opinion survey conducted by the New
South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption found sharp disagreements
even among public sector employees within that part of Australia11.
For this reason, many turn to the law for a definition. Academicians consider popular
or sociological definitions as being imprecise or arbitrary. Only the legal realm, they
argue, could offer a solid definition. Yet, because legal traditions also change over
time and are highly interrelated with the socio-political and cultural context, they tend
to differ quite significantly too. Rather than attempt to resolve this problem, an
alternative approach is to ignore (at least for a moment) legal references. While we
may lose a degree of precision by straying from legal references, we may gain a more
common understanding of the problem and succeed in bridging communication gaps
across national borders.
The alternative pursued here is to seek to clarify the essence of corruption by looking
straight at reality without any particular local or traditional legal lenses. By adopting
this “empirical approach”, we shall try to move towards a wider consensus as to
which acts are intrinsically harmful to society and should therefore be prevented and
punished. Not everyone will agree that all types of questionable relationships and
misconduct described here constitute corruption or should be illegal. The point is to
take into account as many voices and perspectives as possible. This approach will
help nations to reassess what it is that they define as corrupt acts that should be
prevented and sanctioned.
In general terms, we can all agree that corruption is an abuse of (public)12 power for
private gain that hampers the public interest.13 This gain may be direct or indirect.
Most of the time, corruption entails a confusion of the private with the public sphere
or an illicit exchange between the two spheres. In essence, corrupt practices involve
public officials acting in the best interest of private concerns (their own or those of
others) regardless of, or against, the public interest. In this context, when public
policy making, its design and implementation are compromised by corrupt practices
then we classify this phenomena as grand corruption. Examples of grand corruption
abound in privatizations, government procurement, and labor policies. In this case,
the use of public office for private benefit can involve the compromise of government
procedures or the capture of a government institution’s rulings.

11
Jeremy Pope, (1997), TI Sourcebook, Berlin, 1997
12
Using the term public power limits corruption to the public sector. Since much corruption is initiated
by the private sector many scholars see the utility of defining corruption in a broader fashion thereby
including the private sector.
13
UN’s Anti Corruption Tool Kit,(2001),
8
Alternatively, the use of public office for private benefit in the actual course of public
service delivery usually falls under the denomination of petty corruption (e.g. grease
money or speed payments and bribing or custom border officials)
The different expressions of corrupt practices explained below appear under both,
grand and petty corruption. Corruption is a phenomena which preserves the status
quo and inequalities of power in a socio-political sense. In this context, a system of
favouritism remains in place and victimizes current and future generations. People
able to perform the same tasks and get the same jobs are left unemployed because of
their lack of ability or willingness to bribe officials. Corruption also contradicts the
very notion of democracy by distorting the translation of social preferences into
public policies.14
Abuses of public office to secure unjust advantage may include any planned,
attempted, requested or successful transfer of a benefit as a result of unjust
exploitation of an official position. A corrupt official may seek sexual familiarity,
money, gifts, economic influence, hospitality or lucrative business opportunities in
exchange for official action or forbearance. Little benefit is gained by undue focus on
whether the initiative for the prohibited transfer or gratuity originates with the person
seeking official action (bribery) or with the official (extortion). Indeed, the more
widespread and institutionalized corruption becomes, the more impossible and
irrelevant it is to determine which party took the first step in the customary exchange
of favours to encourage or discourage the performance of a public duty.
It is essential, in this context, to determine the extent of the harmful effects of various
behaviours and to decide whether such behaviour and all of its attendant
consequences should be prevented, controlled and sanctioned. This process includes a
thorough analysis of the damaging effect of the single forms of corruption, since some
of them are more important and harmful than others.Public policy ought to take such
differences into account when allocating resources and planning an anti-corruption
strategy.
In the Developing Countries, corruption has hampered national, social, economic and
political progress. Public resources are allocated inefficiently, competent and honest
citizens feel frustrated, and the general population’s level of distrust rises. As a
consequence, foreign aid disappears, projects are left incomplete, productivity is
lower, administrative efficiency is reduced and the legitimacy of political order is
undermined. As it involves the transfer of large sums of money funds from the South
to the North15; corruption impairs economic development. This, in turn, leads to
political instability as well as poor infrastructure, education, health and other services.
Similar effects can be found in industrialized countries. Individuals who wish to
conduct their affairs honestly are demoralized and loose faith in the rule of law.
Corruption breeds distrust of public institutions, undermines ethical principles by
rewarding those willing and able to pay bribes and perpetuates inequality. Economic
competition is distorted and public funds squandered. Wherever economic success of
private enterprises relies extensively on the payment of bribes, the quality of products
and services provided as well as the skills of employees tends to deteriorate.

14
Edgardo Buscaglia and William Ratliff (1997), “Judicial Reform in Developing Countries: The
Neglected Priority” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, March.
15
International Herald Tribune of Feb 7th 2001 quoted a US Congressional report to estimate the
amount of “Dirty Money” to more than US$ 1 trillion per year
9
Domestic corruption also undercuts rules and regulations designed to enhance social
responsibility of corporations and other businesses. Many countries have witnessed
inhuman labour exploitation and serious environmental pollution. National budgets
have been depleted partly due to the concession of excessive tax advantages and
incentives to corporations or industries and partly due to the purchase of unnecessary
equipment or services. Nowhere is such victimisation more pronounced than in
instances of transnational corruption.
In order to maximise profits, legitimate and illegitimate enterprises resort to bribery
and other forms of corruption to cover up crimes against the environment. Unless
effective controls are in place, the environment is damaged sometimes irreparably.
Because of the very substantial amounts16 that are involved in corrupt practices every
year; the international financial systems are also affected. According to a United State
Senate Investigation17, more than US$ 1 Trillion18flows through the international
financial system annual One consequence is “competitive deregulation” whereby
jurisdictions seek to attract these illegal proceeds by a total deregulation of their
financial system and the enhancing of bank and corporate secrecy. Money laundering
becomes an even more lucrative business with a potential corruptive effect and with
increased dependency on assets deriving from all forms of criminal acts.
The global risks are higher when links between corruption and “organized crime”
become stronger. Nearly all profitable illegal markets rely on the support of public
officials and controllers. Corruption is a necessary tool for organized criminal groups
to operate.
Corruption materializes in different forms. It normally includes several of the
elements described below.19
B. Bribery20

16
According to the Financial Times of July 1999, more than US$ 100 billion had been looted from
Nigeria since mid 1980s
17
International Herald Tribune Feb 7. 2001,
18
The same report estimated that 50% of this money was going through US Banks. The report did not
specify whether the source of the money was from corruption, organized crime, drugs or tax evasion
19
Petter Langseth, (2000) Integrated vs Quantitative Methods, Lessons Learned; 2000 (presented at
NORAD Conference, Oslo, 21 October 2000).
20
In particular, Article 8 of the U. N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and Article VI of the
Inter-American Convention, require Parties to criminalize offering of or acceptance by a public official of an
undue advantage in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of the official’s public functions. Article
1 of the OECD Convention and Article VIII of the OAS Convention require Parties to criminalize the offering of
bribes by nationals of one state to a government official of another in conjunction with a business transaction. The
European Union and Council of Europe have also elaborated binding instruments requiring Parties to criminalize
both public and private sector corruption. Articles 2 and 3 of the E.U.’s Convention on the Fight Against
Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union
(1997) requires Parties to criminalize the request or receipt by a public official of any advantage or benefit in
exchange for the official’s action or omission in the exercise of his functions (denominated as “passive bribery”),
as well as the promise or giving of any such advantage or benefit to a public official (denominated as “active
bribery”). The Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1998), goes further by criminalizing
“active” and “passive” bribery of, inter alia, domestic public officials, foreign public officials, domestic and
foreign public assemblies, as well as private sector bribery, trading in influence and account offences. See also,
U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions (1996) (calling for
the criminalization of corruption in international commercial transactions and the bribery of foreign public
officials); and Principle 4 of the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption’s Guiding Principles for Fighting
10
Bribery involves the promise, offer or giving of any benefit that improperly affects the
actions or decisions of a public official. It can also include those who may not be
public officials per se, but may also include members of the public who serve on
government committees. A bribe may consist of money, company shares, inside
information sexual or other favours, gifts, entertainment, a job, promises etc. The
advantages gained by corrupt officials can be direct or indirect. We can speak of
indirect gains when the benefits flow to an official’s friend, family, associate, favorite
charity, private business or interests, campaign funds or political parties. Bribe-
receivers in the public sector are politicians, regulators, law enforcers, judges, or any
other class of civil servant.
Some examples of bribery include the following:
• Officials who work for or supervise revenue-collecting agencies, such as tax
authorities, customs, public utilities may solicit bribes. In such agencies, it is
possible for officials to bill for lower amounts and share the difference with the
citizens. Alternatively, they may not bill at all or ‘disappear’ invoices - and share
the benefits, again with the citizen. Civil servants may accept cash payments in
order to alter tax files (income declarations) of individuals or organisations. Tax
officials may extort money in order not to impose additional taxes on particular
taxpayers (ibid.). Officials may also illegally transfer funds and park them in
accounts earning interest for themselves. Also, public officials are in a position to
manipulate for their benefit foreign exchange rates. This type of corruption can
involve large amounts of money and is rarely picked up by auditors. Customs
officials may receive bribes in order to ignore legal or illegal imports or exports
that have taken place. In this way, the payment of duties and levies is avoided at
the expense of the national treasury. In addition, dangerous or prohibited goods
cross national borders.
• Payroll abuses can yield substantial amounts to unscrupulous officials. A typical
scenario is that personnel lists are inflated with the names of ghost workers. The
salaries would go officials’ friends, relatives or fictitious names. During a civil
service reform implemented in an African country, more than 30% of the people
allegedly employed by the government turned out to be ghost workers.21
• In some countries, local governments and enterprises bribe their way into
state-funded projects. Many contractors believe that the only way to win these
state-funded projects is with bribes. This not only intensifies the abnormal
competition but also proves repeatedly the effectiveness of “official bribery”,
resulting in an increased expenditure by the State, deteriorating quality of goods &
services, decreasing competition on the market and a general lack of quality of
enterprises and their employees skills.
• It also happens that harsh competition among state enterprises for scarce bank
loans has resulted into bribery and consequently increased the number of bad
loans in the banking system. State enterprises and collective enterprises offer
effectively public-funded bribes to officials in order to secure bank loans.
• Bribes are often offered in order to extract privileged information about
competitors. According to information developed by FBI investigations, for

21
Petter, Langseth (1996), Post-Conflict Uganda, Towards and Effective, Civil Service,, Fountain
Publishing House, Kampala, 1996
11
example, “defense contractors had illegally bought secret Department of Defense
information about plans, budgets, and contract bids of other corporations from
government employees. The contractors bribed Department of Defense employees
using cash gifts or promises of future employment. The deals were largely made
through ‘defense consultants’ who acted as conduits for gathering proprietary
information from the military services and then passed it on to the defense
contractors. Their work resembled that of ‘agents’ who do the dirty work in the
bribery of foreign officials by US corporations.
C. Embezzlement, Theft and Fraud22
These offences involve theft of resources by persons entrusted with authority and
control over government property. These can include public officials and private
individuals. For example, government workers in charge of distributing food to the
local village steal a portion of the food and sell it to other parties. Medical supplies
being transported from the airport to a local hospital are stolen and sold to a local
pharmacy instead. A government official submits false invoices for official travel.
Embezzlement also includes conversion of government property and personnel for
private use. In considering legal prohibitions against this type of corruption, the
challenge will be to define the prohibition broadly enough to include every dishonest
method of diverting public resources that criminal ingenuity can devise. Not merely
physical theft should be punished, but also unauthorized use of the time and labour of
public employees and of government facilities and equipment.
Officials sometimes use publicly owned cars and heavy equipment for personal
purposes. World Bank-funded vehicles have been used for taking officials’ children to
school. This activity consumed 25% of the working day for the use of the car for
official business and duties. Equipment is diverted for use on private land or that of
friends and relatives. As a result, the machinery is unavailable for its intended purpose
while the maintenance, wear and tear costs are borne by the public. In other cases,
officials use public facilities for the repair of private cars. In most countries, certain
public institutions (such as, ministries of work, transportation, water boards, power
utilities, etc.) maintain workshop and repair facilities. Worker time, spare parts,
supplies, space and equipment is abused. In addition, parts are taken from official
vehicles or equipment, thus rendering them useless. The diversion of supplies and
materials is also a frequent problem. This ranges from a few sheets of corrugated
roofing to spare parts, tires, batteries and whole tanker truck loads of fuel. In one case,
the monthly loss of a public utility to employee theft was 250,000 liters. Another way

22
A number of recent international legal instruments have sought to ensure that Parties have offences addressing
this type of conduct with varying degrees of specificity. These include the Organization of American States’ Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (1996) and the European Union’s Convention drawn up on the basis of
Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests
(1995). Article XI(1)(b) and (d) of the Inter-American Convention call upon Parties to consider criminalizing a
government official’s improper use or diversion of government property, including money and securities,
regardless of the person or entity to whom the property is diverted, while Article XI(1)(a) calls upon Parties to
consider criminalizing the improper use of classified information by a government official. Article IX requires,
subject to a Party’s Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, criminalization of “illicit
enrichment,” meaning “a significant increase in the assets of a government official that he cannot reasonably
explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of his functions.” Addressing the narrow area of
protection of the financial interests of the European Community from fraud and corruption, Article 1 of the
European Union’s Convention requires Parties to criminalize the use or presentation of false or incorrect
representations or non-disclosure of information the effect of which is the misappropriation or wrongful retention
of funds from the budget of the European Communities. For a more detailed analysis of these instruments, see UN
document E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal Instruments
Addressing Corruption).”
12
in which public assets can be diverted by officials is the illicit use of government
owned housing. For instance, officials may not vacate the government property after
they leave office. A variation of such misuse involves the renting out of public
housing. All of these methods drain public institutions of scarce resources and prevent
them from carrying out their mandates and efficiently serving the public.
D. Extortion
The act of extortion involves coercing a person to pay money or to provide other
valuables or personal favours in exchange for acting or failing to act. This coercion
can be under the threat of physical harm, violence or restraint. For example, a sick
woman needs to see a doctor and at the hospital, the nurse tells her husband that he
must pay something extra just to get into the doctors office. His wife dies while he is
searching for the money. In many countries, the police are known to extort money by
threatening arrest on false grounds. Minor incidents, such as traffic infractions, are
used as the basis for threatening arrest.
So called “speed money” is paid when government agencies are slow to deliver
services and process applications. This mild form of extortion is not regarded by the
“victims” as being offensive. Since payers of speed money simply ask an official to
do his or her job, they do not regard this practice as unethical or inappropriate. They
argue that all they want in exchange for their money is the system to work exactly as
it is supposed to. They are not asking for unlawful favours. Understandable as it may
appear, this logic is against the spirit of democracy and cannot be seriously defended.
Not everyone is willing or able to pay speed money.23 This means that some citizens
or organisations will be treated preferentially. Delays and unresponsiveness will
continue to plague that society as officials have little incentive to improve its general
efficiency. The crucial point is that officials receive salaries in order to do their job
well. They should not be expected to perform their duties only when they are bribed.
E. Exploiting a Conflict of Interest/Influence Peddling, Insider Trading24
Engaging in transactions, “selling” influence, or acquiring a position or commercial
interest that is incompatible with one’s official role and duties for the purpose of
illegal enrichment. For example, with the intent to profit from secret information, a
public official buys land in the area where a large development is planned to be built.
This official votes in favour of granting permission to the real estate developer to
build its project. Regardless of whether or not this project is in the best interest of the
public, this official has exploited a conflict of interest for personal enrichment.
Privatisation of government property, functions and businesses provides abundant
opportunities for corrupt exploitation.
Conflicts between official duty and private self-interest should be properly dealt with,
although defining what conflicts should be made criminal is very culture-bound.

23
Edgardo Buscaglia (1997) :Commonts on Corruption” Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference
on Development Economics (ABCDE Conference). Washington DC: The World Bank
24
Recent international legal instruments have encouraged disclosure requirements as a means of further
minimizing conflicts of interest. See e.g., Art. 13-14, Council of Europe, Model Code of Conduct for Public
Officials (2000); Principle 5 of the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption’s Guiding Principles for Fighting
Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (1999); Art. 5, United Nations,
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials (1996); Global Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat
Corruption in African Countries (1999) (Art. 5). For a more detailed analysis of these instruments, see UN
document E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal Instruments
Addressing Corruption).”
13
Every society would expect a legislator to advance the interests of his or her particular
constituency. It is only at the point where the self-interest of an official is so strong or
expressed in a way so indicative of a wrongful purpose, in a manner to be presumed
to threaten the public good, that criminalization should be considered.
Conflicts that threaten the public good are also common for officials who find
themselves in a necessarily cooperative, even symbiotic relationship with the private
sector. It is only natural for an authority setting the rates for public utilities, approving
the sale of pharmaceuticals, or negotiating contracts between a State agency and
private entrepreneurs to strive for an arms-length but not hostile relationship with the
persons with whom business must be done. There is a greater risk that a conflict of
interest arises when the regulated industry being dealt with has a natural monopoly of
employment or business opportunities in the professional specialty of the government
official. These are unavoidable occasions for temptation, creating conflicts of interest
between the obligations of the often underpaid public servant and the attraction of
highly lucrative private business opportunities, which become available only if the
government regulator finds favour with the industry. When the well being of the
citizenry is subordinated to such favour seeking, penal sanctions would seem to be
appropriate.
The criteria for criminalization of conflicts of interest is not whether the public
interest is served by a particular decision, or whether there is a loss of public financial
advantage. There are almost always multiple financial and non-financial public
interests affected by a single decision, and only a few of them are objectively and
immediately measurable. Such criteria is better defined as the purity and transparency
of the decision-making process. A public official should not be allowed to act in any
matter affecting his or her financial or personal interest
F. Offering or receiving of an unlawful gratuity, favour or illegal commission.
This offence is aimed at public officials who receives anything of value as extra
compensation for the performance of official duties. For example, after the issuing of
a passport or other document the recipient pays offers a “tip” or “gratuity money” for
the good service received. In many countries this will not necessarily be considered an
act of corruption. Particularly where public servants are underpaid, the culture of
tipping is widely spread and generally accepted. However, this practice undermines
the integrity of the public service and can lead to incidents of extortion where the
citizen may not be willing or capable to provide a ‘tip’.
G. Favouritism, nepotism and clientelism:
This is the assignment of appointments, services or resources according to family ties,
party affiliation, tribe, religion, sect and other preferential groupings. For example, a
public servant provides extraordinary services, commissions, jobs and favours to
political allies, family and friends while members of the general public would not
receive this special treatment. This type of corruption tends to reinforce existing
power balances, as it confers most favours to those well connected. It also may
introduce a market place for corruption as new players may afford or be willing to pay
for the same favours.
Clientelism is at the heart of how corruption propagates throughout the state. The
way in which central authorities, for example, usually consolidate their regional
power is by appointing and removing public servants at the local level without any
14
kind of merit based standards. These mechanisms are based on clientelistic practices.
In many cases, the degree of turnover in personnel is such that the institutional
memory of public institutions is lost every electoral period. This use of public office
for pirvate benefit clearly damages the public interest.
H. Illegal Political Contributions
This occurs when political parties or the government in power receives money in
exchange for non-interference and good-will towards the entity or group making the
contribution. It is closely related to bribery. Powerful interest groups, particularly
corporations make generous contributions in order to achieve less regulation of their
industry or for specific favours. Politicians may extend courtesies and protection
towards to legitimate or even illegitimate enterprises in exchange for contributions to
a political campaign.
The expenditure of huge sums of money to influence elections by very calculating
enterprises, including transnational corporations and special interest groups, cannot all
be motivated by ideology or the charisma of a candidate. It is a reality of life that
significant financial or personal advantages are expected by major political
contributors. Most legal systems leave space to accommodate this reality in personnel
appointments at policy-making levels and in other discretionary areas consistent with
the traditions of the society. All, however, have limits beyond which the distribution
of government benefits and advantages should be legally required to be impartial or
governed by objective standards designed to secure a decision on the merits of the
case. When political favouritism becomes so pervasive as to threaten professionalism
in the operation of government programmes, mechanisms must be found to limit its
influence. Laws covering non-partisan bases for government action as a means of
encouraging integrity and professionalism in government are discussed in chapter II
of the present Manual. Disclosure laws governing political financing can be useful for
compelling candidates or political parties to disclose any contributions they have
received, thereby permitting the voting public and the news media to react to those
contributions not only when they are made before an election, but also afterwards,
when the contributors receive unwarranted consideration.
I. Money Laundering
Any comprehensive strategy against corruption must include measures aimed at
preventing and controlling the laundering of corruption proceeds. The connection
between corruption and the laundering of its proceeds is not new and has been
highlighted on several occasions in the past. The link between money laundering and
corruption is not only related to the laundering of corruption proceeds, but goes much
further. Money laundering as such produces a corruptive effect on national and
international financial systems. Due to the close link between corruption and money
laundering, various international fora have noted that a comprehensive anti-corruption
strategy must also include actions to prevent and control the laundering of corruption
proceeds. The corruptive effect of money laundering is not only affecting private
enterprise and its employees but also entire States. In various occasions it seems to be
deliberately accepted that deregulation of the financial sector combined with
enhanced bank and corporate secrecy is leading to an increasing flow of illegal assets
into a countries financial system 25

25
Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Corruption and its Financial Channels (Paris, 30 March to 1
15
PART 2:
POLICIES AND MEASURES

April, 1999), I.A.2 (b).
17
III. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
A. Introduction
An “integrated approach”, designed and currently being pilot tested by UN’s Global
Programme against Corruption, promotes a co-ordinated effort based on six pillars:
(1) democratic reform; (2) a strong civil society with access to information and a
mandate to oversee the state; (3) the presence of rule of law (i.e. predictibility,
stability, and coherence in the interpretation and enforcement of the law); (4)
increased checks and balances through enhancing the presence and balance between
institutional accountability and independence coupled with an increased public
confidence in anti-corruption agencies; (5) new strategic national and international
partnerships to advocate and support implementation of national and international
anti-corruption policies and measures and (6) new strategic national and international
partnerships to develop joint strategies for implementation of international and
national anti- corruption policies and measures.
Lessons learned from pilot countries reveal that the key to reduced poverty is an
approach to development addressing quality growth, environment, education, health
and governance. Such an approach must be evidence based, non partisan, and
transparent as well as inclusive, integrated, comprehensive and impact oriented.26
B. The Integrated Approach
Each of the key aspects of the integrated approach are explained in more detail below:
1. Evidence based
Country assessments identify the types and levels of corruption as reported via the use
of surveys gathering subjective and objective indicators and case studies on a global
and agency-specific basis. This evidence gives service providers the information
necessary to implement reform and service users information to help promote reform
and curb corruption. Indeed, the value of country assessment in giving consumers a
“voice” and allowing them to exert pressure on anti-corruption agencies to curb
corruption and can not be underestimated. The role of a country assessment in
providing concrete data about perceptions in a relatively unambiguous way is also
significant, as is its role in promoting greater participation among service users in the
service delivery process.
One of the main attributes of the evidence-based approach using a country assessment
is that it provides useful management tools. Ultimately, the tools could be used
internally by managers at all levels of the government and externally by governmental
oversight agencies, politicians, the public, and international donors. Country
assessments establish a baseline for service delivery and policy evaluation purposes.
This baseline could be used to improve the design of an anti-corruption program. The
indicators could be measured periodically to ascertain the reform’s progress. A
service delivery survey would also build capacity within the country to design and
implement surveys, as well as to implement results-oriented management.
The process of design and implementation of the country assessment could also build
participatory channels into the reform process. Investigating public perceptions

26
Petter Langseth, 2001, Helping Member States Build Integrity to Fight Corruption, Vienna, 2001
18
implies that there is a value to the customers' opinions. Although some efforts have
been made in the past to touch upon the issue of service delivery through the citizens'
eyes as well as at the ministerial level, service delivery surveys (SDS) can be more
comprehensive in scope as they include ‘perception’ as an integral part of its focus.
This means that such a study is innovative in attempting to measure the reforms from
both a “top-down” as well as “bottom-up” perspective. The study also has
implications for other reforms as well. For example, regional indicators could yield
information relevant to decentralization reforms.
The product of the early phases of a country assessment will be a set of indicators that
the government can use to develop a baseline of corruption levels and services and to
measure the progress of reforms. Ideally, these indicators should also be objective in
nature (i.e. based on the examination of institutional outputs such as abusive
procedural violations) and not just perceptional. Perceptions should also be analyzed
in ways that show different subjects interviewed with compatible perceptions (e.g.
lawyers, court litigants, and judges all perceiving abuse of power within the courts).
In addition, the process of designing the country assessment methodology, including
the survey, will involve representatives of the government. Thus, survey design
capacity will be built in the country.
The chain of argument is simple. First, the country assessment method offers a bridge
between evidence from communities, interpretation of that evidence, and the expert
opinion of the service workers. Second, as local ownership increases along with
results orientation, fewer resources are lost due to system leakage. Indeed, the use of
these techniques to audit the equity, effectiveness and efficiency of public services
might begin with a concern for system leakage (corruption). Third, as planners
become accustomed to using an evidence-based approach consisting of reliable data, a
climate of accountability and responsiveness is created. This sort of transparent
environment is crucial for reducing corruption. By providing information in a system
which naturally suffers from information imperfections, and in conjunction with other
efforts, the evidence-based approach offers a powerful tool that removes information
barriers and closes the fracture between the served (public) and the server
(government).
2. Non-Partisan
Because the fight against corruption will be a long-term effort and may span various
administrations, it is critical that the objectives of ant-corruption efforts remain
politically neutral. Regardless of which political party or group is in power, reducing
corruption and improving service delivery to the public should always be a priority.
3. Transparent
Transparency in government is widely viewed as a necessary precursor to good
governance and corruption reduction. The public has a right to know about the
activities of its government. Public access to the decision-making process is key in
providing accountability of government operations.
4. Inclusive
The integrated approach advocated here argues that both national and international
anti-corruption efforts need to be as broad-based and as inclusive as possible. Very
few initiatives involve the poorest and least educated people suffering from the effects
19
of corruption. It is therefore critical to do more of what ICAC in Hong Kong has done
over the past 25 years. The ICAC interfaces directly (face to face in awareness raising
workshops) with almost 1 % of the population every year.
Broad-based participation and inclusion in reform initiatives is encouraged in order to
raise the expectations of all those involved in the process and to increase the
likelihood of successful reform. Expanding the number and diversity of more
marginalized participants in the process simultaneously empowers those participants
by providing them with a voice and reinforcing the value of their opinions. Successful
reform is more likely to occur in an empowering environment where participants
perceive that their input and efforts will have an impact.
Establishment of strategic partnerships, as a pro-active measure designed to include as
many stakeholders as possible, has proven to be valuable. Early experiences from the
fight against corruption shows that new strategic partnerships between NGOs and
international aid institutions, such as the partnership between the World Bank and
Transparency International, have resulted in excellent national and international anti-
corruption awareness raising.
The integrated approach promotes a co-ordinated effort based on new strategic
national and international partnerships to develop joint strategies for implementation
of international and national anti-corruption policies and measures. Stronger
partnerships, based on trust, are needed between 27:
• The public, the media, private sector, youth, religious organisations and the three
branches of government at the national and municipal level to strengthen checks
and balance, to build integrity and to curb corruption.
• Multilateral and bilateral agencies, recipient governments, local media and
national and international NGOs to educate citizens and to raise public awareness
and actively involve the victims of corruption in the fight against corruption.
• Governments in the North and the South, international institutions and private
sector regulatory agencies to develop international legal instruments that will
facilitate the recovery of money looted by corrupt individuals and regimes from
developing nations.
• International media, governments from North and South and international
institutions to raise international awareness and political support for the
implementation of international legal instruments that will allow the curbing of
money laundering and the recovery and return of funds looted by corrupt leaders
and banked abroad
5. Integrated
The “integrated approach” facilitates and assists governments in the their pursuit of
good governance. In fostering collaborative efforts among all stakeholders in a given
society -- government, public and private sectors -- the integrated approach helps to
draw out shared goals and objectives. Such goals are identified through a variety of
instruments that include diagnostic surveys such as service delivery and integrity
surveys, national integrity systems workshops and action plans and anti-corruption

27
Petter, Langseth, (2001) Value Added of Partnership in the Fight against Corruption, OECD’s 2001
Third Annual Meeting of the Anti-Corruption Network of Transition Economies in Europe, Istanbul,
March 20-23, 2001
20
strategies. Each of these instruments is predicated upon broad-based participation
both to maximize the local ownership and to increase the objectivity and relevance of
the reform.
6. Comprehensive
The phenomenon of corruption entails many factors. Opportunities for corrupt
individuals present themselves when, for example, rule of law has broken down to the
point where lawlessness is rampant due to little or no enforcement of the law, where
civil servant salaries are shamelessly low, where the public has lost its sense of civic
pride due to cynical views about its government, where rules and regulations
overburden the public to the point where frustration leads desperation and bribes just
to get a minimum amount of service, and when the media ignores its responsibility to
report facts of interest to society without regard for being ‘politically correct’ or
honest.
There is no single factor causing corruption. Any effort at corruption reduction must
be comprehensive in scope and must take into consideration that the variety of factors
that enable or propagate the corrupt environment all need to be addressed. Using the
UN’s Country Assessment, for example, a nation may discover that meager civil
servant salaries contribute to a corruption problem and that there is also a civil society
weakness that makes it acceptable to offer bribes. These two factors must be
addressed together in order to succeed in reducing corruption. While this is a very
simplistic example, the point is that many forces combine to produce a corrupt
environment. They can include weak national or local laws, a distrustful public
attitude towards government, police and the judiciary, a lack of honesty and integrity
within the media, and a host of other factors.
7. Impact oriented
Typically, the ability of a national anti-corruption program to meet its goals is
difficult to ascertain. This can be attributed to a lack of baseline data describing the
pre-reform state of services. When designing a reform program, baseline data can
help countries to set realistic goals for the key outcome of reform — curbing
corruption and improvement in service delivery to the public. The same indicators
that determined the baseline could be monitored and periodically reported in order to
measure the reform program’s progress. In a quickly democratizing environment,
such information would be useful to all stakeholders. The indicators could also
facilitate the task of "result-oriented management," upon which governments and
donors increasingly focus, and could contribute in the medium-term to the
introduction of a performance appraisal system.
An effort to determine appropriate and useful indicators of corruption and service
delivery promises to improve the design and implementation of reform programs. A
well designed survey combined with other relevant information could provide
information about types, levels, cost of corruption and the availability, quality, cost
and timeliness of services by country, region, sector, and/or stakeholder. It could also
be used to compare the effects of the program, or different programs, across time,
sector, region or country. It could have focused impact through an easy-to-read
format presenting the most important information policymakers need. Policymakers
could, for example, be presented with the chosen indicators for the baseline and for
subsequent periods. They could also receive a list of programs and the major
events/activities that occurred in that year. In this way they could assess the outcomes
21
of these programs, determine which reforms yield the highest net marginal benefits,
and analyze the relation between inputs and outcomes.
C. Action Research or Learning by Doing
A great deal of literature exists on the concept of “Action Research” or “learning by
doing” as referred to in this manual. Common among most is the concept of creating
dialogue between different groups to promote change through a cycle of evaluation,
action and further evaluation, an iterative process illustrated in Figure 1 below. In
particular, Action Research has been described as embracing “principles of
participation and reflection, and empowerment and emancipation of groups seeking to
improve their social situation.”28
reflect
question
fieldwork
analysis
new actions

Figure 1: Cyclical Research Process29
UN’s Global Programme against Corruption applies the methodology described above
both in the piloting of its new approaches to help governments build integrity to curb
corruption and its dissemination of lessons learned from such pilots and experiences
elsewhere.
D. UN’s Global Programme against Corruption
Considerable progress30 has been made in refining, implementing and raising
awareness about the Global Programme against Corruption, launched in March 1999.
The Global Programme consists of an integrated package of assessment, technical co-
operation, evaluation and contributions to the formulation of international strategies
and instruments to combat corruption. It entails a systematic process of "action

28
Kaye Seymour-Rolls and Ian Hughes, “Participatory Action Research: Getting the Job Done,”
Action Research Electronic Reader, University of Sydney, 1995.
29
Yoland Wadsorth, “What is Participatory Action Research?” Action Research International, Paper 2,
1998. Available on-line: http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/sawd/ari/ari-wadsworth.html.
30
The following facts are indicative of the progress made: (a) the Programme has received firm
endorsement by States, including through the Vienna Declaration, several General Assembly
resolutions and the decision to initiate the elaboration of an international legal instrument against
corruption; (b) the number of countries who have formally or informally indicated the request to join
the Programme has increased from five (1999) to twenty (2001); (c) the number of active pilot
countries has increased from three to seven in the same period, with several more being finalised; and
(c) increased substantive expertise dissemination of information and visibility for the programme has
been achieved, especially through the organization of two international and one national anti-corruption
workshop, the launching of a new web page (www.ODCCP.org/corruption.html) featuring an anti-
corruption tool-kit, participation at international conferences and presentation of professional papers.
22
learning", which will identify best practices and lessons learned through pilot country
projects, programme execution and monitoring through periodic country assessments
and the global corruption trends study. Attention is given equally to institution
building, prevention, awareness raising and education, enforcement, anti-corruption
legislation, judicial integrity, repatriation of illegal assets as well as monitoring and
evaluation.
A global corruption trends study is being initiated to analyse and forecast trends,
types, levels, cost and causes of corruption around the globe, identify anti-corruption
policies and best practices and assess public awareness. It will be carried out in close
partnership with concerned institutions and will link up closely with other crime and
justice issues and related work, especially organised crime, trafficking in human
beings, illicit global markets and money-laundering.
An anti-corruption tool-kit has been developed, which outlines some 30 anti-
corruption tools. Each tool will be supplemented through case studies from country
experiences. The tool-kit will be disseminated both in print and through GPAC’s web
page. (www.ODCCP.org/corruption.html).
A web page detailing the Programme has been launched and is being continuously
updated, as a component element of the Centre’s web site (www.ODCCP.org.html).
The web page will be used to disseminate detailed information on the Programme,
especially lessons learned, updates on findings of the global corruption trends study,
results of perception surveys from country assessments, etc.
It is envisaged that during its initial stage, the Programme will undertake projects in
selected pilot countries from all regions of the world. Seven countries, all of which
have requested the Centre’s assistance to design and implement an integrated
anti-corruption programme, have been selected for pilot projects: Benin, Colombia,
Hungary, Lebanon, Nigeria, Romania and South Africa. Projects in these countries
are currently at different stages of formulation and implementation. Decisions on
additional pilot countries are being reached on the basis of project concepts and
feasibility assessments, in close consultations with the authorities of the concerned
countries. These currently include Indonesia, Iran and Uganda.
An expert group meeting on the “Global Programme against Corruption -
Implementation Tools” was held in Vienna, on 13 and 14 April 2000. The experts
provided feedback on the proposed strategies and contents of the Programme and
presented anti-corruption tools, to be compiled in the Anti-Corruption Tool-Kit.
A workshop on “Integrity in Judiciary” was also organised in Vienna, on 15 and 16
April 2000, which was attended by eight chief justices from Africa and Asia. A
follow-up to this Leadership group on Integrity in Judiciary took place in Karnataka
in India in March 2001, and the GPAC is expected to, in partnership with other
national and international stakeholders, pilot test integrity tools such as codes of
conduct and assessments of corruption in the judiciary in selected pilot countries.
In March 2001, GPAC, in collaboration with UN’s Global Programme against Money
Laundering, convened an Expert Group meeting to: (i) define what role UN should
play in the area of Recovery of Assets and (ii) how ODCCP should respond to the
request from Nigeria to facilitate the recovery of money looted by former dictators.
The recommendations from the Expert Group will be presented at the Crime
Convention in May 2001.
23
E. GPAC’s Country Assessment.
The country assessment is conducted with the cooperation of different national and
international partners (e.g. In Hungary: UNICRI, Gallup). It is primarily a locally
requested tool that will, among other things, be used by the civil society to hold
government accountable. Important elements of the assessment include a desk review
aimed at compiling all relevant anti-corruption information on relevant public sector
institutions as well as from civil society and the private sector. This includes the
following:
(a) The public opinion surveys, sufficiently representative to indicate corruption
levels, types and coverage across sub-national units and key institutions.31
(b) One important variable to survey regularly is the public confidence across all
institutions and stakeholder groups involved in the fight against corruption
including.
(c) The focus groups to promote in-depth discussion with opinion makers or
targeted interest groups in government and society. Using this technique
detailed information can be gathered about perceptions of corruption, what
they see as the causes and what the government needs to do in order to fight it.
(d) The case study, as elaborated by local experts, to describe typical corruption
cases in great detail as a means of facilitating a better understanding of how
corruption actually occurs. Well-documented practical case studies are
expected to help anti-corruption agencies fine-tune their measurement as well
as to make the public and potential whistleblowers more aware.
(e) The Legal Assessment to assess existing laws and regulations, e.g. what
constitutes a corrupt act and what sanctions should be applied; analysis of
legal insufficiencies and inconsistencies32; examination of how these laws and
regulations are implemented and enforced, whether they are viewed seriously,
and whether sufficient resources have been invested in their execution
Additionally, the assessment will be addressing the inefficiencies in formal
legal structures that are found to be closely related to the activities of
organized criminal firms, such as both inefficient substantive laws and state-
induced shortage of legal professionals and other rights-enforcement agentFor
example, the state’s lack of capacity to enforce property and contractual rights
tend to foster the presence of organized crime in areas such as debt collection,
lending operations, and labor disputes.
(f) General assessment of official oversight bodies to hold governmental officials
and agencies accountable for their actions. Examples could be the Inspector-
General of Government, Ombudsman and/or Auditor General.
(g) The institutional assessments to inventory what judicial, executive and
legislative bodies are doing to fight and prevent corruption. It is important to
go into greater depth with some of these anti-corruption agencies to identify

31
As an example in Uganda each of the 46 districts would have survey data comparing their district
with the national average. This type of survey was requested by the Government Inspector-General,
who argued that the only way he can fight corruption is to have information about corruption levels
across sub-national units.
32
Certainly anti corruption provisions can appear in many different laws: criminal and penal codes,
civil service laws, standing orders, public procurement regulations and many others. These should be
consistent.
24
where there are specific problems. To accomplish this, the Global Programme
will use different techniques including “process mapping” to analyze the
functions, procedures, reporting relationships, access to information and
incentives in anti-corruption agencies across all three branches of government.
The mapping specifies how an organization does its business, identifies what
is efficient and effective and reveals where there are conflicts of interest and
excessive opportunities for extortion, bribe taking, and bribe giving.
(h) The assessment of civil society and of informal institutions to determine the
capacity to hold the government accountable and the extent of government
failures respectively. This can be evidenced by their access to information and
the freedom and independence of press. Different techniques can be used to
assess the quality and the vigilance of the media reporting on corruption cases.
This can range from: (i) systematic content analysis, (ii) the impact of
different media types; (iii) a review of ownership and control of the media.
F. UN’s Anti-Corruption Tool Kit
The technical co-operation activities facilitated by UN Centre for International Crime
Prevention (CICP) under the framework of GPAC are supported by a modular
approach that draws from a broad set of anti-corruption policies and measures, or
“tools.” These anti-corruption tools may be utilised at different stages and levels in a
variety of combinations according to the needs and context of each country/sub-
region, thereby maximising the flexibility of the adoption of such measures.
The Anti-Corruption Tool-Kit covers areas relating to prevention, enforcement,
institution building, awareness raising, recovery of illicit assets and assessment of
corruption levels and impact monitoring of anti-corruption policies and measures.
This extensive, though by no means exhaustive, collection of approaches and their
associated practical applications has been developed from anti-corruption research
and technical assistance activities, including the GPAC comprehensive Country
Assessment, undertaken by CICP in a number of pilot countries.
Currently the Anti-Corruption Tool Kit (www.ODCCP.org/corruption.html) contains
the following 30 Tools:
25
TABLE OF CONTENT

Tools italic red are under preparation
Institution
Building Prevention Awareness Raising Enforcement Anti-Corruption
Legislation
Recovery of
Assets Monitoring and Evaluation
Anti Corruption
Agency (ICAC) Disclosure of Assets Access to Information Guidelines for Investigations into
Corruption
Amnesty Standards to curb
the Laundering of
Corruption Proceeds
United Nations
Country
Assessment
Ombudsman International
Monitoring
Mechanism
Mobilizing Civil
Society Financial Investigation and
Monitoring of Assets
Easing the
Burden of Proof Model Legislation on International
Legal Assistance
Performance
Monitoring of
Anti-Corruption
Agencies
United Nations
Ombudsman Integrity Pacts Anti- Corruption Action Plans Integrity Testing Whistle Blower Protection Facilitating the Recovery of Assets
through
Partnerships
Public Hearings
Strengthening Judicia
Integrity Private Sector Anti-Corruption
Cooperation
Media Training Electronic
Surveillance
Operations
Freedom of
Information
Act
Cooperation
between the
Financial Sector
and Governments
Civil Society-
Government
Watchdog Boards
Codes of
Conduct Reduction of Procedural
Complexities and
Discretion
Special
Awareness
Program for the
Youth
Civil
Society/Government
Complaint Boards
Model Anti-
Corruption
Legislation
Measuring the
Impact Money
Laundering Policies
and Initiatives
Monitoring the
Implementation of
International
Legal Instruments
National Integrity
Steering
Committee
Result based
Management Disseminate Anti-Corruption Tools Guarding the Guards Monitoring and Evaluation
Workshops
Action Planning
Meeting Prevent Links between
Organized Crime
and Corruption

National
Integrity Unit Civil Service Reform
Strengthening
Local
Government
Level

Local Anti-
Corruption
Planning and
Implementation
Mechanisms

Parliament’s
Role in Fighting
Corruption

Empower the
Victims of
Corruption
through Social
Control Boards

26
27
IV. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION –
Administrative and regulatory mechanisms for the prevention of
corrupt practices
A. Elimination of Abuse of Discretion
The application of clear, stable, and coherent criteria in the interpretation and
enforcement of laws and regulations is key to avoid an institutional environment
within which the propensity towards corrupt practices is avoided. Recent studies
centered on the judiciaries worldwide demostrate that this facto is related to
procedural corruption and state capture by vested interests.33 Moreover, these studies
show that the degree to which public officials lack criteria, or do not apply existing
criteria, or d not understand decision making rules will all be related to abuse of
discretion. These conditions apply to customs, municipal governments, and tax
authorities alike.
The sampling and review of case files can then generate objective indicators of
practices enhancing the likelihood of a corrupt environment. Usual mechanisms to
counteract these practices include the issuing of procedural manuals coupled with the
strengthening of an unbiasedand independent institutional review of the decisions
made by public official
B. Procedural Complexity
Best anti-corruption practices show the need to decrease procedural complexity and
discretionality through procedural reengineering in service delivery areas. The
rationalization of procedures would be based on the introduction of quality control
standards based on objective indicators applied to specifying for each service the
optimal/recommended number of procedural steps, required decrease in procedural
times, and on the justified number of departments involved in a single procedure. The
critical services to be addressed must be defined during workshops with government
and civil society members exchanging information related to problems affecting
citizens in their interaction with the state. The determination of benchmarks should
also be delineated during these workshops bringing together representatives of civil
society and government agencies involved in the reforms.
Once these “under-performing” services are identified, it is necessary to measure the
procedural complexity and its variability for each “critical” procedure. Indicators of
procedural complexity have already been developed in past reform experiences in
developing countries. For example, an indicator based on the weighted average of
combining the effects of procedural times, number of procedural steps, and number of
departments/divisions involved in a decision has been associated to corrupt practices
in several institutional contexts worlwide. 34 Addressing the procedural complexity
and reducing its variability can be achieved by eliminating steps and departments with
no value added and by applying quality control techniques to service delivery in order
to reduce the range within which procedural times, service delivery outputs, and
procedural steps can all vary. The experiences in the judicial sector of Costa Rica

33
Edgardo Buscaglia. 2001. “An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Corrupt Practices in
Developing Countries: A Governance-Based Appraoch” International Review of Law and Economics,
June
34
Edgardo Buscaglia and Jose Luis Gerrero (1995), “A Quality Control Approach to Judicial Reform”
Quality Control Journal. Vol 21, pp. 34-67V
28
and the municipal governments of Venezuela shows that anti-corruption programs
applying these type of technical components combined with social control
mechanisms have been able to render unprecedented results in fighting corruption.
C. Lack of Transparency in the Allocation of Public Resources
The introduction of more effective integrated budgeting and auditing systems that are
constantly accessible online on an agency-specific basis by internal/external auditors
is key to the enhancement of transparency and consequent accountability. These
integrated systems should cover all departmental and municipal budgetary and extra
budgetary financial transactions at the operational and non-operational levels; In this
context, public policies must aim at minimizing the differences between a
Parliamentary-approved and executed budgets and rwards/penalty systems should be
implemented for deviations above a pre specified rate. Extra-budgetary spending and
budget deviations must be further monitored through quarterly financial statements
and justified only by Executive and Emergency Decrees. At the municipal and
regional levels, the discretionary use of co-participation funds and allocation of these
funds by the National government mostly to local governments without clear criteria
is usually associated with the existence of clientelistic practices, therefore, fostering
corruption at the municipal level.
Additionally, the lack of standard procedures in the municipal budgetary
management, makes it usually possible for mayors to approve budgets and bypass
social controls in order to deal with politically-allied base organizations. The
unjustified discretionary and abusive practices caused by the lack of procedural
guidelines in budget determination and allocations at the municipal level (e.g. lack of
municipal government obligation to share information with the public, lack of
enforceable deadlines, and lack of penalties to be applied to those governments failing
to incorporate accountability mechanisms to their budget-allocation process) the high
levels of budget diversions.
At the national and local levels, governments must also strengthen the enforcement of
internal agency-specific administrative rulings in order to reduce the range of decision
making options allowed under a given system of budgetary rules. In this context, it is
necessary to specify a uniform criteria for discretionary decision-making in the
allocation of budget resources (extrabudgetary allocations and/or budget diversions)
between national and municipal levels and for personnel management decisions (e.g.
political quotas) from the national to the local levels.
Finally, program budgeting must aim at the establishment of program structures in
public institutions with clearer statements of agency and program objectives (strategic
and outcome-oriented) and the determination of performance indicators that would
serve as inputs in the PBCs periodic decision making on personnel management. In
this way, agency’s accountability is enhanced through the disclosure of budget-related
performance objectives before-the-fact in spending estimates (the basis of Congress’
appropriations) along with the after-the-fact disclosure of results in departmental
annual reports.
29
D. Employee motivation35
A necessary step towards the prevention of corrupt practices is motivation of the
employees. This measure gains particular importance where salaries of public
employees are low and corruption has become an accepted way of making a living. In
such an environment, however, the first and at the same time most unpopular step
must be the increase of salaries to enable the public official to an appropriate lifestyle.
Adequate resources should be expended to employ a competent workforce and
managerial staff at a living wage. Where government is not able to ensure appropriate
salaries it may not only force the public official to top his income through corrupt
practices but it provides a moral justification for corruption. When a clerk in a public
office does not earn a subsistence salary, he is likely to be frequently absent, cheat on
his hours of work, steal, extort or take bribes. When an agency head making
governmental decisions comparable to those of a corporate executive receives a salary
comparable to that of a corporate clerk or Manual laborer, the occasion for corruption
is there, simply awaiting the right temptation. When a Government fails to pay
salaries roughly commensurate with responsibility, it suggests that governmental
functions are not worthy of respect or professionalism and can be performed by
anyone, no matter how poorly paid. If that attitude is communicated, the elements of
altruism and idealism that bring some employees into government service are
rejected, and the moral tone of the workforce is thereby lowered, while at the same
time a certain moral reward is eliminated that could otherwise partly compensate for
any disparity in pay.
However, in particular in countries where corruption is rampant the simple increase of
the salaries of public officials will not resolve the problem of corruption. It is unlikely
that the government will be able to meet the income made by the corrupt public
officials. Consequently the economical incentive to use corrupt practices remains high
and unless it is not replaced by a moral/ ethical incentive, the likelihood that a
significant part of the public service continuos to consider corrupt practices as an
acceptable alternative. Therefore, government employers rood to be educated in
ethics. Employees must be instructed, with periodic retraining, on what the ethical
obligations of government service require. In this area, precision and subtlety may
have to be sacrificed to clarity and enforceability. It may be better to allow an
employee to accept any type of hospitality in the form of food or drink, or to flatly
prohibit acceptance of any hospitality at all, rather than to promulgate tortuous rules
based upon the value, intent and nature of the acquaintance, which allow very
compromising relationships so long as they are carried out artfully. Employees should

35
35 The need for such mechanisms to combat public corruption was recently recognized by the Global Coalition
for Africa in its Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries (1999), Article 15 of which encourages
states to adopt legislative mechanisms and procedures for public submission of corruption complaints; as well as in
the Organization of American States’s Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996), Article III
(preventative measures); Global Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries
(1999) (Art. 15); and Principle 2 of the Global Forum’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption and
Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (1999). For a more detailed analysis of these
instruments, see UN document E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal
Instruments Addressing Corruption).”

30
receive the same message from government deeds as they do from ethical
exhortations by their superiors36.
Institutional effectiveness in service delivery is also very much related to the
perception of dysfunctional personnel-related managerial capacity. In this context,
best-practices applied in Costa Rica and Colombia indicate that it is necessary to
adopt human resource policies implementing merit-based performance evaluations for
all hiring, promotion, and firing practices at the middle management and lower rank
levels based on internal and external periodical citizen-survey-based reviews. The
handling of these issues could be conducted by social control bodies (also called
Public Service Commissions) for each area of service delivery (health, education, tax
collection, etc.). This would allow governments to avoid conflicts of interest by
separating personnel adjudicational tasks (i.e. firings, promotions, hirings) from
operational and management tasks for each service area., thereby reducing the
chances of clientelistic practices.
In this context, salary scales must be based on group-related individual performance
evaluated through internal and external channels. A human resources policy system
must also address the corruption-enhancing short term horizon mind-frame found in a
significant proportion of the public officials interviewed who stress the lack of
perceived stability associated to their job environment37; The career system must then
address different approaches to the three levels of decision-making: top level political
appointees, middle management, and the lower ranks of administrative employees. At
the lower rank and file level, emphasis must be placed on small group-based
performance evaluation based on pre-established measures of productivity coupled
with external citizens-users’ surveys and social control boards. The combination of
productivity-based and users’ perceptional results must be ranked in accordance to
well-known and transparent criteria (e.g. number of permits processed for each
category combined with users’ perception of service effectiveness) that would later
serve to justify the change in employees’ salary levels. In order to enhance
uniformity in the enforcement of such criteria it may be necessary to create a
specialized agency with assigned responsibility for convening appeal and reviews
related to promotions, discipline, redeployment and related management decisions
affecting employees; for investigating grievances and, where appropriate,
recommending corrective measures.
E. Result based management
Another effective preventive measure is the strengthening of accountability of
government employees. Accountability within the public sector may be greatly
enhance through a management style based on results, i.e. on outcomes and impacts.
As stated in the previous section, emphasis must be placed on small group-based
performance evaluation based on pre-established measures of productivity coupled
with external citizens-users’ surveys and social control boards. Results-based
management (RBM), also known as performance management, has been adopted by
many governments and organizations to provide a coherent framework of

36
. In this regard, Spain has statutes, which are very precise and detailed as to those activities that are
incompatible with public office, with administrative sanctions whose severity depends upon the
seriousness of the activity.

37
Edgardo Buscaglia and Jose Luis Gerrero (1995), “A Quality Control Approach to Judicial Reform”
Quality Control Journal. Vol 21, pp. 34-67V
31
accountability in a decentralized environment. Even though fractionalized operations
have the potential to more effective and efficient that centralized administrations, they
may more easily fall prey to corruption because of the lack of effective monitoring.
The usefulness of an RBM style of management in deterring corrupt activities and
monitoring the effectiveness of goal attainment can be thus stated quite simply. RBM
functions as both a management system and a performance reporting system. It can
support an on-going transition in operational methods from a Management by
Objectives style to a strategy-driven results-oriented management style. RBM
emphasizes development effectiveness and accountability, in line with the demands of
a new external environment. It supports a culture focusing on results on the ground,
greater transparency and participation. The results chain includes inputs, processes,
outputs, outcomes, and ultimate impacts. Such a system gives room to effective
monitoring and consequently to the detection of insufficient results as well as corrupt
practices which may not only be caused by the monitored agency’s short comings but
also of instances where such shortcomings may be caused by corruption.
F. Internal reporting procedures
Institutions with effective integrity programmes generally have well-developed
procedures to deal with potential dishonesty and the complicating factors of
supervisory and personal relationships. Only where there are clear obligations and
procedures for the reporting of breaches of the Code of Conduct, it is likely to be
respected. Such rules have the effect, when observed and enforced by management, of
protecting employees from allegations of disloyalty, breach of friendship,
self-promotion or bad judgement. Each organization can develop rules suitable to its
own culture and counterpart organizations. Employees may be required to report to a
supervisor at a certain level unless that supervisor is alleged to be involved in
wrongdoing. An ethics officer for the entire organization may be designated, as the
primary point of referral or as an alternate contact when the allegation touches the
supervisor who would normally is the primary recipient. The rules should require the
creation of a permanent record by the maker or recipient of the allegation to permit
subsequent accountability and monitoring of the action taken. The channel of
transmittal to the appropriate investigating authority should be clear, with time-limits
and explicit standards governing which allegations must be referred for review by a
criminal justice authority. The primary goal is either for allegations to be brought
promptly and accurately to the notice of someone at a responsible level of
management, who then has the responsibility of following specific standards to decide
whether to involve a criminal investigating authority, or for them to be submitted
directly to such an authority by the employee.
G. Disqualification
As an administrative precaution in sensitive situations, as a preventive measure
against corruption and as a means of protecting the reputation of employees and of
government operations in general, public officials involved in the decision-making
process should disclose their interests. Their continued involvement in the matter
should be decided by an impartial body. As a general rule in the evaluation of a
conflict of interest: when in doubt, disqualify. If vigorously applied by policy makers,
who set an example for subordinates, one of the principal causes of public distrust of
government might be reduced. In a governmental culture where disqualification for
personal or financial interest has become the norm, can help to reaffirm the public
32
trust in government decision making processes. Moreover, disqualification regulations
provide a useful defence mechanism for the honest official, who can discourage those
who attempt to influence his or her decision.
H. Codes of Conduct38
Additional obligations for public officials, judicial officers and other government and
private sector employees can derive from codes of conduct. They should be
implemented to establish standards of behavior consistent with organizational and
ethical principles of justice, impartiality, independence, integrity, loyalty towards the
organization, diligence, propriety of personal conduct, transparency, accountability,
responsible use of the organization’s resources and, where appropriate, standards of
conduct towards the public. It should also enumerate the sanctions for non-
compliance by affected members or employees.
The code of conduct should not only contain rules governing behaviour. Also, the
code of conduct should establish a system that ensures implementation of the code.
The code must therefore translate the underlying guiding ethical and organizational
principles into concrete behavioral rules, promote and provide for monitoring
compliance with those rules; and provide clear sanctions for violation of those rules.
As a first logical step in developing a Code of Conduct, the responsible body must
identify the ethical principles that are most relevant for a particular organization.
Some of those principles which apply to most contexts are: justice, impartiality and
independence, integrity, loyalty towards the organization and towards the public
interest, diligence, propriety of personal conduct, transparency, accountability and the
responsible use of the respective organization’s resources.
Specific categories of public officials as well as professional categories might require
specific rules of behaviour. Therefore the development of separate codes for civil
servants, police, members of parliament and cabinet, judicial officers, journalists and
other employees in the private sector should be considered.
It is not be enough to disseminate the code and have the organization’s members or
employees read and sign it. An integrated implementation strategy must be planned
that balances “soft” and “hard” measures to ensure that the organization’s members
will act in accordance with the code. The code should therefore contain rules that
encourage and monitor compliance by all employees, members and/or public officials
with clear sanctioning penalties enumerated in cases of breaching the code.
Exemplary behavior and conduct should be rewarded and managers should provide
moral leadership at all times. Employees should receive regular training on issues of
integrity and on what each employee can do to ensure compliance by their colleagues
in the work place. Peer pressure and peer reviews should also be encouraged.
Disciplinary sanctions should be envisaged as well as a system ensuring that criminal
action is initiated when appropriate. Any members of the organization who become
aware of allegations of unethical, improper, criminal or unprofessional conduct by
officials should be obliged to immediately take adequate steps to report this to the

38
Two international ethical codes have been promulgated in recent years: the Council of Europe’s Model Code of
Conduct for Public Officials (2000); the UN International Code of Conduct for Public Officials (1996). Moreover,
the Global Forum’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and
Security Officials (1999). Principles 2, 3 and 7 address various ethical codes States may wish to consider
promulgating. See also, Global Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries (1999)
(Art. 17). For a more detailed analysis of these instruments, see UN document E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the
Secretary General on Existing International Legal Instruments Addressing Corruption)
33
appropriate body. The practice of whistle blowing should be institutionalized and
destigmatized, and adequate protection for whistleblowers should be guaranteed.
I. Disclosure of Assets
Excessive assets, income, gifts, and liabilities are all indicators of irregularities when
they are out of proportion to one’s earned salary. Therefore, the disclosure of assets is
another effective measure to enhance accountability and integrity of public servants.
Transparency of the accumulation of assets/liabilities and of gifts to government
officials serves as a deterrent to illicit enrichment from corrupt practices. Disclosure
of assets can also assist in the investigation of corruption allegations and may provide
evidence for subsequent prosecution. It is essential for the disclosure to be made upon
entry into the public service. It should thereafter be updated on a regular basis. The
monitoring of these asset declarations and their accuracy should be performed by an
independent agency such as an ombudsman, inspector general or an anti-corruption
agency.
It is unrealistic to expect that laws requiring disclosure of illegal financial gains by
public officials will result in voluntary confessions. Nevertheless, laws or regulations
requiring comprehensive disclosure of financial assets will provide a basis upon
which to monitor unearned income and can also provide a basis for prosecution. As
such, financial disclosures should include all financial obligations and relationships, a
summary of significant financial events, such as extraordinary income, business
activities, receipts besides income, sales, purchases, exchanges or gifts of any asset
exceeding a certain value as well as details of all major spending.
To be effective, penalties for non-disclosure or false reporting must be severe enough
to act as a significant deterrent. The standard for determining such penalties could be
consistent with penalties for the offence of illicit enrichment or a similar law. In
addition to the obligation to submit the disclosure declaration, public officials should
be obliged to answer any follow-up clarification needed to verify the accuracy of their
declaration.
A further refinement of disclosure status relates to the support of political activities.
Disclosure laws governing political financing can be useful for compelling candidates
or political parties to reveal contributions they have received. This would permit the
voting public and the news media to react to those contributions as soon as they are
made public
35
V. ENFORCEMENT-
Procedures for the detection, investigation and conviction of corrupt
officials
A. Covert and consensual nature of corruption
Unlike other crimes such as theft or murder, where a complainant with some interest
in uncovering the crime comes forward, crimes of corruption and bribery are
committed in the shadows with both parties benefiting from the crime. This unique
relationship, since neither party believes they are victims of any crime, prevents
authorities from knowing that a crime has taken place. Neither party is going to report
the crime. The inherently covert and consensual nature of corrupt activities makes it
difficult to obtain information on instances of corruption.
Challenges exist in developing a flow of information to overcome the inherent secrecy
of corruption offences. Encouraging the public, particularly its most frightened and
victimized members, to report instances of corruption is key.
Similarly, it is necessary to elaborate mechanisms that would assure reporting by
agency workforces among whom there is likely to be considerable awareness or
informed suspicion of any wrongdoing within their sphere of experience and
observation. The significance of encouraging and processing citizen complaints is to
restore or confirm public confidence in government. A complaints system should be
established enabling service users to complain, either through a “hot-line” or by other
means, to a credible and independent complaints office. The incoming complaints
should be entered into a computerized management system that allows for the analysis
and monitoring of the complaints, tracks the allegations reported, action taken,
outcome of any investigation and resulting disciplinary and court proceedings. The
agency responsible for receiving the complaint should also perform a clearing house
function, so that those complaints that alleging inefficiency rather than corruption are
forwarded to the appropriate authorities.
Persons who know about instances of corruption but are reluctant to submit a
complaint that would reveal their identity should nevertheless be encouraged to come
forward. Because of its susceptibility to abuse, the anonymous complaint should
initially be considered as investigative intelligence. The subject of an anonymous
complaint should by all means be treated with utmost confidentiality. This is
necessary to protect the reputation of allegedly corrupt individuals.
B. Other sources of Information
Efforts should be made to encourage “insiders” to provide information. For this
purpose whistleblower protection is essential. People are often aware of corrupt
activities by co-workers but are frightened to report them. Therefore, a clear and
simple framework must be established that encourages “whistle-blowing” and
protects such “whistleblowers” from victimization or retaliation. The main purpose of
whistleblower laws is to provide protection for those who, in good faith, report cases
of maladministration, corruption and other illicit behavior inside their organization.
Some whistleblower laws are only applicable to public officials, while others provide
a wider field of protection including private sector organizations and companies.
Experience shows that the existence of a whistleblower laws alone are not sufficient
to instill trust in potential whistleblowers. Laws alone will not encourage people to
36
come forward. In a survey carried out among public officials in New South Wales,
Australia, regarding the effectiveness of the protection of the Whistleblower Act
1992, 85% of the interviewees were unsure about either the willingness or the desire
of their employers to protect them. 50% stated that they would refuse to make a
disclosure for fear of reprisal39.
Disclosures by whistleblowers must be treated objectively and even if they prove to
be inaccurate or false, the law must apply as long as the whistleblower acted in “good
faith”. It must also apply irrespective of whether or not the information disclosed was
confidential and the whistleblower therefore might have breached the law by blowing
the whistle.
Since whistle blowing is a double-edged sword, it is necessary to protect the rights
and reputations of persons against frivolous or malicious allegations. Whistleblower
legislation should therefore include clear rules to restore damage caused by false
allegations. In particular, the law should contain minimum measures to restore a
damaged reputation. Criminal codes should contain provisions sanctioning those who
knowingly come forward with false allegations. It should be made clear to
whistleblowers that these rules apply also to them if their allegations are not made in
good faith.
The whistleblower law should also contain rules providing for compensation or
reinstatement in case whistleblowers suffer victimization or retaliation for disclosing
the information. In the case of dismissal, it might not always be acceptable for
whistleblowers to be reinstalled in their position. The law should therefore provide for
alternative solutions by obliging employers either to provide for a job in another
branch or organization of the same institution, or to pay financial compensation.
C. Prosecution and Investigations
The deterrent effects of investigation and prosecution and the direct incapacitation of
wrongdoers by their removal from office and incarceration can reduce corruption in
government. Yet virtually all practitioners involved in anti-corruption efforts would
concede that, no matter how draconian or rigorously enforced the penal measures
might be, no society could realistically punish more than a small proportion of the
officials who abuse their positions. If the level of integrity in government is to be
improved, it will be by managerial, administrative, regulatory and reporting
mechanisms40. This has been recognized by one of the best organized anti-corruption
entities, the Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC).41

39
John Feneley, Witness Protection: Pitfalls and Best Practices, paper presented at the 8th International
Anti-Corruption Conference, http:// www.transparency.de/iacc/8th_iacc/papers/feneley.html
40
The need for such mechanisms to combat public corruption was recently recognized by the Global Coalition for
Africa in its Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries (1999), Article 15 of which encourages states
to adopt legislative mechanisms and procedures for public submission of corruption complaints; as well as in the
Organization of American States’s Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996), Article III
(preventative measures); Global Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries
(1999) (Art. 15); and Principle 2 of the Global Forum’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption and
Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (1999). For a more detailed analysis of these
instruments, see UN document E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal
Instruments Addressing Corruption).”
41
The ICAC has three departments with separate functions. The Operations Department performs
criminal investigative work, the Corruption Prevention Department attempts to eliminate vulnerability
to corruption in systems or procedures and the Community Relations Department educates the public
about the evils of corruption. Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago has reinforced its existing anti-corruption
37
D. Auditing authorities
Auditing functions may have various configurations. However, there should always
be one government-wide office to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of
governmental programmes It may have an executive, legislative or even a judicial
function. It could theoretically have direct operational responsibility for management
audit and integrity inspections of every government activity. Perhaps more frequently,
an office of government-wide competence will function primarily in a policy-making
and supervisory role, as does the Secretaria de la Controloria. General de la
Federación in Mexico. Separate audit or inspection staffs may exist in each
government agency (as do the “controlorías internal" in the Government of Mexico).
Sometimes the power to make legislative or public reports is vested in government
auditors and occasionally they have statutory guarantees of operational authority,
budgetary independence or other incentives to objectivity.
In addition to serving as a logical contact and screening point for both anonymous and
attributed citizen complaints, an internal auditor can perform other valuable functions
by stimulating and making use of the flow of information that is essential to
identifying and combating dishonesty in government. An audit staff works throughout
an agency and should enjoy a reputation for objectivity, because its organizational
loyalty is normally owed only to the chief executive. With mobility and prestige, an
audit staff is an obvious point of contact for the reporting of wrongdoing by
government employs. To preserve employee confidence, a tradition of discretion may
need to be established, but that should always be the standard in corruption inquiries.
Audit staffs are also more likely to be technically knowledgeable than are members of
a general law-enforcement authority. This means that auditors can perform necessary
functions not only by screening complaints, but also by interpreting them for less
technically sophisticated criminal justice authorities, both at the time of initial referral
and as a continuous resource throughout an inquiry requiring specialized knowledge.
The identification of areas of excessive cost and of inferior management controls also
serves to detect and deter corruption in ways in which a criminal justice anti-
corruption authority cannot. Penal jurisdiction is normally triggered only by a
complaint or observation of conduct, which if proved true would constitute a crime. A
criminal justice agency, even if it legally had discretion to do so, could ill afford to
devote its resources to examining bid approval procedures for which no specific
allegation of criminality had been received. A vigilant audit staff would perform just
such an examination, recommend preventive and corrective measures, and also refer
any evidence of wrongdoing to the penal authorities. A separate authority, which has
not only criminal justice but also anti-corruption audit responsibilities can provide a
public image of independence, and can identify, expose and lead to the correction of
situations where the vulnerability to corruption is unacceptably high.

mechanisms, such as its Ombudsman, with an Integrity Commission, for the purpose of receiving and
monitoring financial declarations from public officials. In the Philippines, the Office of the
Ombudsman has laid the ground for a comprehensive and long-range corruption prevention
programme. In its prevention efforts, the Office of the Ombudsman has sought to enlist the support of
the public at large through the creation of Community-based Corruption Prevention Units and Citizen
Committees on Good Government. The corruption prevention programme is geared towards building
values and trust in public service, inter alia, through research and special studies
38
E. Disclosure statutes
An invaluable measure to obtain indicia of corrupt practices are disclosure statutes.
Even though it is not realistic to expect that any law requiring the reporting of illegal
acts by public officials will result in voluntary confessions, laws or regulations
requiring comprehensive disclosure of a person's financial assets as well as a periodic
review can be extremely helpful for the detection of corruption. Their value is
twofold. They function as an early-warning device, an indicator that a person whose
financial picture and lifestyle are inconsistent with the salary of a public official
should be required to explain the situation, or should be watched carefully. A second
useful function is as a separate vehicle of prosecution, when the underlying corruption
that generated the illegal income or assets may not be provable. Each country could
impose disclosure requirements appropriate to the practices of beneficial ownership
and societal group interests that are of particular concern in the context of its legal and
social traditions.
To be effective, sanctions against non-disclosure or false reporting must be
approximately as severe as those against the underlying corruption42. Purely civil
sanctions, or those that treat reporting violations as infractions or minor offences, are
frequently ineffectual because they can be exploited as the lesser of two evils. An
official who has enriched himself unjustly will be motivated to conceal the criminal
proceeds in any reporting document because the consequences of non-disclosure
would be significantly less painful than those of disclosure, involving discovery of the
illegal payment and the resulting greater criminal sanction for that offence. Lesser
penalties for failure to report allow a similar option. A failure to report, however, will
be noticed fairly promptly if the disclosure is required to be periodic, instead of being
triggered by an event that can be known only to the corrupt individuals.
F. Means of countering intimidation43
Sometimes physical threats may be made, the severity of which depends upon the
personalities involved, how accustomed they are to the use of violence, the scope and
profitability of the suspected corruption, and the probability of sanctions. When the
threat of violence is sever, both witnesses and criminal justice system personnel may
need protection.
A programme may be necessary that would allow witnesses to be protected. The
investigating authorities and their families may need to be housed in secure locations.
A pool of prosecutors and investigating magistrates may be developed, as in the
"Palermo anti-Mafia pool", to diffuse responsibility and to prevent one person from
becoming the sole institutional memory and solitary target. Court members should be

42
With respect to relevant recent international principles addressing this issue, see e.g., Principle 5, point 2 of the
Global Forum on Fighting Corruption’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity
Among Justice and Security Officials (1999). For a more detailed analysis of this instrument, see UN document
E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal Instruments Addressing
Corruption).”
43
For recent international provisions relevant on this issue, see United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (2000), Articles 23 (requiring Parties to provide criminal penalties for obstruction of justice) and
24 (requiring Parties to take measures to protect witnesses); the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (1998), Article 22 (Protection of collaborators of justice and witnesses); the Organization of American
States’s Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996), Article III (preventative measures); Global
Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries (1999) (Art. 15); and Principles 2, 5
of the Global Forum’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and
Security Officials (1999). For a more detailed analysis of these instruments, see UN document E/CN.15/2001/3
(Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal Instruments Addressing Corruption).”
39
chosen for their invulnerability to intimidation and corruption. Diplomatic or
academic assignments abroad may and are being used as a combination of reward and
cooling-off period after a particularly sensitive and dangerous investigation.
Other threats may be more subtle. For example, suggestions of a diminution of career
opportunities or of unfortunate budget cuts for the investigating unit may be implied.
Methods must be found to prevent these subtler forms of intimidation. In particular
the independence of the authorities responsible for the prosecution of corruption cases
is essential. Where anti-corruption inquiries are carried out by an investigating
magistrate, judicial independence can help to insulate the magistrate from unwanted
contacts and undesirable pressures44. Where the anti-corruption authority is a police or
prosecuting body, ways must be found to ensure independence from improper
influences within the executive branch of government45. In special cases, the
legislature may create an independent anti-corruption body.
G. Defining tasks
When an investigating authority has to deal with a case of suspected corruption,
certain fundamental management questions need to be resolved. For this purpose clear
and comprehensive terms of reference (TOR) should be developed. They should
contain a comprehensive list of all the resources needed (human, financial,
equipment) to conduct the investigations, a clear definition of the scope and a
timetable. Particular consideration should be given to the possible need of additional
resources to maintain the secrecy of the investigation.
In addition the TOR should contain a clear description of the facts giving rise to the
investigation, all decisions rendered during the investigation with their justifications
and reasons for the involvement / non-involvement of senior management of the
institution for which the suspect works.
The selection of an effective team will be crucial to the success of an investigation. Its
members should possess the specific investigative skills needed, should have proven
integrity and high ethical standards and be willing to undertake the work. Their
backgrounds should be thoroughly checked, including their social and family ties and
lifestyle.
Rather than following only one investigative path, it may be advisable to pursue
reasonable leads that might prove useful. It is not unusual that seemingly insignificant
information becomes vital in proving criminal activity. This also applies to statements
and documents. They should be carefully analyzed and cross-referenced using the
names, places and all other information that can help to provide information and may
serve to confirm the validity of evidence gathered.
One of the most successful ways to produce evidence against corrupt public officials
is to conduct financial investigations to prove that they spend or possess assets
beyond the means of their income. This will help to produce a preponderance of
evidence of corruption, and can identify those illegal assets that might later be

44
See the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary in Seventh United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August-6 September 1985:
report prepared by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IV.1), chap. I, sect. D.2.
45
See the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials contained in the annex to General Assembly
resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979. See also the guidelines on the role of prosecutors contained in
the annex to resolution 26 of the Eighth Congress (Eighth United Nations Congress..., pp. 188-194).
40
confiscated. However, suspects are unlikely to place the bounty from a bribe into their
daily bank accounts and instead may transform the proceeds into other forms of
property. Therefore, financial investigations should also concentrate on the lifestyles,
expenditures and property of the suspected persons. In this respect, it might be helpful
to look not only at what has actually been spent, but also to compare the amounts of
money deposited into the bank accounts of suspects with deposits from previous
years. Efforts should also be focused on identifying whether the suspected corrupt
person maintains foreign accounts. The existence of such an account can be
suspicious alone and indicate that funds are being hidden. In order to be effective,
financial investigations should be extended to the suspected persons’ family members
and those living in the same household: experience shows that they are often used as
conduits for corruption proceeds.
During the period of investigation, a decision might be made to suspend suspects from
their official duties. In particular, if they are involved in making important decisions
and a subsequent conviction may negatively influence the validity of their decisions,
actual or perceived, it may become necessary to remove them from any approval
processes. When the suspect is employed by an institution of the criminal justice
system, measures should be taken to prevent him from “networking” after any
suspension. Colleagues of the suspected persons should be given strong warnings
about relating information to the suspended colleague who should be authorized to
contact only one specific supervisor within their organization.
A comprehensive witness interviewing strategy should be designed. It should include
measures to overcome obstructive lawyers, witness protection, ensuring the credibility
of the witness and to avoid suspected illegal managing of witnesses. Witnesses often
have a criminal background themselves and therefore might not be very credible. It is
essential that witnesses admit their involvement in prior criminal acts, particularly if
they are involved in the acts of corruption for which the suspects are being
investigated. Nothing is more damaging to a prosecutor’s case than for an important
witness to be unexpectedly exposed to the jury as a criminal. The personal
background of the criminal witness must be offered to the jury as soon as possible in
the proceedings. Also, witnesses must be protected against threats. The most cost-
effective means to do this is to protect the identity of witnesses for as long as possible.
The best way to avoid allegations of illegal managing of witness by the investigating
team is to electronically record all interviews.
During investigations and court proceedings, a clear media strategy should be
elaborated that assigns one person to interface with and report to the media All other
personnel and investigators involved should be made aware of the potential damage
that may be caused to the successful outcome of the investigation and prosecution if
they make comments to the media. This also applies to the witnesses. In the case
where a public official is accused, the senior managers of the institution in which the
accused works should be informed of the risks of commenting to the media.
Cases of grand corruption often include international aspects. For example, the bribe
giver may be a foreign investor, the slush fund might be located in a country other
than that where the bribe is paid, or the bribe might be transferred directly into a
recipient’s foreign bank account. Investigators and prosecutors should therefore be
trained on mutual legal assistance and exchange of information procedures at the
international level.
41
There should be no obligation to inform the suspect about the investigation during its
early stage. When a suspect has knowledge of an investigation prior to the time the
police can secure sufficient evidence, the suspect might destroy evidence and warn
other targeted persons to do the same.
Strong investigative powers are fundamental for successful investigation. In
particular, the ability to order searches and seizures without court authorization,
ability to remove banking secrecy during investigations and the ability to request
preventive detention and telephone interception have proved extremely helpful.
The possibility of making recourse to plea bargaining and summary proceedings has
been extremely helpful in increasing efficiency during what are normally long and
complex proceedings. Plea bargaining has also been successfully used to help identify
other criminal activity as reported by suspects wishing to reduce the severity of a
potential conviction.
H. Case selection strategies
Some type of case selection criteria will be necessary to effectively allocate resources.
Where resources are limited, prioritizing cannot be avoided. It must be noted that case
selection criteria must be uniform and consistent. Any less rigorous method can raise
suspicions of improper motives, if not corruption itself. Ignoring seemingly minor
allegations will deter future complainants from reporting perhaps even more
significant matters. Moreover, what may appear as minor quite often develops into a
serious matter when investigated. Guidelines should be developed giving the
investigative agency clear indications on how to manage the workload.
Before devoting efforts in any investigation, it is important to evaluate the most cost-
effective means of deploying staff and focusing investigative energies. Probably the
least defensible approach is a response to stimulus without any governing standards or
master plan. Such responses allow investigative resources to be applied in an
uncontrolled fashion to what seems like the most vulnerable or newsworthy target of
the moment. This approach, risks the absorption of substantial resources in cases that
are simple to solve or interesting to investigate, but have little programmatic impact.
A more defensible and efficient strategy based upon reaction to externally presented
referrals and complaints would involve some form of priority-setting according to
conscious criteria laid down in advance and consistently applied. For obvious reasons,
inquiries and complaints from the legislative branch or arising out of sensational mass
media exposés may be accorded immediate attention rather than inquiries not yet in
the public domain. Some inquiries can be declined immediately or with minimal
action if the offender cannot be identified without disproportionate expenditure of
resources. Others may demand immediate action while the offence is still being
committed or before crucial evidence is lost.
Also wrongdoing that is on the borderline between administrative and criminal
misconduct can be subject to guidelines. If national law permits providing for
exclusively administrative handling or summary referral by a criminal justice
authority to administrative authorities, if the offence is minor and the sanction is
adequate the speedy passing on of the case to the respective authorities should be
possible. Establishing and enforcing such guidelines can at least permit the allocation
of resources in a consistent and accountable pattern, which can then be adjusted by a
process of programme evaluation to meet changing goals or priorities.
42
Both the above targeting approaches are reactions to external stimuli. Such reactive
strategies have the advantage of being non-controversial. The investigating authority
is less likely to be accused of partisanship and to be the target of institutional hostility
from an entity under investigation, when it is apparent that the inquiry was dictated by
a complaint or outside pressure and was not the product of the authority's improperly
motivated desire to impair organizational or personal reputations. Nevertheless,
purely reactive strategies are subject to criticism because of the inherently covert and
consensual nature of most corruption. Exposure and prosecution of only the most
blatant and unsophisticated offences may simply perpetuate the status quo, placating
public opinion without really exposing or threatening large-scale corruption. Reactive
strategies provide no mechanism for exposing the far more costly effects of
sophisticated corruption, inviting the cynical conclusion that the system protects the
corrupt but powerful official by sacrificing the clumsy petty thief. These
anti-egalitarian consequences of reactive strategies and their obvious inability to reach
corrupt practices that are well hidden or difficult to comprehend provide the impetus
for developing alternative strategies for target selection.
As an alternative, the selection strategy may be based at least partially on intelligence.
A relatively small percentage of investigative resources should be used to collect,
analyze and generate criminal intelligence to identify possible targets for
investigation. Most of the resources are then applied to the development of cases
targeted as a result of this intelligence-gathering and evaluation process. The
law-enforcement authorities may gather intelligence on the connections of public
officials to known criminal elements or may ask that travel and immigration records
be provided so that they can select for investigation frequent travelers to particular
destinations. Of course, any targeting of individuals can be controversial because of
the danger of damage to individual reputations and the possibility of abuse. An
approach that somewhat reduces those dangers is the risk assessment of a unit or
programme rather than of individuals.
Also ongoing investigations should be used to collect and analyze intelligence. During
the course of investigation, fragments of information, or intelligence, is collected.
This intelligence must be analyzed in order for the investigator to piece together
fragments of information to have a clear picture of the relationships and events that
taken together can constitute proof of criminal activity. Intelligence gathering and
analysis is therefore critical in uncovering corruption. In addition, a constant analysis
of the results will help to redirect and adjust efforts and will serve to help allocate
resources efficiently.
One method which has proven to be highly effective in the context of intelligence
gathering is financial monitoring. Pro-active monitoring aimed at defining indicators
of corruption, such as living beyond ones means, may help in identifying targets for
investigations. Another method to define the target for financial monitoring is to
examine the outcome of past corruption cases. If the results of a corruption
investigation suggest that corruption and bribery in a certain public service is
widespread, it is advisable to concentrate on the systematic checking of the assets of
all possible bribe takers. However, this exercise may not yield enough information to
warrant further investigation.
43
I. Integrity-testing
A far more controversial targeting strategy is one that employs decoys and
integrity-testing tactics46 The criticisms of these devices are substantial. They
arguably express an intolerably cynical view of how law enforcement should operate.
A decoy may be seen as manufacturing simulated crime when no real crime is
otherwise provable. And it could also be argued that the weakness of human nature
may permit law enforcement to target, trap and destroy almost any opponent,
political, personal or ideological, that it chooses.
As a response to these criticisms, the analytical observation may be made that hidden
corruption can continue indefinitely until exposed, and that no other technique has the
capability to penetrate the secrecy of bribery and other abuses of office. The
pragmatic argument that accompanies the theoretical analysis is that integrity testing.
has proved effective and has on occasion revealed depths, and heights, of corruption
never previously exposed. It is one of the most effective tools for cleaning up vital
government services in an extremely short time. In particular, in conditions of
rampant corruption and low trust levels, it is one of the few tools that promise
immediate results and are able to restore trust in public administration. Most of the
legal systems that provide for “agent provocateur” scenarios, ensure that they are not
be designed to instigate criminal conduct and make criminals out of people who might
otherwise have been honest citizens. It is therefore important to ensure that the degree
of temptation is not extreme, etc. If the scenarios are not reasonably handled, they can
make honest people appear to be criminals, and many criminal law systems exclude
evidence of an agent provocateur when the provocation is considered to be excessive.
Although this activity might initially require considerable preparation and resources,
it can produce rapid results that serve as an excellent deterrent. Close monitoring and
strict guidelines are essential to avoid the danger of entrapping a target. Any decision
to use integrity testing must have a sound and defensible basis. The test itself must be
fair to the target so that can be defended in court as reasonable. Integrity testing
should be electronically recorded in the interest of fairness to the target and for
accurate evaluation of criminal responsibility by judge and jury. Conviction’s
resulting from integrity testing must be based clearly on the necessary criminal intent,
on the part of the accused. The government must not engage in convincing anyone to
commit a crime they are not predisposed to commit. More than in any other area of
policing, the public must be protected from false accusations or behavior tending to
entrap an individual into committing and offence he or she would not have otherwise
committed but for the encouragement of the police.
Integrity testing is an instrument that enhances both the prevention and prosecution of
corruption. Integrity testing can help to determine whether or not a public civil servant
would engage in corrupt practices. It can be used in order to ‘clean up’ the public
service from (possibly) corrupt civil servants, can increase the actual and perceived
risk for corrupt officials of being detected and can increase the number of reports of
“real” corruption cases.
Integrity Testing can also be used as a “targeted test” to confirm an existing suspicion
which is usually based on one or more allegations from members of the public,

46
Examples may include members of a police integrity unit dressed in civilian clothes, driving rented
cars in an apparently drunken manner to ascertain if police officers will stop them and solicit a bribe in
lieu of an intoxication test, or the willingness of an investigator posing as a foreign investor to pay
bribes to legislators to secure favourable treatment for a proposed investment
44
criminals or even other officers. It can also be used as a “random test” to determine
more generally the likelihood of a public official to engage in corrupt practices.
In order to be fair, the public servants must normally know that they might be
subjected to an integrity test. This gives them a fair chance to refuse the bribe and
report the incident. It also avoids any disadvantage for those who undergo the test at
an early stage (i.e. when the “news” about integrity testing has not yet spread),
compared to those who might be tested later on, and who are already aware of it
through the experiences of their colleagues. However, this does not mean that the
public officials have to be informed about the number, types or general targets of the
test. Public servants are only more likely to refuse and report cases when they cannot
exclude that the bribe offered might be a “set-up”.
Experiences in various police forces where integrity tests have been carried out, such
as the London Metropolitan Police, the Police of Queensland, Australia and the New
York Police Department, have shown that it is not enough to ‘clean up’ an area of
corruption when problems appear. Instead, systems must be developed that ensure
that there will be little chance of corruption returning. It is therefore essential to
repeat random and targeted tests on a regular basis.
Positive integrity tests can produce various results that differ significantly according
to whether random or intelligence led testing is conducted. It might be a good idea to
provide incentives for those who successfully pass integrity tests. In the case of
positive intelligence led tests, harsh disciplinary consequences and even criminal
prosecution should be taken into consideration, while for random tests the responses
should perhaps be milder and should focus mainly on educating the subject.
J. Publicity and the news media
All investigations of corruption should be conducted in a discreet and professionally
responsible manner, although what constitutes a discreet and responsible inquiry will
vary. It will never include those occasions in which detailed or sensational
descriptions appear in the news media of allegations being investigated, based upon
anonymous sources that are obviously knowledgeable. Such leaks are sometimes
defended as a means of bringing forward additional witnesses and evidence or of
exposing and deterring wrongdoing when the corrupt officials may escape criminal
prosecution because of the inability to assemble prosecutable evidence. The goal of
securing additional evidence may be legitimate, but must be pursued in conformity
with the laws of investigative and judicial secrecy. The goal of exposing wrongdoing
is only rarely permitted by laws that allow investigative findings not constituting a
chargeable offence to be publicly reported, almost always under judicial or legislative
supervision. In the absence of such laws and without rigorous compliance with their
procedures, the disclosure of information capable of damaging reputations through
unofficial channels seems tantamount to an abuse of authority, to an infliction of
summary punishment by the investigating authority where no guilt has been proved.
The media play a potentially useful role in enlisting public and ultimately political
support for necessary Anti-corruption resources and legislation. They also have a
legitimate role, as surrogates for the public, in guaranteeing transparency and
accountability in government and particularly in the criminal justice system. Yet they
are not an element of law enforcement, and their interests are not congruent with
those of responsible investigators, prosecutors and judges. When the laws and
procedures of a culture dictate disclosure of investigative action, and the resulting
45
publicity inhibits criminal conduct of increases the available fund of intelligence and
evidence, justice is being served. When an investigation or a suspect is still protected
by judicial secrecy, but is disclosed because someone within the investigating
authority is impatient with the delays and restrictions imposed by secrecy laws and
implements a personal judgment that exposure is warranted, justice is not served.
Such situations provoke the understandable suspicion that personal or institutional
favour is being sought with the media. Since they may result in illegal damage to
reputation, they should be avoided and discouraged by effective administrative or
penal sanctions.
During investigations and court proceedings, a clear media strategy should be
elaborated that assigns one person to interface with and report to the media All other
personnel and investigators involved should be made aware of the potential damage
that may be caused to the successful outcome of the investigation and prosecution if
they make comments to the media. This also applies to the witnesses. In the case
where a public official is accused, the senior managers of the institution in which the
accused works should be informed of the risks of commenting to the media.
K. Dealing with the subject of investigation
From the investigative point of view, a dominant consideration is that disclosure of
law-enforcement interest should be avoided while there is any possibility of
productive covert action. The investigating authority should control the extent and
timing of any disclosure. Even when investigative action becomes overt, secrecy is
advantageous because it minimizes the likelihood of destruction of evidence and
intimidation of witnesses. Given the risks involved, it may be difficult to understand
why an investigatory authority should notify those responsible for a suspect
organization or activity of the existence of an inquiry.
Given the advantages of secrecy, it is, however, a great temptation for an
anti-corruption authority to adopt a garrison mentality, assuming that integrity exists
only within its ranks and that anyone affiliated with a unit or activity under inquiry
must be viewed as under suspicion. Consequently there might be great reluctance to
inform the supervisors of the person being investigated, even if they are not under
suspicion. Such notification may, however, be useful. The supervisor may be in a
position to provide further information. Also, timely notification will avoid that the
supervisors themselves will feel unjustly suspected and therefore be reluctant to assist
law enforcement when it should become necessary at a later stage. The suspects may
be removed from positions where they can obstruct the investigation and assigned to
temporary duty elsewhere. The programme agency can be relied upon to assemble
and screen documents or other evidence, even though the criminal investigators make
the final examination. Moreover, honest persons with pertinent knowledge or
evidence may be found in almost any organization, no matter how corrupt, and it is
poor practice to denigrate the institution and provoke a hostile anal defensive reaction
by even its honest employees, who may already be facing substantial disincentives to
candid cooperation.
Additional reasons for notification may derive from bureaucratic self-defence, even
during the covert stage of the investigation. If a covert operation has a substantial risk
of being disclosed in an embarrassing manner, if the motives of the investigating
authority can be made to appear suspect, or simply if the investigation will be
controversial, the investigating authority must consider notifying the person
46
responsible for the target agency. Indeed, an anti-corruption authority that acts
without regard for such considerations may ultimately find itself at odds with political
authorities that see it as an unrestrained and irresponsible destroyer of organizational
or personal reputations. Moreover, consultation can help to preclude later criticism
that the investigation was ill-founded, incompetently planned, or would have been
successful if only more consultation and cooperation had been sought. Finally, there is
a legitimate public interest in ensuring that corruption is not permitted to continue any
longer or anymore extensively than is necessary to permit the development of a sound
prosecution. Indeed in some situations, (for example, corrupt tolerance of the disposal
of hazardous wastes, of transport safety violations, of drug importation and
distribution), immediate termination of the practice, whether accomplished
administratively or by criminal justice measures, may be as important as any ultimate
conviction.
Clearly, personal acquaintance, a good reputation for discretion or comparable
guarantees of reliability are necessary before such a confidence can be imposed. Once
overt investigation commences, the notification becomes less a matter of reposing a
confidence than an essential bureaucratic courtesy. It is a self-serving means for the
inquiring authority to discharge its function and simplify its task. The notification
should detail how non-disclosure of investigative direction and findings is compelled
by judicial secrecy and the need to protect members of the recipient organization from
any suspicion regarding the transmission of investigative information to the subjects
of the investigation. It may convey little real factual data, other than what cooperation
the investigating authority requires to assist it in its functions. It has the advantage,
however, of aligning the programme agency leadership with the anti-corruption
authority and permitting it to preserve its authority and self-respect vis-á-vis the
public and within the agency.
L. Witnesses
In many case those allegedly corrupt may possess significant power. Those who could
provide evidence of their corrupt practices, may be reluctant to do so because of fear
of being victimized. Often the fear of reprisal is likely to be a serious deterrent. It is
therefore necessary to consider ways and means to protect witnesses from any form of
harm or reprisal. Witness protection programmes may in some cases be extended to
the witnesses of corruption cases, if there is the realistic fear that the witness will
become the target of acts of intimidation or revenge. In particular the identity of the
witness should be protected as long as possible. Also informing the administrative
entity concerned by the allegation should be considered with care. Even though there
may be a natural interest of safeguarding the integrity of the administrative entity
concerned and to afford it the opportunity to take action and eliminate wrongdoing
and to screen complaints, thus reducing the workload and cost of investigative and
enforcement agencies, in some cases giving out this information may lead to the
identification of the witness and consequently to reprisals.
47
VI. INSTITUTION BUILDING –
Strengthening the institutional anti-corruption framework
A. Introduction
Institution building has traditionally focused on expanding government facilities and
skills. Typically, such projects financed infrastructure, equipment and technical skills
training. These activities are important, but without a leadership confident in
introducing accountability, transparency and a focus on objectives and results, the
sustainable effect of these initiatives is questionable. The new approach emphasizes
the importance of leadership and of an “integrity mind-set”. Mind set refers to the
outlook that civil servants bring to their jobs. Donors work as facilitators with clients
to establish standards and ground rules for leaders in the public service through the
introduction of leadership codes, codes of conduct, and declarations and monitoring
of assets. Integrity is critical when appointments of key executive or civil service
positions are made and is equally important among politicians.

WHAT WHO
Skills
Mind-set
Leadership
Integrity
Tools
New ApproachTraditional
Enforcement Agencies
Parliament
Executive
Media
Private Sector
Civil Society
Judiciary
Watchdog Agencies
Capacity
Building
Incentives
Information

Figure 1: Institution Building  A New Definition

The second change is that the audience for the institution building is broadened to
include all parts of society interested in creating and maintaining national integrity.
Traditionally, the focus of donor attention has been on the Executive Branch of
government, particularly the programs and activities relating to government
ministries. However, capacity building focused almost entirely on strengthening the
capacity of ministries to deliver public services is insufficient. A more systemic
approach to building integrity and sustainable development requires institutional
strengthening of other “pillars” that is, domestic stakeholders both inside and outside
government. Donors have in some of the more advanced countries been invited in to
help initiate awareness raising and skill building efforts with parliaments, law
enforcement agencies, judiciaries, public account committees, NGOs and private-
sector organisations.
The pillars are the “who” in Figure 2 and are a central part of a new definition of
capacity building.
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Figure 3: Pillars of Integrity47
To ensure that there is an enabling environment that is supportive of private and
public sector contributions to sustainable development, a National Integrity System
needs to be built with mutually supportive pillars48. The “pillars of integrity” in a
society include actors outside the executive and outside government itself. The
collection of stakeholder groups is referred to as “pillars of integrity” because it is
incumbent on them to support and uphold practices that promote public integrity. A
National Integrity System is based on eight pillars of integrity: (1) executive, (2)
parliament, (3) judiciary, (4) watchdog agencies, (5) media, (6) private sector
(Chambers of Commerce, etc.), (7) civil society and (8) law enforcement agencies.
The pillars are interdependent, a weakening of one pillar results in an increased load
being shifted on the others. Where several pillars weaken, the system can no longer
support sustainable development and effectively collapses. Figure 3 illustrates the
interaction of the different stakeholders in combating corruption. Examining a
National Integrity System requires identifying gaps and opportunities for corruption
within each of the pillars and then co-ordinating the work of the government, civil
society, and donors into a coherent framework of institutional strengthening.
The reasons for building an integrity system may differ from country to country. In
Figure 3, three broad, almost generic, objectives are identified: rule of law,
sustainable development, and quality of life. In the fifteen countries that have
embraced the reform effort, inadequate rule of law could turn out to be the critical
bottleneck for progress. This is particularly the case in much of Latin America and
Africa where it is estimated that many countries need ten to fifteen years of intensive
work before effective rule of law can be established.

47
The integrity pillars were first presented by TI’s Ibriahim Seushi in Tanzania and later adapted by
Jeremy Pope and Petter Langseth in building the framework for a National Integrity System in
Tanzania.
48
Petter, Langseth,, Rick Stapenhurst, and Jeremy Pope.(1997). The Role of a National Integrity
System in Fighting Corruption. Washington, D.C.: EDI Working Papers Series, World Bank.
49
B. Organizational structures49
Legislation may be required to organize the structures that put anti-corruption
measures into effect. In reply to the question whether a specialized anti-corruption
unit is necessary or whether the function can be handled within existing organizations,
it may be said that for police, prosecutors and investigating magistrates alike, there
are both advantages and disadvantages to separate units. Among the disadvantages are
rivalries and barriers to communication between a new authority and existing
organizations, greater administrative costs, and the possible or perceived diminution
in the prestige and morale of the existing law enforcement, investigative and judicial
structures. It is also necessary to follow some workable principle with respect to the
creation of new entities and to ask, for example, whether an investigative unit is
necessary not only for corruption offences, but also for drugs, theft of cultural
patrimony, environmental crimes or whatever other phenomenon may receive
political and public attention at any particular moment. Among the advantages of a
separate unit are specialization, greater security and accountability. The latter may
well be the greatest virtue, as it allows the political authority to measure what success
is being achieved with given resources, and assigns anti-corruption responsibility to
identifiable persons or entities. This ability to measure results is important because of
the nature of corruption as a covert activity, which may never be detected, and
effectively dealt with, without aggressive law enforcement and investigative efforts.
Sometimes, radical structural changes may be legislatively imposed as a result of
scandals that have created a perception of corrupt activity and concealment by the
very same authorities charged with exposure and suppression of such wrongdoing.
Once public opinion becomes outraged, the only means of satisfying it may be the
creation of entities considered to be impervious to the corrupting influences that gave
rise to the scandal, and independent of the traditional authorities believed to have been
corrupted. A police scandal in Hong Kong in the 1970s led to erosion of public
confidence, as a result of which a new entity was created the Independent
Commission against Corruption. This Commission is an example of a single-purpose
anti-corruption entity independent of any other authority save judicial review and
necessary budgetary support. An independent counsel mechanism has existed in the
United States of America since shortly after the Watergate political scandal of
1972-1974, in which high-ranking public officials were implicated. In any case
involving certain legislatively enumerated positions of the executive branch and of the
presidential election campaign, it is required that the Attorney General notify a special
court, which then appoints a special prosecutor to investigate the matter and to
prosecute if necessary. This independent counsel must be chosen from outside the
Government, and operates without supervision by the Attorney General, but may call
upon an unlimited budget and any desired resources of the Government, including the
investigative agencies normally under the control of the Attorney General.
These entities are rather rare creatures, anti-corruption elements created to be
independent of the existing power structure and enjoying operational autonomy, even

49
With respect to recent relevant international initiatives addressing this issue, see e.g., the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), Article 9 (requiring Parties to provide anti-corruption
authorities with adequate independence to deter inappropriate influence on their actions); the Council of Europe
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1998), Article 20 (establishing specialised anti-corruption authorities);
the Organization of American States’s Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996), Article III
(preventative measures); the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption
and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (1999)
50
to the extent of determining their own budget. They do entail substantial costs, both
financially and in loss of prestige by existing law enforcement units, and can be
controversial. Such extreme measures may be necessary to preserve public confidence
that even the highest levels of government can be held accountable. Whether or not a
society needs an independent authority capable of action against its leading political
authorities outside regular channels seems to be a question answerable only within the
context of the Government's level of, and vulnerability to, corruption, the degree of
law-enforcement professionalism, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary
and responsiveness t public opinion.
C. Exclusivity of anti-corruption jurisdiction
Regardless of whether anti-corruption responsibility is assigned to an independent
agency or remains with a branch or division of an existing structure, exclusivity of
jurisdiction needs to be considered. When certain resources are dedicated exclusively
to corruption matters, it is tempting as a matter of managerial clarity, to give the entity
that operates those assets a monopoly over all corruption investigations. In addition,
endemic delays in the administration of justice due to overloaded dockets of courts
argue in favour of exclusive anti-corruption jurisdiction, even at the judicial level. The
demonstrated susceptibility of human nature to the corrupting influence of power and
to the temptations and wrongful opportunities that come with authority argues,
however, against the orderly logic of exclusive competence. The Latin maxim of quis
custodiet custodes ipsos? is a reminder that one must question who will guard the
guards themselves. A little redundancy and even competition can be a healthy
antidote to corruption, because no single person or entity has the power to license
illegal activities. An obligation of other entities to report all corruption investigations
to the primary anti-corruption authority seems appropriate, the only real question
being the timing of such an obligation. The legislative and managerial challenge in
this area is to allow just enough redundancy, and even rivalry, to expose corruption if
the primary anti-corruption authority fails to do so, but not to permit so much
duplication that the flow of intelligence, or of investigative and prosecutive
opportunities, available to the primary authority is disproportionately reduced.
D. Anti-Corruption Agencies50
The Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) is an independent institution with the mandate to
detect, investigate, monitor, prosecute and prevent corruption, and to educate the
public about the negative effects of corruption and its role in fighting it. It is normally
established where: (1) corruption is systemic and the traditionally responsible
governmental institutions are corrupt, or perceived as being so, and do not enjoy the
necessary trust of the public to engage in a credible effort to fight corruption; and (2)
a comprehensive, integrated approach including prevention, enforcement, monitoring
and education is needed.
ACAs are usually created when corruption is so pervasive and the law enforcement
agencies so corrupt that offences of bribery are no longer investigated or prosecuted.
If the traditional criminal justice system is able to handle the problem of corruption,
the creation of such an ACA is not advisable. Doing so may induce a perception of
mistrust in existing institutions and therefore produce a demoralizing effect that may
cause far more damage to the government’s overall anti-corruption strategy than the

50
UN’s Global Programme against Corruption (2001), Anti Corruption Tool-Kit, web page http
51
good done by the ACA. In order to avoid unnecessarily discrediting the other
governmental bodies, in particular the police and the office of the public prosecutor,
the appropriateness of an ACA should be evaluated carefully. If that is not the case,
resources might be better employed by enhancing the creation of specialized units
within the existing law enforcement agencies. To this purpose it is helpful to conduct
an assessment of the levels, causes, locations and remedies of corruption. This will
not only give an answer to the question of whether traditional law enforcement is too
corrupt to enforce the anti-corruption laws, but will also help to define and prioritize
the work program of the new agency.
The agency should be created by law. The law must provide both for its independence
and the methods by which it is to be accountable to the community. It is important
that the agency is politically and financially independent. It should not depend on the
executive for either strategic decisions or for human and financial resource related
issues. The law should include: (1) An investigative and prosecuting function.
Especially when the country is emerging from a situation of systemic corruption, the
ACA will be the only body willing to start to investigate and prosecute high-level
government officials. Successful criminal action against them will obviously not solve
the problem of corruption. However, if no action is taken against the main culprits,
the entire government anti-corruption campaign will suffer from the general cynicism
created by inaction, (2) An educational and awareness raising function. The public
needs to be educated about the negative effects of corruption and what they can do
against it. Any ACA that does not enjoy the support of the public is unlikely to
succeed. It is therefore critical for any ACA to regularly monitor the trust level
between the public and the their agency, (3) A preventive function. A close nexus
must be found between investigation and institutional reform. Wherever systemic
corruption is detected, the organizational causes must be analyzed and the necessary
improvements made and (4) A legislative function. The ACA must also be empowered
to submit legislative proposals to the parliament.
Effective performance must be measured in terms of impact and cost. Thus “cases
prosecuted” may be a success indicator of the workload of the prosecution
department, but where it results in an inconsequential number of convictions, the
indicator takes on a very different significance. Case backlog and continuing case
management are essential pre-conditions for such an evaluation. For the awareness
raising, it is essential to measure the interface with the public and to conduct regular
surveys on issues such as the extent of public knowledge of, and trust in, the ACA:
how many people know its mandate, how many people view it as being successful,
how many people would give their name as a complainant or informant, etc.
In order for the ACA to be effective, certain obstacles must be overcome. Some of the
important ones include weak political will, political interference and skepticism
regarding the benefits of anti-corruption initiatives. Even if the determination to tackle
corruption is initially strong (usually upon the accession of a new government to
power), it often diminishes as the realities of office, the vested interests in the status
quo and the pressure of more immediate tasks bear on the actions of government. It is
therefore highly advisable from the outset to create an institution that is as politically
independent as possible. Interference in the administration of the ACA should be
minimal, while the necessary accountability should be ensured. Inadequate laws also
present a significant obstacle. Often the laws against corruption are ineffective
because they: (i) are either too complicated and unintelligible, (ii) fail to contain some
basic offences, (iii) do not fit in well with existing laws either because they contain
52
duplications or because they are incomplete, or (iv) require evidence which is not
sufficient taking into account that corruption is a secretive act and therefore evidence
is particularly hard to gather. Another potential impediment may result from the past.
This is especially problematic in countries that have suffered widespread, systemic
corruption for many years. If the government announces a new initiative to launch an
ACA to address the problem, public expectation is raised. Without clear provisions
concerning past corruption, the new agency may be swamped by information from the
public, much of it going back years, that it is unable to handle properly. Due to lack of
qualified staff, time and resources, current corruption may be dealt with inadequately.
E. Judicial Sector
Corruption within the judicial sector ranks can create a pernicious multiplier
corruption effect on the rest of the public sector. One could consider judicial
corruption as a “corruption of corruptions” in which those who’re responsible to
interpret and enforce the rules to counteract corrupt practices are themselves corrupt.
The ability of the police, prosecutors’ office, and judicial branch to enhance integrity
within its own ranks depends on best practice reforms that have already rendered
positive results in other contexts. These reforms include:
1. Championing Multi-party Politics:
The latest findings show that the best safeguard of judicial independence is party
competition. Where there are real risks for a politician of losing office, with at the
same time an expectation of running again and winning in future periods, legislators
will try to ensure that there are impartial fora for resolving differences with those in
power and for deciding election petitions. It is therefore rational for single-party
dominated political systems to accord courts less independence because of the
governing party expectation itv will continue to win elections, whereas competitive
party systems favor greater judicial independence in order to preserve a party’s
legislative gains while in office once it is out of power.
There are four traditional ways of assessing judicial independence. One, called the
“legalist” approach assesses the judiciary’s degree of insulation from partisan
political pressures is afforded by the legal (sometimes constitutional) provisions of
appointment, security of tenure, and remuneration. A second approach known as
“behavioralist” analyzes judicial decision making per se. That is, whether courts
interpret and apply the laws in ways hostile to or in disregard of the wishes of those
with political power and influence; a third approach is a “culturalist approach”
whereby judges themselves estimate their own perception of independence; and a
final method focuses on the career path patterns dealing with the determinants of
appointments and promotions in judicial careers. Yet, accountability mechanisms
need to be in balance with judicial independence if countries are to avoid abuses of
power within their judicial ranks. In this area, the judicial councils and civil society
control mechanisms (explained below) play a key role. In this context, high degrees
of judicial independence shows a remarkable association to the low occurrence and
low perception of corrupt practices.51

51
Edgardo Buscaglia (1999), “Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic
Consequences” Essays in Public Policy. Hoover Institution. Stanford University.

53
Of course, the judiciary has a very limited role in ensuring political competition to
begin with. Yet, an institutional environment within which the judicial sector achieves
a balance between accountability and independence have proven to render the best
results in fighting corrupt practices elsewhere in the public sector.52
2. Organizational and Administrative Control Issues:
Clear rules applied to personnel management and budget related issues can make a
difference in promoting integrity systems within the judicial ranks. Weak governance
in these areas can reduce the level of effectiveness among jurisdictional and
administrative personnel, and also create a consequent lack of commitment with the
institution as seen in many international surveys.53 More specifically, decisions on
promotions, recruitments, appointment of personnel, and budgeting maybe
sometimes arbitrary and not based on institutional service delivery needs. In fact, the
perception of a lack of rule-based and merit-based personnel and budget
managements can be quite damaging within the courts and prosecutors’ offices.
Clientelistic practices are also usually rampant in the appointment of police personnel.
The lack of an effective judicial and administrative career coupled with no practice in
applying quality control standards in the definition of enforceable performance
indicators act as incentives to enhance personal and political relationships above
everything and makes lower level judges too dependant on superior and supreme
court judges who are usually more politically motivated and subject to clientelistic -
related capture.
The enactment of civil service reforms in the police, prosecutors’ and judicial areas
would address these problems by generating career incentives based on rewards and
penalties (predictable promotions and value-enhancing rotations) needed to address
the sometimes prevailing opportunistic behavior among court personnel. This requires
the introduction of performance indicators in order to determine individual
promotions, compensation benefits and salary increases all related to budget planning.
This would also serve to avoid high turnovers of judicial personnel coupled with the
lack of predictable rotation and performance standards in those remaining, all of
which creates an environment that usually fosters the emergence of organized
networks where lawyers and court personnel interact to advance corrupt practices in
the handling of files (e.g. evidence disappearing in a systematic fashion, delays in
notifications and citations, ex-parte communication, disappearance of files, or even
the “buying” of rulings.) It is also true that the lack of a case-flow management also
add to an environment where these corrupt practices prevail.
Lack of a clear and predictable career path makes many prosecutors and judges think
that they will inewvitably remain where they are, in low wage positions and aften in
remote communities. In these cases, they have little incentives to cultivate good
reputations.
Administrative discretionality and lack of uniformity in the handling of administrative
procedures can sometimes be explained by the high concentration of administrative

52
Mark J. Ramseyer (1994), “The Puzzling (In) Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Appraoch.”
Journal of Legal Studies, 23: 721-747

53
Edgardo Buscaglia (2001). “An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the
Courts: an Objective Governance-Based Approach” International review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier Science. June
54
and managerial responsibilities in one or two members of each court or prosecutor’s
office who are not subject to formal procedural or performance monitoring systems.
The lack of administrative transparency is also explained by the absence of uniform
accounting and auditing standards within and among the court system.
Courts and prosecutors sometimes also lack best practice organizational and
administrative procedural manuals and therefore, ad hoc discretionary procedures
prevail among all staff. Moreover, the courts and prosecutors alike sometimes lack
adequate organizational structure and an internal control system to monitor group and
individual performance based on pre-specified and transparent average standards such
as the ones used by the Judicial Councils in Costa Rica and in Singapore. The
combination of an absence of performance standards, the absence of enforceable
procedural manuals, and the lack of a predictable organizational structure all add to
the dilution and segregation of responsibilities, therefore, creating an environment
where the lack of user-oriented service and abuse of public office is more likely.
3. Substantive law-related aspects of institutional performance
The study of judicial sector corruption worldwide also shows that the lack of due
justification and consistency in the judges’ and prosecutors’decision making criteria is
considered to be a key element in the propensity to engage in corrupt practices (e.g.
case fixing). This is very much related to the lack of systems supplying information
on new statutes, doctrines, and jurisprudence. In this context, inconsistencies and
contradictions involving legal and constitutional frameworks are common. If judges’
and prosecutors make decisions based on laws that have been rescinded or
contradicted, this would foster an institutional environment within which there’s a
propensity towards corrupt practices.
4. Procedural Law-related aspects of institutional performance:
We need to differentiate substantive law related corruption (e.g. case fixing at the
prosecutor or at the court) from procedural judicial corruption, that represents the
most widespread form of corruption everywhere54 (e.g. paying court employees to
delay or accelerate a case where employees are simply compensated for performing
normal services such as delivering a notification, or for taking a deposition within the
stage when evidence is gathered). Procedural delays are sometimes used as a strategic
tool by lawyers and courts to extract payments from one of the litigants. This usually
is more likely to happen in the midst of a lack of effective case control and case-
tracking mechanisms that would allow supervision by the prosecutor and judicial
management of the procedures for each case type.
The use of quality control methods to monitor and correct deviations from expected
procedural times and caseloads have been used in several pilots in Argentina and
Ecuador. These techniques also help to identify and address procedural defects.55
5. Political Interference and Judicial Effectiveness
The state capture of the court or of the prosecutor’s office is common in most
countries with high levels of corruption linked to organized crime or to irregular

54
Edgardo Buscaglia (1995), “Stark Picture of Justice in Latin America” The Financial Times, London:
March 13, p. A5.
55
Edgardo Buscaglia and Maria Dakolias (1995) “Judicial Reform in Latin America: The Cases of
Argentina and Ecuador” Technical Paper Series # 353, The World Bank
55
partisan practices. Sometimes, this is partly rooted in the power of Congress to select
and fire prosecutors’ and judges through non-transparent and unpredictable
procedures. Political criteria based on regional and party quotas maybe used in the
appointment and impeachment of judges and prosecutors. This appointment and
impeachment criteria based on mainly political clientelism and patronage networks
joined by the lack of an effective judicial career system and unjustified discretionality
in the allocations of budget and personnel all combines into a recipe where there's no
"wall of fire" between a dependant court system and the political system once a judge
is appointed.
The interaction between the prosecutor’s office and the judiciary in the fight against
corrupt political influences is an area that has been relatively unexplored. The
contrast of case studies (e.g. Italy vs. Germany) show that there is an association
between low effectiveness in fighting political-administrative corruption and systems
where the prosecutors have a monopoly in deciding the course of a criminal action.
This low effectiveness in fighting political-administrative corruption can also be
linked to a lack of uniform written guidelines or criteria established and strictly
enforced by the chief prosecutor in conjunction with the Justice Ministry. In these
systems, it is common to find the combination of a lack of regulation in prosecutorial
discretion with a lack of written guidelines (establishing criteria, guidleines,
standards) monitored by civil society. This is compounded sometimes in cases where
there is a lack of coordination with regional district attorneys where each prosecutor
can pursue his own agenda. This environment in which prosecutorial action is
personalized and uncoordinated is ripe for political capture. There is a another
relevant association between low effectiveness in fighting political-administrative
corruption and systems where there is no systematic rotation in prosecutors
assignments and where politicians are the ones who determine the geographic
jurisdiction where they will work.
6. Social Control Mechanisms
Countries that have improved the institutional effectiveness of their judicila sector
(e.g. Costa Rica and Singapore) have also found mechanisms to inject social control
of prosecutors and courts. Complaint boards and review boards have made a
difference in instilling civil society’s concerns in everyday operations when dealing
with abuses of judicial or prosecutorial discretion. In general, specialized non-
governmental organizations with a track record in monitoring judicial trends have
been the ideal candidates to perform these functions from the civil society side.
Review boards, dealing with the allocation of personnel and budget resources to
service delivery have performed an advisory role.
F. Strengthening Local Governments
Local governments in developing countries are increasingly governed by elected
officials. Greater decentralisation has also opened up opportunities for citizen
participation in decision making at the local level. As a result, this "first generation"
of democratic leadership is being required to carry out key government functions such
as construction and maintenance of basic infrastructure, delivery of basic services,
and social services. In this context, access to additional resources for local
governments that are compatible with an increased level of responsibility do require
institutional safeguards to assure integrity . As this occurs, it is important that best
56
governance practices are deepened and strengthened through transparent decision-
making mechanisms that are open to citizen participation.
Corruption is one of the gravest problems affecting local governments and
populations within their jurisdictions. The economic, social, and political costs
caused by corruption have a negative impact on service delivery and therefore, on
poverty and economic growth. Additionally, corruption negatively affects the
government’s legitimacy and hampers its capacity to enhance the public interest.
Effective programs aiming at reducing corrupt practices must place emphasis on
identifying the most common institutional/governance failures explaining
irregularities . Moreover, the necessary elements to reduce corrupt practices at the
municipal levels include the design of public information channels to be used by
citizens in their daily interaction with government, political leadership, and collective
action.
G. Social Controls and Anti-Corruption Measures
The application of participatory channels designed to make social control an
everyday operational mechanism is key to the sustainable success of any
anticorruption program. Specialized committees composed of well-trained civil
society members and government officials must then be formed. The following is a
list of examples where committees, composed of civil society and government
officials, are designed to cover the policy design, monitoring, and evaluation of:
• Annual Public Audience on Budgetary Affairs
• Public Audience on Public Projects
• Public Audience on Public Projects Directly Run by Civil Society
• Tripartite Commission (composed of reps of Civil Society-Legislative Council-
and Mayor aimed at Monitoring Government Affairs from within)
• Long Term Social Investment Boards (composed of reps of Civil and Mayor
• Complaint Boards56
• Public Information Office
• Community Service Delivery Monitoring Committee

The idea is to incorporate best practices (that have given positive results already in
many contexts) into municipal public anti-corruption policies through these civil
society operational committees acting as watchdog bodies from within the
government itself. One can expect lower levels of corruption and improved service
delivery sustained through best practice technical solutions combined with the
accountability generated by effective social controls. This would demonstrate the
advantages of combining political will, technical capacity to execute reforms, and a
partnership with civil society. All combined produces enhanced efficiency, equity,
and transparency.
As stated above, the Local Integrity Steering Committee is the watchdog and
mechanism to launch, implement and monitor a country’s municipal integrity
strategy. Its mandate typically consists of:

56
Refer to Edgardo Buscaglia “Access to Justice and Poverty: An Empirical Design and Evaluation of
Performance Indicators for Policy Reform” Paper Presented at the World Bank Conference on Judicial
Reform. St. Petersburg, Russia. July 2001
57
• the broad-based development of an integrated municipal integrity strategy;
• monitoring of its implementation;
• translating the anti-corruption policies of the municipal and national integrity
strategy and action plans into legislation;
• ensuring broad-based support of the national and municipal integrity strategies by
the general public; and
• guaranteeing momentum for the implementation of the municipal integrity
strategy and the anti-corruption action plan.
The key challenge to staffing the Committee or Anti-Corruption Agency is to appoint
local citizens/opinion makers known and respected for their integrity. The Committee
consists of representatives from the mayor’s office, from the municipal council,
municipal civil servants in key departments, such as budget, revenue collection, and
public services departments. From outside government, leaders from municipal
districts, business groups, agricultural credit unions, farmers’ associations, unions,
religious groups, media, and special interest groups all must be included.
The task of this strategic steering local committee is to prepare the municipal
integrity and action planning meetings. It must also identify priority areas, plan the
implementation strategy for the municipal integrity strategy and the municipal
integrity action plan by balancing short, medium, and long-term reform goals, and
design mechanisms for raising public awareness and encouraging broad-based local
citizen participation. Of course, the Municipal Integrity Steering Committee (and the
Commission Boards explained below) must be also formalized by law or municipal
decree. This law must clearly establish the composition, functions, and jurisdiction.
In addition to the strategic steering committees, operational boards must also be
formed with the purpose of undertaking the every day operational watchdog roles
mandated by the Strategic Committee. These boards must cover several areas
involving:
i- a commission in charge of gathering and determining the public preferences
for the next period’s spending coupled with the monitoring of the execution of
budget-related affairs;
ii- a civil society commission social investment projects implemented by the
local government,
iii- a civil society commission in charge of channelling of the public funds
directly managed by the community in the process of constructing public
infrastructure,
iv- a tripartite commission (composed of representatives of the mayor, the
council, and civil society) all in charge of the daily monitoring of
administrative affairs within the “black box” of local government. At the
same time, this Commission must be in charge of designing a an internet data
base available to the public to monitor the procurement practices, contracts,
and public finances.
v- A local management civil commission in charge of receiving the public’s
requests reflecting the priorities for spending in the medium to long term;
58
vi- public “accountability” audiences where the mayor is held accountable for her
management and execution of the budget on an annual basis. This audience
would be based on a results oriented criteria;
vii- Complaint civil boards in charge of channelling the requests made by citizens
to the local government;
viii- A civil commission in charge of advising the local government on how to
simplify procedures faced by citizens
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VII. AWARENESS RAISING AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
A. Introduction
The purpose of this measure is to increase the checks and balances by empowering the
civil society to oversee the state including the executive, legislative and the judiciary.
The desired impact of an awareness raising programme includes broad public
dissemination of the negative impacts of corruption and the expected behaviour on the
part of government collectively and its officials individually. Such awareness and
public involvement on government matters should lead to greater accountability of
public service providers (officials) in the delivery of government services.
Among the few existing success stories, Hong Kong has taught us that it takes time
and considerable effort to curb corruption in a systemic corrupt environment. Having
fought corruption for the past 25 years, Hong Kong’s Independent Anti-Corruption
Commission (ICAC) continues to allocate substantial financial and human resources
in its efforts build integrity to prevent corruption, spending US$ 90 million (1998) per
year and employing 1,300 staff who in 1998 conducted 2,780 training sessions to
strengthen partnership between anti- corruption agencies and private and public sector
and in doing so interfacing, on an annual basis, directly with close to 1% of the
population.57
Educating and involving the public in building integrity is essential to prevent
corruption in the medium and long term. It is a key element of the broad based,
comprehensive, integrated, evidence based and impact oriented strategy. Public
education and awareness raising can be implemented through any of the following
activities:
• Government and/or private sector sponsored public education and
awareness raising campaigns (radio, news papers, TV);
• annual broad based national/municipal integrity workshops were all
stakeholders are invited to discuss problems and suggest changes;
• government and/or private sector sponsored public hearings
• improved information to citizens about their rights (Citizens’ Charter); and
empower the citizens to monitor the government through periodic service
delivery surveys;
• production and dissemination of a national integrity strategy and an annual
corruption survey at national, municipal and sub-county level;
• production and broad dissemination of integrity survey results at the
municipal or sub-national level;
• investigative journalism and more active role the media in describing the
negative effects of corruption and exposing corrupt officials; and
• dissemination of international instruments such as the (i) UNOV Manual;
(ii) The TI Sourece book; and (iii) the UN’s Anti-Corruption Tool Kit both
presenting experiences of other countries in combating corruption.

57
Petter, Langseth, (1999) APrevention: An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption,@ ISPAC 1999
Conference on AResponding to the Challenge of Corruption,@ Milan, 19-20 November 1999.
60
Organisations in the public and private sector at the local and national level must
adopt various public education measures in order to achieve success in the fight
against corruption. Economic development, democratic reform, a strong civil society
with access to information appear to be crucial for the effective prevention of
corruption. The following is a list of measures or initiatives that should be developed
and implemented at various levels within the public and private sectors58. The
measures must address policy, systemic and behavioural issues and aspects of change.
In order to address both aspects in a comprehensive and integrated manner, public
education and awareness raising measures have been organised as follows: (i) Public
Sector or executive measures; (ii) Legislative measures; (iv) Private sector measures;
(v) Civil society measures; and (vi) International measures59.
B. Public Sector (executive) Measures
Public sector measures may include:
• Opening up government to the public by: (i) inviting civil society to
oversee aid and other government programs; (ii) establishing and
disseminating service standards, (iii) establishing a credible complaints
mechanism; (iv) regularly assess public confidence in anti-corruption
institutions, judiciary and law enforcement and design programs to
improve trust levels.
• Enforcing access to information;
• Focusing on prevention projects which educate society to the evils of
corruption and instill a moral commitment to integrity in dealings with
business and government officials;
• Create independent anti-corruption commissions and or National Integrity
Steering Committees which focuses on, among others research, education,
training and advice.
C. Legislative Measures
Legislative measures should include60:
• freedom of information,
• freedom of the media and
• freedom of expression
D. Private Sector Measures
Private sector measures should aim at:
• Educating, aiding and empowering businesses to avoid involvement in
corrupt practices;
• Promoting ethical standards in business through the development of codes
of conduct, and

58
Petter, Langseth, (1999) presentation at the 9th IPAC conference in Milan, November 1999.
59
This list of recommended action has been developed in collaboration with Jeremy Pope from
Transparency International in the UK
60
Petter,. Langseth.(1999) presentation at the 9th IPAC conference in Milan, November 1999.

61
• Education and integrity training.
E. Civil Society Measures
Civil society measures should include:
• Increasing education, awareness and involvement of the civil society to
mobilise civil society organisations (media, NGOs, professional
associations, research or university institutes) to research and monitor
good governance;
• Creation and strengthening of NGO-networks to share information on
local, regional and national initiatives;
• Strengthening civil society to demand integrity and fairness in government
and business transactions;
• Developing databases and networks for ensuring analysis and monitoring
of corruption trends and cases as well as information exchange among
different agencies dealing with corruption.
F. Media Training
In the context of awareness raising, building and maintaining of an independent,
professional and free media with a nation building role is crucial. A free, competent
and independent media with professional investigative capabilities can be a “nation
builder.” Measures aimed at strengthening the media in this role may include: (i)
capacity building; (ii) enforcing integrity through introduction and monitoring of
codes of conduct; (iii) encouraging owners/editors to allow balanced reporting and
(iv) encouraging the media to police itself.
By drawing attention to corruption, journalists can help to turn corruption from a
seemingly low risk/high profit activity to a high risk and low profit venture.
Recognizing the critical role of the media, Uganda began training of its investigative
journalists with donors help in 199561. A preliminary assessment, which will be
validated by content analysis, shows that training and awareness raising among the
journalists has had a positive effect on the frequency and quality of reporting on
corruption. The lessons learned from the investigative journalism workshops in
Uganda have been transferred to Tanzania, Mauritius, Benin, Malawi, Ethiopia,
Ukraine, and Nicaragua through regional workshops, study tours, and exchanges.
G. Integrity Steering Committees and Operational Boards
The Integrity Steering Committees are the watchdog body and mechanism to launch,
implement and monitor a country’s integrity strategy. Its mandate typically consists
of:
• a broad-based development and delineation of an integrity strategy;

61
Uganda has, with the help of donors, trained over 200 journalists in investigative journalism, most of
who work in print media. However, Uganda’s eight FM radio stations and the two Radio Uganda
stations reach 80 percent of Uganda’s population, according to the 1993 Research International Report.
The two leading English daily newspapers reach 10 percent with their combined daily circulation of
about 42,000–45,000 papers.
62
• monitoring of the implementation of an integrity strategy;
• translating the anti-corruption policies of the municipal and national integrity
strategy and action plans into legislation;
• ensuring broad-based support of the national and municipal integrity strategies by
the general public; and
• guaranteeing momentum for the implementation of the municipal integrity
strategy and the anti-corruption action plan.
The key challenge to staffing the Committee or Anti-Corruption Agency is to appoint
organizations or citizens/opinion makers known and respected for their integrity.
Examples include prominent members of business groups, agricultural credit unions,
farmers’ associations, unions, religious groups, media, and special interest groups.
The task of the Committee is to prepare the integrity and action planning meetings. It
must also identify priority areas, plan the implementation strategy for the integrity
strategy and the integrity action plan by balancing short, medium, and long-term
reform goals, and design mechanisms for raising public awareness and encouraging
broad-based citizen participation.
In the case of long-term initiatives, such as service delivery and legal reforms that
tend to be technical in nature, the Committee may create specialized joint sub-
committees and assign them specific fields of action. The Integrity Steering
Committee must be also legalized through a public participation law. This law must
clearly establish the composition, functions, and jurisdiction of these bodies.
Additionally, operational boards must be formed with the purpose of undertaking the
every day watchdog role mandated by the aforementioned steering committee in each
key government institution suffering from critical levels of corruption. These boards
must cover several activities involving for example the monitoring the execution of
budget-related affairs; monitoring social investment projects implemented by the
government; and dealing with monitoring government procurement practices.
63
VIII. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS
A. Introduction
Several international instruments, both soft and hard law, have been developed during
the last decade. However, a comprehensive international binding legal instrument is
still lacking. Existing instruments are limited in scope, substance and geographical
coverage. The following summary describes existing anti-corruption legal instruments
62

B. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by
the General Assembly on 15 November 2000 and open for signature from 12 to 15
December 2000 in Palermo (Italy), though mainly aimed at the fight against organized
crime, includes several provisions related to the phenomenon of corruption.
The Convention envisages criminalization of corrupt acts by public officials; adoption
of such measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence participation
as an accomplice in corruption-related offences; liability (criminal, civil or
administrative) of persons who corrupt public officials; measures to prevent, detect
and punish the corruption of public officials; promotion of the concept of "integrity"
of public officials as well as the provision for adequate independence of authorities
engaged in the prevention, detection and punishment of those who corrupt public
officials. The Convention strengthens its provisions by stating that the offence of
corruption shall be established, inter alia, independent of any transnational nature or
involvement of an organized criminal group.
The Convention also provides that each State Party shall adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, i) the promise,
offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage,
for the official himself or herself, or another person or entity, in order that the official
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties and, ii) the
solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue
advantage, for the official himself or herself, or another person or entity, in order that
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. In
addition, each State Party shall consider criminalizing the conduct described above
where it involves a foreign public official or an international civil servant. Other
forms of corruption are also identified for criminalization.
The UN Convention introduces and promotes the concept of "integrity" of public
officials and foresees that each State Party shall take measures to ensure effective
action by its authorities in the prevention, detection and punishment of corruption by
public officials. Independence of the anti-corruption authorities is also provided for
(article 9).
With respect to confiscation and seizure, the UN Convention provides that States
Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their domestic legal systems,

62
See United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in Commercial Transactions
(General Assembly Resolution 51/191, Annex) and International Code of Conduct for Public Officials
(General Assembly Resolution 51/59, Annex) See Report of the Secretary-General on international
instruments, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 10th Session, E-CN.15/2001/#.
64
such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of: i) proceeds of crime
derived from offences covered by this Convention, or property, the value of which
equals that of the criminal proceeds; and ii) property, equipment or other
instrumentalities used in or destined for use in offences covered by the Convention.
For this purpose, each State Party shall empower its courts or other competent
authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be
seized. Sates Parties shall not decline to act on the grounds of bank secrecy.
The provisions of the UN Convention dealing with extradition and mutual legal
assistance are similar to traditional provisions already in place in many regional and
bilateral agreements. The major significance of these provisions is that a large number
of countries are expected to ratify the Convention thus making legal assistance and
extradition available more widely than is presently the case. However, these
provisions are intended to set minimum standards only. Countries can go further in
bilateral or regional arrangements, and are in fact encouraged to do so.
According to Article 16, extradition from another State Party may be sought for the
four specific offences established by the Convention. This remedy will be available
regardless of whether or not there was involvement in the offence by an organized
criminal group. However, the offence itself must be punishable by the domestic laws
of both States. Where extradition is refused solely on grounds that the concerned
person is one of the requested State Party’s nationals, the requested State Party shall,
at the request of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case
without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution
(article 16, par.10). Also, States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition on the
sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters (article 16,
par. 15).
Article 18 provides that the broadest measure of mutual legal assistance can be
requested from another State Party for any investigation, prosecution or judicial
proceedings in relation to offences covered by the Convention. The provisions of this
article can be used to obtain statements or other evidence, conduct searches or
seizures, serve judicial documents, examine objects or sites, obtain original
documents or certified copies, identify or trace proceeds of crime or other property,
obtain bank, corporate or other records, facilitate the appearance of persons in the
requesting state party, or any other form of assistance permitted by the laws of the
states involved (article 18, par.3). Since the variety of available assistance is generally
consistent with many existing mutual legal assistance agreements, the major
significance of the Convention provisions are that these extend mutual legal
assistance to a much greater number of countries than is presently the case. According
to article 18, par. 8, States Parties to the UN Convention shall not decline to render
mutual legal assistance on grounds of bank secrecy.
In addition, the UN Convention also provides the general basis for conducting joint
investigations (article19), co-operation in special investigative procedures, such as
electronic surveillance, and general law-enforcement co-operation (articles 20 and
27). The development of domestic training programmes and the provision of technical
assistance to other States in training matters are also encouraged (articles 29 and 30).
C. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption COUNCIL OF EUROPE
In November 1998, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the
text of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and decided to open it for
65
signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe and the non-Member States
that had participated in its elaboration. Currently Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic;
Denmark; Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia have ratified the Convention.
The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption is an instrument aimed at the co-
ordinated criminalization of a large number of corrupt practices. For example, it seeks
to criminalize: i) active and passive bribery of domestic and foreign public officials;
ii) active and passive bribery of national and foreign parliamentarians and of members
of international parliamentary assemblies; iii) active and passive bribery in the private
sector; iv) active and passive bribery of officials of international organizations; v)
active and passive bribery of domestic, foreign and international judges and officials
of international courts; vi) active and passive trading in influence; vii) money-
laundering of proceeds from corruption offences; and viii) accounting offences
(invoices, accounting documents, etc.) connected with corruption offences. In
addition, it is foreseen that each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish criminal laws against aiding or abetting the
commission of any of the criminal offences established in accordance with the
Convention.
States are required to provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and
measures, including, when committed by natural persons, penalties involving
deprivation of liberty that can lead to extradition. Legal persons will also be liable for
the criminal offences of active bribery, trading in influence and money-laundering, as
established in accordance with the Convention and committed for their benefit, and
will be subject to effective criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary
sanctions. Furthermore, the Convention contains provisions concerning the
development of specialized anti-corruption bodies, protection of persons collaborating
with investigating or prosecuting authorities and gathering of evidence and
confiscation of proceeds.
The Convention also provides for enhanced international co-operation (mutual
assistance, extradition and the provision of information) in the investigation and
prosecution of corruption offences. In connection with mutual assistance, it provides
that Parties must create special designated central authorities to handle requests in a
prompt manner. While mutual assistance may be refused if the request undermines the
fundamental interests, national sovereignty, national security or ordre public of the
requested Party, refusal may not be made on the grounds of bank secrecy.
D. Civil Law Convention on Corruption
The Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe is the first attempt
to define common international rules in the field of civil law and corruption. It aims at
requiring each Party to provide in its internal law for effective remedies for persons
who have suffered damage as a result of corruption, in order to enable them to defend
their rights and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for
damage. However, only Albania, Bulgaria and Estonia have ratified this Convention.
The Convention requires each Party to provide, in its internal law, for the right to
commence a civil action in corruption cases. It should be noted that, under the
Convention, damages may not be limited to any standard payment but must be
determined according to the actual loss sustained. This excludes punitive damages.
However, parties whose domestic laws provide for punitive damages are not
66
precluded from seeking such damages. The extent of compensation is determined by
the Court which is empowered to award such compensation for material damages,
loss of profits and for non-pecuniary losses. In order to obtain compensation, the
plaintiff must prove the actual damage, must show whether the defendant acted with
intent or negligence, and must indicate the causal link between the corrupt behavior
and the damage. With regard to the unlawful behavior on the part of the defendants, it
should be noted that, as a matter of policy, those who directly and knowingly
participate in corruption should be liable for damage that results. This includes
liability on the part of the giver and the recipient of the bribe, as well as those who
incited or aided the corruption or failed to take the appropriate steps to prevent
corruption.
The Convention also deals with the issue of state responsibility for acts of corruption
by public officials. However, the Convention does not indicate the conditions for the
liability of a State Party but leaves each Party free to determine in its internal law the
conditions under which the Party would be liable.
The validity of contracts is also addressed. According to the respective provision
“each Party shall provide in its internal law for any contract or clause of a contract
providing for corruption to be null and void”. Furthermore, each Party shall provide in
its internal law for the possibility for all parties to a contract whose consent has been
undermined by an act of corruption to be able to apply to the court for the contract to
be declared void, notwithstanding any right to claim for damages.
The Convention also aims at protecting the interests of whistleblowers by obliging
State Parties to take the necessary measures to protect employees who report, in good
faith, their suspicions on corrupt practices.
Finally, the Convention addresses international co-operation. Under the Convention,
Parties shall cooperate effectively in matters relating to civil proceedings in cases of
corruption, especially concerning the service of documents, obtaining evidence
abroad, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements and litigation
costs, in accordance with the provisions of relevant international instruments on
international co-operation in civil and commercial matters to which they are Party, as
well as with their internal law.
E. Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
In May 1999, the representatives of the Committee of Ministers of Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, by adopting
resolution 99 (5), established the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). 63
The aim of the GRECO is to improve its members' capacity to fight corruption by
monitoring their undertakings in this field, including the ratification, implementation
and compliance of State Parties with the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight
against Corruption and implementation of the international legal instruments adopted
in pursuit of the Programme of Action against Corruption64.

63
The following countries have then become Member States of GRECO: Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Denmark; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia; Hungary; Latvia; Poland; United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.
64
The Programme of Action against Corruption, drafted by the Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption,
has been approved by the Committee of Ministers in November 1996.
67
Ad hoc teams of experts are appointed to evaluate each member in each evaluation
round. Evaluation teams examine replies to questionnaires, request and examine
additional information to be submitted either orally or in writing, visit member
countries for the purpose of seeking additional information relevant to the evaluation,
and prepare draft evaluation reports for discussion and adoption at the plenary
sessions.
F. The twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption
In resolution (97) 24 of November 1997, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe agreed to adopt the twenty guiding principles for the fight against
corruption, elaborated by the Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption (GMC).65 The
principles represent the fundamental directives that Member States are called to
implement in their efforts against corruption both at national and international levels.
The principles, which have been elaborated on the basis of the recognition that the
fight against corruption must be multidisciplinary, include different elements such as
i) raising public awareness and promoting ethical behaviour; ii) ensuring a co-
ordinated criminalization of national and international corruption; iii) guaranteeing
the appropriate independence and autonomy of those in charge of the prevention,
investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption offences; iv) taking
appropriate measures for the seizure and deprivation of the proceeds of corruption
offences as well as for preventing legal persons being used to shield corruption
offences; and v) limiting immunity from investigation, prosecution or adjudication of
corruption offences to the degree necessary in a democratic society. In addition, the
Committee of Ministers agreed on other measures such as i) promoting the
specialisation of persons or bodies in charge of fighting corruption and providing
them with appropriate means and training to perform their task; ii) denying tax
deductibility for bribes and other expenses linked to corruption offences; iii) adopting
codes of conduct both for public officials and elected representatives; iv) promoting
transparency within the public administration, particularly through the adoption of
appropriate auditing procedures, activities of the public administration sector as well
as public procurement processes; v) guaranteeing that the media have freedom to
receive and impart information on corruption matters; vi) ensuring that civil law takes
into account the need to fight corruption and provides effective remedies for those
whose rights and interests are affected by corruption; and vii) ensuring that in every
aspect of the fight against corruption, the possible connections with organized crime
and money laundering are taken into account.
G. Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted, on 11 May 2000, a
recommendation on codes of conduct for public officials which includes a Model
Code of Conduct for Public Officials. The Model Code of Conduct offers suggestions
on how to deal with real situations frequently confronting public officials, such as
gifts, use of public resources, dealing with former public officials, etc. The Code
stresses the importance of the integrity of public officials and the accountability of
hierarchical superiors. It comprises three objectives: 1) to specify the standards of
integrity and conduct to be observed by public officials 2) methods to help them meet

65
The Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption has been set up as a result of the 1994 Malta Conference
of the European Ministers of Justice.
68
those standards and 3) to inform the public of the conduct it is entitled to expect of
public officials. Furthermore, it contains a series of general principles addressing, for
example, conflicts of interest, incompatible outside activities, appropriate reactions
when confronted with problems such as offers of undue advantages, especially gifts,
susceptibility to the influence of others, misuse of official position, use of official
information and public resources for private purposes and the rules to follow when
leaving the public service, especially in relations with former public officials.
H. Convention of the European Union on the protection of its financial interests
The Convention constitutes the first agreement under “Provisions on police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters” of the Treaty of the European Union. It has
been ratified by Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Sweden and
United Kingdom.
The Convention aims at protecting the European Communities’ financial interests by
calling for the criminal prosecution of fraudulent conduct injuring those interests.
Fraudulent acts are defined as all acts affecting the European Communities’ financial
interests, including any intentional act or omission relating to: (i) the use or
presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, which results
in the misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds from the general budget of the
European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European
Communities, (ii) non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation,
with the same effect, (iii) the misapplication of such funds for purposes other than
those for which they were originally granted. Revenue related incidents such as: (i)
the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents,
which has as its effect the illegal diminution of the resources of the general budget of
the European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European
Communities, (ii) non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation,
with the same effect, (iii) misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, with the same
effect, are also included.
Member States are obliged to establish jurisdiction over these offences when: (i)
fraud, participation in fraud or attempted fraud affecting the European Communities’
financial interests is committed in whole or in part within its territory, including fraud
for which the benefit was obtained in that territory, (ii) a person within its territory
knowingly assists or induces the commission of such fraud within the territory of any
other State, (iii) the offender is a national of the Member State concerned, provided
that the law of that Member State may require the conduct to be punishable also in the
country where it occurred. Furthermore the Convention establishes the criminal
liability of heads of businesses and covers the issues of extradition and prosecution as
well as cooperation.
I. Protocol on the Convention on protection of the European Communities’
financial interests
The Protocol was elaborated as an additional instrument to complement the
Convention and to reinforce the protection of the Communities’ financial interests.
The Protocol is primarily aimed at acts of corruption that damage, or are likely to
damage, the European Communities’ financial interests. In order to ensure a broad
and homogenous application of its substantive provisions, the Protocol is applicable to
community officials, national officials and officials of another Member State.
69
With regard to jurisdiction, the Protocol establishes a series of criteria conferring
jurisdiction of a Member State to prosecute and try cases involving the offences
covered by the Protocol if (a) the offence is committed in whole or in part within its
territory; (b) the offender is one of its nationals or one of its officials; (c) the offence
is committed against a national of the Member State, an official as defined by the
Protocol, or member of a Community institution; (d) the offender is a Community
official working for a Community institution or a body set up in accordance with the
Treaties establishing the European Communities which has its headquarters in the
Member State concerned.
J. Second Protocol on the Convention on the protection of the European
Communities’ financial interests
The Second Protocol is directed at the liability of legal persons, the laundering and
confiscation of proceeds of corruption, and cooperation between the Member States
and the Commission for the purpose of protecting the European Communities’
financial interests and protecting personal data related thereto.
According to the Second Protocol legal persons shall be made liable for fraud, active
corruption and money laundering committed for their benefit by any person, acting
either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who has a leading
position within the legal person, based on (i) a power of representation of the legal
person, or (ii) an authority to make decisions on behalf of the legal person, or (iii) an
authority to exercise control within the legal person, as well as for involvement as
accessories or instigators in such fraud, active corruption or money laundering or the
attempted commission of such fraud. In addition, Member States shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of
supervision or control by a person referred to has contributed to enabling the
commission of a fraud or an act of active corruption or money laundering for the
benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority. The sanctions for
violations under national law shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and other
sanctions such as: (a) exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; (b)
temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities;
(c) placement under judicial supervision and (d) a judicial winding-up order.”
Member States shall also take the necessary measures to enable the seizure and,
without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, confiscation or removal of
the instruments and proceeds of fraud, active and passive corruption and money
laundering, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds. Any
instruments, proceeds or other property seized or confiscated shall be allocated or
distributed by the Member State in accordance with its national law.”
K. Convention of the European Union on the fight against corruption involving
officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States
The Convention has been elaborated in order to help ensure that corrupt conduct
involving Community officials or Member States’ officials is criminalised. Prior to
the Convention, criminal law in most Member States did not apply to officials of
other Member States, even where covered offences took place in their own territory or
at the instigation of one of their own nationals. As this situation became increasingly
intolerable, the Council decided to develop a free-standing international legal
instrument addressing corrupt conduct involving Community officials or Member
States’ officials. The Convention draws extensively from the agreements reached in
70
the above Protocol. It sanctions active and passive corruption by “Community
officials” and “national officials” as well as the participation and instigation of such
acts.
In order to broaden and strengthen the scope of the anti-corruption measures
introduced by the Convention, it requires that each Member State’s criminal law be
adjusted to accommodate certain offences committed by individuals occupying
specific posts in the Community institutions. As with the first Protocol, a principle of
assimilation is introduced whereby Member States will be bound to apply to members
of the Community institutions the same descriptions of corruption offences as apply to
individuals occupying similar posts within their own institutions.
L. Joint Action of 22 December 1998 on corruption in the private sector by the
Council of the European Union
The Joint Action of 22 December 1998 is directed at combating corruption in the
private sector on an international level. The Joint Action applies a broad definition of
the concept of ‘breach of duties’ covering, as a minimum, any disloyal behavior
constituting a breach of a statutory duty, or, as the case may be, a breach of
professional regulations or instructions which apply within the course of conducting
business. Passive corruption in the private sector is defined as the deliberate action of
a person who, in the course of his business activities, directly or through an
intermediary, requests or receives an undue advantage of any kind whatsoever, or
accepts the promise of such an advantage, for himself or for a third party, in order to
perform or refrain from performing an act in breach of his duties. Active corruption in
the private sector is described as the deliberate action of whosoever promises, offers
or gives, directly or through an intermediary, an undue advantage of any kind
whatsoever to a person, for himself or for a third party, in the course of the business
activities of that person, in order that the person should perform or refrain from
performing an act in breach of his duties.
The Joint Action also addresses forms of participation and instigation of active and
passive corruption, the liability of and sanctions for legal persons and establishment
of jurisdiction.
M. Inter-American Convention against Corruption
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption addresses measures to prevent
and control corruption. Towards this end, it obliges Member States to take necessary
action (1) to promote and strengthen the development of mechanisms needed to
prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption, and (2) to promote, facilitate and
regulate cooperation among the States Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures
and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the performance of
public functions and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance. Since
its effective date of 6 March 1997, it has been ratified by Argentina, Bahamas
(Commonwealth), Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The Convention defines as acts of corruption the following behaviors: (a) the
solicitation or acceptance, by a government official or a person who performs public
functions, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, in exchange for any act or
omission in the performance of his public functions, (b) the offering or granting, to a
71
government official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of his public functions, (c) any act or omission in the discharge of his
duties by a government official or a person who performs public functions for the
purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party, (d) the
fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of the acts referred to in
this article, (e) participation as a principal, co-principal, instigator, accomplice or
accessory after the fact, or in any other manner, in the commission or attempted
commission of, or in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit, any of the acts
referred to in this article 66. The Convention also covers transnational bribery and
illicit enrichment, even though it does not establish an obligation for criminalisation.
However, any State Party that decides not to follow the recommendation of the
Convention shall, as far as its own laws permit, provide assistance and cooperation
with respect to these offences. Transnational bribery is defined as “the offering or
granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual
residence in its territory, and businesses domiciled there, to a government official of
another State, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor,
promise or advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial transaction in
exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official’s public
functions.” Illicit enrichment is described as the “significant increase in the assets of a
government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful
earnings during the performance of his functions.”
With respect to prevention, States Parties agreed to consider the applicability of
measures within their own institutional systems to create, maintain and strengthen: (1)
standards of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper fulfillment of public
functions, (2) mechanisms to enforce these standards of conduct, (3) instruction to
government personnel to ensure proper understanding of their responsibilities and the
ethical rules governing their activities, (4) systems for registering the income, assets
and liabilities of persons who perform public functions in certain posts as specified by
law, (5) systems of government hiring and procurement of goods and services that
assure the openness, equity and efficiency of such systems, (6) government revenue
collection and control systems that deter corruption, (7) laws that deny favorable tax
treatment for any individual or corporation for expenditures made in violation of the
anti-corruption laws of the States Parties, (8) systems for protecting public servants
and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption, (9) oversight bodies
with a view to implementing modern mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing
and eradicating corrupt acts, (10) deterrents to the bribery of domestic and foreign
government officials, such as mechanisms to ensure that publicly held companies and
other types of associations maintain books and records which accurately reflect the
acquisition and disposition of assets, and have sufficient internal accounting controls
to enable their officers to detect corrupt acts, (11) mechanisms to encourage
participation by civil society and non-governmental organizations in efforts to prevent

66
For the purpose of its application the Convention defines the terms of “public function”, as any
temporary or permanent, paid or honorary activity, performed by a natural person in the name of the
State or in the service of the State or its institutions, at any level of its hierarchy. “Public official” is
defined as any official or employee of the State or its agencies, including those who have been selected,
appointed, or elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or in the service of the
State, at any level of its hierarchy. ”Property” means assets of any kind, whether movable or
immovable, tangible or intangible, and any document or legal instrument demonstrating, purporting to
demonstrate, or relating to ownership or other rights pertaining to such assets.
72
corruption, (12) the study of further preventive measures that take into account the
relationship between equitable compensation and probity in public service.
Furthermore, the Convention addresses the issues of jurisdiction over the offences it
has established in accordance with the Convention and issues of extradition and
mutual legal assistance. The Convention obliges State Parties to provide the broadest
assistance possible with regard to measures of assistance in the identification, tracing,
freezing, seizure and forfeiture of property or proceeds obtained, derived from or used
in the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention.
Finally, the Convention provides that State Parties, when requested to provide
assistance, shall not invoke bank secrecy as a basis for refusal. At the same time, the
requesting State shall be obligated not to use any information received that is
otherwise protected by bank secrecy for any purpose other than the proceeding for
which that information was requested.
N. OECD-Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions
The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions was signed on 17 December 1997 and became effective on 5
February 1999. At the beginning of 2001, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United
States have ratified the Convention. Brazil, Portugal, Turkey, Ireland, Luxembourg,
New Zealand and Chile are in the process of ratification.
The main purpose of this Convention is to provide a framework to criminalise
corruption in international business transactions. Countries party to the Convention
pledge to punish those accused of bribing officials of foreign countries, including
officials in countries that are not part of the Convention, for the purpose of obtaining
or retaining international business. The Convention seeks to ensure a functional
equivalence among the measures taken by the Parties to sanction bribery of foreign
public officials without requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a
Party's legal system. International bribery is defined as the intentional offer, promise,
or giving of any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order
that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct
of international businesses.
Also, the Convention addresses the issue of the criminal liability of legal persons, the
effectiveness of the criminal and civil sanctions, the jurisdiction for the offences
established under the Convention, the confiscation of the proceeds of corruption and
bribery and the provision of mutual legal assistance. With regard to the "enforcement"
of the offences established, the Convention recognizes the fundamental nature of
national regimes of prosecutorial discretion. However, it specifies that investigation
and prosecution of the bribery shall not be influenced by "...considerations of national
economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the identity
of the natural or legal persons involved.” Although the primary scope of the
Convention is the criminalization of the bribery of foreign public officials, it also
contains provisions related to money-laundering and falsified accounts. In this regard,
73
the Convention requires State Parties to make the bribery of foreign public officials a
predicate offence to money laundering, given that bribery as such is a predicate to
money laundering. In connection with falsified accounts, the Convention obliges State
Parties to take the necessary measures to prohibit the establishment of off-the-books
accounts and similar practices used to bribe foreign public official's or to hide such
bribery.
Within the framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions and pursuant to the OECD Convention, a rigorous procedure
for self- and mutual evaluation was adopted to ensure compliance with the
Convention. Since 1999 twenty-one countries out of the thirty-four signatories that
had deposited their instruments of ratification have been subject to close peer
monitoring. For each country, the Working Group on Bribery adopted a report,
including an evaluation, which was made available to the public subsequent to the
OECD meeting. As highlighted in a report on the implementation of the Convention,
presented in June 2000, the Working Group noted that there is overall compliance
with the Convention's obligations in the majority of countries.
O. Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions
A first Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions was
adopted in 1994. In 1997, the OECD Working Group on Bribery reviewed this
Recommendation and issued a revised version which was adopted by the OECD
Council on 23 May 1997. This document pulls together analytic work on anti-
corruption measures and commitments undertaken over the previous three years to
combat bribery in international business transactions. This revised version, as an
expression of the common political position, is an important vehicle to encourage
action by Member countries. Its implementation is enabled as it includes provisions
concerning monitoring and other follow-up procedures designed to promote their
implementation.
The Revised Recommendation invites member countries to '"take effective measures
to deter, prevent and combat" international bribery in a number of areas. Specifically,
it elaborates commitments in the fields of: criminalisation of bribery of foreign public
officials, accounting, banking, financial and other provisions designed to ensure that
adequate records are kept and made available for inspection and investigation. It also
covers public subsidies, licenses, government-procurement contracts and other public
advantage that could be denied as sanctions for bribery in appropriate cases. It also
urges prompt implementation of the 1996 Recommendation on the Tax Deductibility
of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials and incorporates the proposals contained in the
1996 Recommendation by the Development Assistance Committee on Anti-
Corruption Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement.
P. Future Convention against Corruption
In recent years, the international community has demonstrated an unprecedented
awareness of the gravity of corruption. Responding to the call of addressing
corruption in a coordinated manner, the international community became engaged in
the negotiation and the elaboration of several international legal instruments within
different organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the European Union, the
Organization of American States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
74
With the exception of the OECD, all the other intergovernmental organizations under
which the existing international legal instruments have been developed are regional.
One remark that can be made in this connection is that these instruments have been
developed by countries facing similar problems and sharing, at least to a certain
degree, similar legal practices. These characteristics are reflected in the approaches
taken and the choices made in these instruments. However, while the OECD
Convention is the only instrument having comprehensive geographical coverage, the
scope of the instrument remains rather limited. The instrument tackles solely a
specific part of the global problem of corruption; i.e. the so-called "supply" side of the
bribery of foreign public officials. Similar considerations must be made with regard to
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. While
comprehensive in its geographical scope, this instrument remains limited with regard
to substantive scope.
The General Assembly, via resolution 55/61, recognized the desirability of an
effective international legal instrument against corruption and has begun the
elaboration of such an instrument in Vienna at the headquarters of the Centre for
International Crime Prevention of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention.
The mandates by the General Assembly, in resolutions 55/61 and 55/188, represent a
unique opportunity to develop a global and comprehensive legal instrument against
corruption which can fully address the concerns of the international community as a
whole and which can include provisions and mechanisms applicable at a global level.
The international community is in the advantageous position of being able to take
stock of what has proved more or less workable and feasible. It is also in a position to
explore, with the benefit of the broadest possible participation, whether common
thinking has evolved over the last few years and whether the experience of existing
joint efforts has enabled innovative solutions to emerge.
The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report analysing
all relevant international instruments and other documents and recommendations
addressing corruption and asked the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, at its tenth session, to review and assess the report and, on that basis, to
provide recommendations and guidance as to future work on the development of a
legal instrument against corruption. In addition, the Assembly requested the
Secretary-General to convene an intergovernmental open-ended expert group to
examine and prepare, on the basis of the above report and of the recommendations of
the Commission at its tenth session, draft terms of reference for the negotiation of the
future legal instrument against corruption.
In accordance with General Assembly resolution 55/188 on "preventing and
combating corrupt practices and illegal transfer of funds and repatriation of such
funds to the countries of origin", the above intergovernmental open-ended expert
group will also examine the question of illegally transferred funds and the repatriation
of such funds to their countries of origin. The intergovernmental open-ended expert
group is expected to meet in Vienna from 30 July to 3 August 2001.
75
IX. NATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
A. Criminal Law
1. Sanctioning of corruption and related acts
Corruption has been defined as the abuse of (public) power for private gain. This
would include acts such as bribery, embezzlement and theft of public resources by
public officials, fraud damaging the state and extortion, as well as the laundering of
the proceeds from such activities. Certain other behaviors such as favoritism and
nepotism, conflicts of interest and contributions to political parties may, under
specific conditions, be considered worth sanctioning by means of administrative or
criminal law. The difficulty of defining these types of acts as corruption lies in the
fact that only from time to time do they actually cause damage either to the state, the
individual, or to the public at large. Often the harm they cause consists mainly of a
negative perception that ultimately results in a decrease in trust of the public towards
the State.
Another measure worth considering is the criminalisation of the creation of slush
funds, that is the accumulation of assets “off the books” with the purpose to use such
funds to pay bribes. In many national legal systems, the creation of slush funds is not
necessarily illegal. 67
There is an increasing tendency, both at the international and national levels, to
criminalize the possession of unexplained wealth by introducing offences that
penalize any (former) public servants who are, or have been, maintaining a standard
of living or holding pecuniary resources or property that are significantly
disproportionate to their present or past known legal income and who are unable to
produce a satisfactory explanation for this. Several national legislators have
introduced such provisions and, at the international level, the offence of “illicit
enrichment” or “unexplained wealth” has become an accepted instrument in the fight
against corruption. 68 An alternative to criminalization of unexplained wealth could be
to provide, instead, for administrative sanctions that do not require the unconditional
presumption of innocence and that do not carry the stigma of conviction or make a
person liable to imprisonment. Examples would be loss of office, loss of licenses and
procurement contracts, and exclusion from certain professions, etc.69
Since business and high level corruption are often committed by legal persons, in
particular corporate entities, normative solutions must be developed regarding their
criminal liability. This desire has been recognized by many jurisdictions and is
provided for in some international legal instruments. Companies that do not have any
risk of being dissolved and loosing their assets if they engage in, or tolerate, criminal
activities of their staff, are unlikely to strengthen compliance with the law. This is

67
Art. 8 of the OECD Convention and Art. V. of the OECD Recommendation (Note 3). See also the
Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Corruption and its Financial Channels (Paris, 30 March to 1
April 1999), I.E.14 (k).
68
For example, Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance Section 10; Botswana Corruption and
Economic Crime Act, Art. 34; Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention against
Corruption, Art. IX; National Law of the Republic of Indonesia on combating the criminal act of
corruption No. 31/ 1999, Art. 37
69
For example, Italian Law No. 575/ 1965.
76
especially true if there are incentives to not comply with the law, as is often the case
in the context of corruption. Both, the UN Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Criminal Law Convention of the Council of Europe foresee
establishing (criminal) liability of legal persons for the participation in the offences of
active and passive corruption and money laundering.
2. Confiscation of the proceeds of corruption
Confiscation of the proceeds of corruption should be obligatory and where proceeds
per se cannot be confiscated, confiscation should be ordered for the equivalent value
of the proceeds. In this regard, consideration for easing the evidentiary requirements
needed in order to establish the illicit origin of the proceeds of corruption should be
allowed. Various national legislators have introduced such provisions. They are all
based on the concept that a public officials’ property should be confiscated if they
maintain standards of living, or if they control or possess pecuniary resources or
property, that are disproportionate to their present or past known sources of income,
and if they fail to give a satisfactory explanation in this regard70. The official is in the
best position to explain how he or she came into these excessive possessions.
Jurisprudence in most legal systems agree that courts can require defendants to
establish (at least on the balance of probabilities) the existence of facts “peculiarly
within their own knowledge”. Such is the case with personal possessions. This does
not reverse the burden of proof but simply establishes rules for the gathering and
evaluation of evidence that allows the court to base its decision on a realistic
foundation. Unexplained wealth that is totally out of proportion with past and present
sources of income points to some sort of hidden income. Although such wealth may
be totally legal (such as inheritance, gifts from wealthy relatives, or a win on the
lottery) it is likely to be illegal if the owner cannot – or is unwilling to - provide a
satisfactory explanation for it.
Both the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs an Psychotropic Substances of 1988 provide a
useful model with respect to easing the onus of proof and provides a procedural
mechanism that can be of immense significance in anti-corruption efforts. The
approach has both tactical and strategic appeal. As a tactical weapon, it offers a means
of forfeiture that requires relatively few resources and involves little risk of unfairness
or error. Placing the burden of identification and explanation of assets on the
possessing official is tantamount to conducting psychological and tactical warfare
against corruption. The constant fear of being required to account for ill-gotten
possessions should give rise to a state of anxiety which would have a deterrent effect.
In easing this burden of proof and shifting the onus of proving ownership of excessive
wealth onto the beneficiary, careful consideration must be given to the principles of
due process, which in many jurisdictions are an integral part of the constitutional
protection of human rights. To ensure consistency with constitutional principles, no
change would be made in the presumption of innocence or the obligation of the
prosecuting authority to prove guilt. What may be established is a procedural or
evidentiary rule of a rebuttable presumption. Some countries, such as Italy71 and the

70
German Criminal Code Art. 73d, Singapore, Corruption Confiscation of Benefits Act, Art. 5; Art.
34a Norwegian General Civil Penal Code
71
Other states like Italy also enriched their legal framework with special administrative procedures that
allow for forfeiture and confiscation of assets independently of criminal conviction. Art. 2 ter of the
77
United States,72 in order to overcome constitutional concerns, provide for the
possibility of civil or administrative confiscation. Unlike confiscation in criminal
matters, this type of legislation does not require proof of illicit origin “beyond
reasonable doubt”. Instead, it considers a high probability of illicit origin and the
inability of the owner to prove to the contrary as sufficient to meet this requirement.
However, the more these sanctions resemble criminal penalties, the more they lead to
criticisms based on human rights. It is interesting to note that Germany, in order to
overcome concerns raised with regard to the presumption of innocence, has re-
introduced the property penalty recalling medieval penal proceedings. This provision,
as the name indicates, does not enable the confiscation of property of illegal or
apparently illegal origin, but establish a real penalty which applies independent of the
actual origin of the concerned assets. By introducing this provision, the legislature has
tried to avoid any limitation of the presumption of innocence.
B. Laws to facilitate the detection of corruption
Although corruption is not a victimless crime per se, unlike most crimes, the victim is
often not easily identifiable. Usually, those involved are beneficiaries in some way
and have an interest in preserving secrecy. Clear evidence of the actual payment of a
bribe can be exceptionally hard to obtain and corrupt practices frequently remain
unpunished. The traditional methods of evidence gathering will often not lead to
satisfactory results. Additional laws are needed providing for more innovative
evidence gathering procedures, such as integrity testing, amnesty regulations for those
involved in the corrupt transaction, whistleblower protection, abolition and/ or
limiting of enhanced bank, corporate and professional secrecy, money laundering
statutes, and access to information.
1. Collaboration of offenders
Parties to offences can be encouraged to come forward and offer evidence. This
inevitably gives rise to the question of immunity from prosecution and amnesties. In
Central and Eastern Europe there exist provisions that when the giver of a bribe
reports it within 24 hours, he can be immune from prosecution (others might see this
really as a matter of reporting the fact that one has been the victim of extortion).
However, it seems that these provisions have not operated effectively, if at all. In the
US, the first person involved in the violation of a Securities and Exchange
Commission offence who “blows the whistle” is usually granted automatic immunity.
This introduces an element of risk into the corruption equation.

Law 31 May 1965/ No. 575 foresees the seizure of property that is owned directly or indirectly by any
person suspected of participating in Mafia-type associations when its value appears to be out of all
proportion to his or her income or economic activities, or when it can be reasonably argued, based on
the available evidence, that the said goods are the proceeds of unlawful activities or the use thereof.
The seized property consequently becomes subject to confiscation if its lawful origin cannot be proved.
72
The United States Anti-Drug Abuse Act 31 U.S.C. § 5316 foresees a so-called "civil confiscation".
Differently from criminal confiscation, this type of measure does not require proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the illicit origin of the property to be confiscated, but considers a probable cause to be
sufficient. The rules of evidence of criminal procedure are not applicable. If the illegal origin is
probable, the burden of proof shifts to the owner who has to prove the legal origin of the property.
However, civil confiscation has been strongly criticized for violating the rights of defence and of
private property.
78
Any provision granting the offender immunity or limitation of criminal responsibility
for contributing to the detection of crimes in which he has been involved should
require an admission in sufficient detail to allow authorities to prosecute other
criminals. Further, redistribution of all ill-gotten proceeds should be effected.
2. Money laundering statutes
Money laundering statutes can contribute significantly to the detection of corruption
and related offences by providing the basis for financial investigations. Identification
and recording obligations as well as the reporting of suspicious transaction, as it is
also required by the UN-Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, will not
only facilitate detection of the crime of money laundering but will also help identify
the criminal acts from which the illicit proceeds originated. It is therefore essential to
establish corruption as a predicate offence to money laundering.
Identification by financial institutions of the true beneficiaries of a transaction can
often be difficult. Criminals engaged in money laundering typically use false
identities. Financial institutions must refrain from entering into business relations
where true identification is questionable and in particular when identification is
impossible because of the use of company schemes that are mainly designed to
guarantee anonymity. Furthermore, all relevant information regarding the client and
the transaction need to be registered. In order to make this a manageable task, the
obligation should exist, at a minimum, where the transaction exceeds a certain value
or where the client wants to enter into a permanent business relationship with the
institute, for example when opening an account. Regardless of the value of the single
transaction, financial operators should be obliged to report such transactions that give
rise to reasonable suspicions that the assets involved in the transaction derive from
one of the predicate offences of money laundering. The reporting obligation should be
established independent of the institute actually executing the transaction.
In order to support financial institutions in implementing this obligation, “Red Flag
Catalogues” indicating instances in which they should pay special attention to
transactions having no apparent economic or obvious lawful purpose, should be
provided to them. Criteria relating to corruption/money-laundering will be different
from those “red flags” pointing towards drug-money laundering. It is possible to make
distinctions between high-risk areas, industries and persons, and risky transactions. It
might therefore be advisable to include in the traditional lists of “red flags” those
situations that point to possible corruption proceeds.
The above obligations should not necessarily be limited to institutions entitled to
execute financial operations. Instead, it should also be considered to extend the
obligations to other businesses which are typically conducting transactions of
considerable value, such as broker/dealers in gold, company shares and other
precious commodities.
The statute should also provide for sufficient penalties for violation of the obligations.
In some jurisdictions it might be considered to provide for procedures that ensure the
adequate protection of the bank personnel.
3. Limitation of bank and professional secrecy as well as the introduction of
adequate corporate laws
Banking secrecy laws are a serious obstacle to successful corruption investigations.
The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Drug Convention
79
address the issue of bank secrecy in the context of confiscation. Efforts at reducing
secrecy of account ownership has resulted in some traditional tax havens adjusting
procedures to allow more access to accounts and greater possibility of confiscation,
while other jurisdictions have used the opportunity to capture a greater share of the
international market by offering enhanced bank secrecy.
However, bank secrecy is not the only obstacle to investigations. Accounts opened in
the name of a company often provide for the true beneficiaries to remain anonymous.
Banking laws and regulations that prevent information on the true identity of
beneficiaries from being obtained have been identified as a source of concern at
various international fora, such as the Paris Expert Group on Corruption and its
Financial Channels and the OECD Working Group on Corruption.73
4. Access to information legislation
If information is power, to increase public access to information serves to empower
the civil society to oversee the state. If done correctly, increased access to information
could raise the likelihood of detecting instances of corruption. In an environment of
transparency, citizens, NGO’s, and the media can easily obtain necessary information
to detect irregularities in public administration which are often indicators for
inappropriate management of resources, if not outright corruption. Many Member
States, both in the North and the South, have recognized this and have enacted
appropriate legislation 74. The basic principle is the “right to know”. Access to
Information Legislation provides for the practical tools to implement this right.
Access to Information Laws usually adopt four methods to achieve its objective. It
usually provides that (1) every government agency is required to publish an annual
statement of its operations, (2) a legally enforceable right of access to documented
information held by the government be recognized, subject only to such exceptions as
are reasonably necessary to protect public interests or personal privacy. (3) a person’s
right to apply to amend any record containing information relating to them which, in
their opinion, is incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading be recognized and (4)
independent bodies provide a two-tier system to appeal against any refusal to provide
access.
C. Administrative Law
Judicially-supervised administrative procedures, involving the citizens’ right to a
hearing, notice requirements and a right to a statement of reasons for a public
official’s decision, are all effective mechanisms for preventing and controlling corrupt
practices because they give civil society a tool to challenge abuse of authority. This is
also an effective mechanisms for citizens to challenge non-transparent policy making.
By creating judicially-enforceable procedural administrative rights, politicians
decentralize the monitoring function to their constituents, who can bring suits to place
public pressure in cases of politicians of bureaucratic abuse of power. In these cases,

73
Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Corruption and its Financial Channels (Paris, 30 March to 1
April 1999), I.C.6 (f), and I.D.11.
74
Australia, New South Wales, Freedom of Information Act 1989; Ireland, Access to Information Act ,
1997; Sweden, The Freedom of the Press Act; Uganda, Right of Access to Information, Article 41 of
the Constitution of Uganda, 1995; United States of America, Freedom of Information Act, Part 552 of
Title 5 (U.S. Code)
80
one could state that administrative substantive laws and procedures are means of
ensuring accountability and act as instruments of political control of the state. They
serve the purpose of monitoring and disciplining public officials.
There are also some drawbacks that need to be taken into account when introducing
administrative law as an anti-corruption tool. First, extensive administrative
procedures may entail a slower, less flexible administration. At the same time, these
procedural rights that extend to politicians’ opponents may be used for political
purposes in order to gain electoral advantages.
81
X. CURBING ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS AND THE
REPATRIATION OF ASSETS
A. Introduction
The large-scale illegal transfer of funds by corrupt political leaders, their relatives and
their close associates has long been a serious problem. The former Shah of Iran was
alleged to have misappropriated some $35 billion during the 25 years of his reign,
largely disguised by foundations and charities. Papa Doc Duvalier and his son, Jean
Claude Duvalier, as Presidents of Haiti from 1957 to 1986, were alleged to have
extracted between $500 million and $2 billion from the state, an estimated 87% of
government expenditure being paid directly or indirectly to Duvalier and his
associates between 1960 and 1967. The case against family members of former
President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, is still ongoing almost 15 years after
he left office amid allegations that he misappropriated at least $5 billion of state
assets.75
More recently, a Pakistani court convicted the husband of former Pakistani Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, of accepting $9 million in kickbacks, and
he is known to have channeled $40 million of unexplainable origin through Citibank
private bank accounts. In Nigeria, the late Sani Abacha and his associates are
estimated to have removed funds from Nigeria of up to $5.5 billion, mainly deriving
from the systematic looting of the Central Bank, as well as bribes received by foreign
investors. In Peru, a congressional investigation has estimated that Vladimiro
Montesinos, Peru’s former head of intelligence, might have acquired as much as $800
million from activities including kickbacks from military procurement. Former
Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko is believed to have embezzled around $1
billion from the state. Now under arrest in the United States on charges of laundering
some $114 million, Lazarenko has admitted to having laundered $5 million through
Switzerland, which has repatriated almost $6 million to Ukraine.
Broadly speaking, the assets mainly derive from bribes, kickbacks, extortion and
protection money, the systematic looting of the state treasury, the illegal selling of
national resources, the diversion of loans granted by regional and international
lending institutions and of project funding contributed by bi- and multilateral donor
agencies.
In view of these occurrences, repatriation of assets diverted by top-level public
officials and politicians through corrupt practices has become a pressing issue to
many Member States. However, the successes have been scarce so far. Most cases
take years to conclude and all are extremely expensive. It is rare that more than a
small proportion of the illegal funds is repatriated to the country from which they
were stolen. In the Marcos case, after 15 years, only $600 million (much of that
interest on the original sum) of more than $5 billion lies in escrow in the Philippines
National Bank and the case shows no signs of being concluded.
The problems hindering repatriation may vary depending on the countries involved.
Nevertheless, current and past cases seem to share some similarities. For example, the
following factors hinder or render successful recovery of assets impossible: (1) the
absence or weakness of the political will within the victim country as well as within

75
A 1989 RICO claim brought in California estimated that the assets amounted to $5 billion.
82
those countries where the assets have been diverted, (2) the lack of an adequate legal
framework allowing for necessary actions in an efficient and effective manner, (3)
insufficient technical expertise within the victim country to prepare the groundwork at
the national level, such as by filing charges against the offenders and at the
international level to prepare the mutual legal assistance request, (4) the specialized
technical expertise is extremely limited and mainly provided by private lawyers
whose services are very expensive and who normally do not have any interest in
building the necessary capacities at the national level, (5) the reluctance of victim
States to improve their national institutional and legal anti-corruption framework, a
deficiency which may not only lead to the further looting of the country, but also
seriously damaging to the credibility of the country when requesting mutual legal
assistance.
B. Lack of political will
A strong and committed political will in both the requesting as well as the requested
state is essential for the successful outcome of the recovery effort. Direct involvement
in the diversion of state funds by high-level government officials, and all too often the
countries’ leaders themselves, can impede any action that could be taken. Once a new
government comes into power, its credibility depends largely on the question to what
extent it will prove willing and capable to deal with the “grand corruption” that took
place under its predecessor. Successful recovery of what has been looted from a
country can be more important to the public than sanctioning and imprisonment of
the offenders. The repatriation of stolen funds can not only confirm to the public a
return of the rule of law, but can also provide the government with the necessary
resources to implement the reforms promised during the crucial initial phase of
coming into power.
However, even where a Government decides to embark on a recovery effort, their
internal political conditions may not to allow an unrestricted effort. This condition not
only affects the credibility of the recovery initiative, but also of the new government
in general. For example, restricting recovery efforts to certain person or circle of
people might lead to difficulties in the process of gathering evidence since such
evidence might lead to the uncovering of assets that have been diverted by other
people than those targeted. In some instances, the lack of unconditional political will
to recover all funds that have been diverted may hinder the recovery effort and can
lead to criticism both at the national and international level. This could eventually
lead to the reluctance of some parties involved to provide their full support and
collaboration.
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Another common feature of many cases is that the victim states often concentrate
exclusively on the extraterritorial investigations while they neglect the basic
preparatory work at the national level. In most jurisdictions, there is little hope to
recover assets unless a conviction is obtained for the crimes committed in the course
of the looting and the connection between those crimes and the assets abroad has been
established76.
A lack of political will on the part of the requested country is also a common barrier
to successful recovery of stolen assets. Authorities may be reluctant to move against
powerful interest groups, such as banks. This seems particularly obvious where the
banks are not only holding the assets but were also involved in facilitating their
transfer in the first place77. Wherever the political will is weak, there is little chance
that the complex legal and factual problems typically occurring in cases of asset
recovery will be overcome.
C. Legal framework
Recent examples of recovery efforts show that there is no legal framework providing
sufficiently practicable basis for the recovery of assets diverted through corrupt
practices. Multi- and bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties are too limited in their
substantial and geographical scope and are therefore often not applicable except in the
context of the specific case from which they originated. As a consequence, no
standard procedure is applied. Recovery strategies vary from civil recovery to
criminal recovery to a mix of both. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages
and the final choice seems to depend exclusively on what is expected to work best in
the jurisdiction where the assets are located. Selection of the appropriate strategy,
therefore, requires specialized legal expertise that is typically very costly, if available

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In Nigeria, it was only after more than one years after the first mutual legal assistance requests had
been submitted, that charges were filed against M. Abacha at the Abuja High Court. In Mexico, Raúl
Salinas has been convicted of murder, but not of drug trafficking or money laundering. Peru has issued
warrants for the arrest of Vladimiro Montesinos, but he has disappeared. Former Ukrainian Prime
Minister Pavlo Lazarenko has been convicted in a U.S. court of money laundering but not yet in
Ukraine itself, where he is suspected of having stolen or generated up to $1 billion in illegal funds
77
A number of further significant developments in controlling the proceeds of corruption offences that implement
principles first enunciated in the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances. Initially, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) contains a
number of strong measures to control the proceeds of bribery and other serious crimes committed by an organized
group. Such measures are found in Articles 6 (criminalisation of laundering the proceeds of crime), 7 (regulatory
regime against money laundering), 12-14 (asset confiscation), 16(15) (non-refusal of extradition for fiscal
offences), 18(8), (22) (non-refusal of mutual assistance on bank secrecy or fiscal offence grounds). The Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1998) also contains strong obligations pertaining to control of
the proceeds of corruption, including in Articles 13 (corruption offences to be considered money laundering
predicates), 19(3) (confiscation of proceeds of corruption offences), 26(3) (non-refusal of mutual assistance on
bank secrecy grounds). Provisions of this sort also appear in the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1997) (Articles 3(3) (confiscation), 7 (money
laundering), 9(3) (non-refusal of mutual assistance on bank secrecy grounds); and the Organization of American
States’s Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996), Articles XV (asset forfeiture) and XVI (non-
refusal of assistance on bank secrecy grounds). See, also Recommendations of UN Expert Group Meeting on
Corruption and its Financial Channels (1999) (recommending, inter alia, measures to regulate money laundering,
removal of tax benefits and bank secrecy impediments); Global Coalition for Africa, Principles to Combat
Corruption in African Countries (1999) (Art. 4, 21); Global Forum’s Guiding Principles for Fighting Corruption
and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (1999), Principles 8, 10; Council of Europe,
Twenty Guiding Principles For The Fight Against Corruption (1997) (Prin. 4, 19); G8 Senior Experts Group
Recommendations to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (1996), Recommendations 29-34 (treating money
laundering, confiscation of proceeds of crime, regulation of corruption); G8 Forty Recommendations of the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (1996). For a more detailed analysis of these instruments,
see UN document E/CN.15/2001/3 (Report of the Secretary General on Existing International Legal Instruments
Addressing Corruption).”
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at all. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
provides a response to some of these problems. However, mainly because of its
limited scope, it will be only applicable in some specific cases.
1. Legal Problems encountered
During the initial phase of a recovery effort, the main challenge lies in the tracing of
the assets, the identification of the various players involved in the process of the
looting of the assets and the determination of their potential criminal or civil
liabilities. Often, the exchange of information between various jurisdictions as well as
the public and the private sphere is extremely cumbersome, if possible at all. In such
an environment, most efforts fail in this initial phase or are not even undertaken
because of the difficulties envisaged. The central legal problems are related to
jurisdiction and territoriality. Where legal systems are incompatible, particularly when
cases involve cooperation between Continental and Common Law systems,
cooperation is difficult. Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) have proven
cumbersome and ineffective when the object is to trace and freeze assets as quickly as
possible. Overcoming jurisdictional problems slows down investigations, often
fatally. By the time investigators get access to documents in another jurisdiction, the
funds have moved elsewhere.
The legal problems encountered differ significantly depending on the jurisdiction in
which the recovery effort is pursued (common / continental law) and the approach
chosen (civil/ criminal recovery). Each approach and jurisdiction has its advantages
and disadvantages. Civil law, allowing for confiscation and recovery based on the
balance of probabilities, has the clear advantage since the evidentiary threshold is
typically lower than with criminal actions. Conversely, access to information as well
as investigative powers in the civil process is limited and, apart from some common
law countries, the freezing of the assets can be difficult. Civil recovery, however, also
opens alternative approaches as far as the civil action against third parties is
concerned. For example, in some common law countries where compensation goes
beyond simple economic damage and where moral and punitive damage
compensation is possible, actions against the facilitators of the looting may be
considered. Another advantage of civil recovery consists in the free choice of the
jurisdiction in which the recovery of the proceeds of corruption is pursued. In the case
of criminal recovery, prosecution must follow pre-set jurisdictional conditions while
civil recovery can be pursued almost anywhere in the world, and, perhaps even more
importantly, be pursued in several jurisdictions in parallel. This can be particularly
important where there is the risk that the offender might transfer his or her loot to a
“non-freezing-friendly” jurisdiction.
The criminal law approach generally provides the investigators with privileged access
to information, both at the national and international level. The investigative powers
of a prosecutors office make it easier to overcome bank secrecy and to obtain freezing
orders. At the same time, however, the actual confiscation and refunding to the victim
may prove more complex since most legal systems still require that the illicit origin of
the proceeds be established beyond any reasonable doubt. In the civil proceeding, the
link between the assets and the criminal acts at their origin must only be established
on the grounds of balanced probabilities, also known as a preponderance of the
evidence.
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Another clear advantage of criminal recovery is the cost factor. Criminal recovery
requires less financial resources on the part of the requesting State since most of the
investigative work which has to be conducted is undertaken by law enforcement
agencies of the requested country. However, a clear disadvantage of criminal recovery
arises from the dependency on the sometimes strict requirements that need to met
under the requested countries national law in order to obtain the collaboration of its
authorities. Courts in requested countries often set preconditions to file charges or to
bring forfeiture proceedings against individuals prior to agreeing to freeze assets or to
keep them frozen. Repatriation in most cases can be only granted after a final decision
is made on criminal prosecution or forfeiture to permit repatriation. Those
proceedings must comply with the requested state’s own procedural requirements of
due process. The courts might also want to establish that the proceedings in the
requesting countries satisfy human rights principles. Many requesting countries have
found some or all of these requirements difficult to fulfill.
Other aspects are linked to the legal tradition of the jurisdictions involved. For
example, a clear advantage within many continental law jurisdictions is the possibility
for the victim to participate in the criminal proceeding as a partie civile. Such status
enables the victim to have access to all the data available to the prosecution and
reliance on the criminal court to decide on the (civil) compensation to the victim.
In common law systems, the wide discretionary powers of the prosecution to engage
in plea-bargaining has proven to be an effective tool in asset recovery cases. In
particular, where the main objective consist not in obtaining conviction for all the
single criminal acts involved but to recover the largest amounts of assets possible,
offenders may be offered immunity from prosecution in exchange for their fullest
collaboration in the location of the diverted assets. However, the impediments
mentioned above only touch upon a few of the most evident problems involved. A
complete inventory of all the possible scenarios is beyond the scope of this manual.
2. Solutions and Limitations of the TOC Convention in the context of the recovery of
assets
Because the TOC-Convention currently under consideration for ratification, the issue
of asset recovery as a legal problem will receive some important attention. The
Convention, even though targeted at combating offences transnational in nature and
involving organized criminal groups, will provide for some solutions in this context.
Once ratified, the Convention will also be applicable to other crimes, such as the
embezzlement of state resources, fraud, thievery, extortion and other forms of the
abuse of public power for private gain, as most of them will be considered as serious
crimes under the national law of the State Parties.
The transnational nature of illegal transfers of stolen property will always be present
in repatriation cases. However, proving involvement of an organized criminal group
in the activity might be problematic. In view of the wide definition of the organized
criminal group as a “structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of
time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or
offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain directly or
indirectly a financial or material benefit”, the Convention may nevertheless be
applicable. In many cases of the more recent past, the main offenders relied on a
network of close associates participating in and benefiting from the various criminal
acts involved in the looting. E.g. Mohammed Abacha, son of the late dictator Sani
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Abacha, and his associates have already been charged for participating in an
organized criminal group under Swiss law.
The Convention obliges the State Party that has been requested to provide mutual
legal assistance in investigation, prosecution, and judicial proceeding in relation to the
offences covered under this Convention. However, the requesting Party must have
reasonable grounds to suspect that such offences are transnational in nature and
involves an organized crime group. In particular, the mutual legal assistance to be
afforded may include measures such as the identification, tracing, freezing or seizing
and confiscating of the proceeds of crime. However, the request shall be executed in
accordance of the domestic law of the requested State. This provision gives the
requested State wide grounds to refuse responding to the request.
The Convention also obliges State Parties to submit the request for mutual legal
assistance in relation to the confiscation of proceeds from offences covered under this
Convention to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining an order of
confiscation, and if granted, to give effect to it. In addition, the requesting State party
is also entitled to submit an order of confiscation issued by a court of its own territory
to the requested State for execution.
This new legal framework would mean that Member States handling cases of large
scale corruption will have a functioning and practical legal framework. In particular
they would be able to obtain the cooperation of other State Parties to identify, trace,
freeze or seize assets deriving from a large variety of corrupt practices. Recovery of
the assets, however, can remain problematic. According to Article 14, State parties
shall give priority consideration to returning the confiscated proceeds of crime or
property to the requesting State Party. This provision is not mandatory and it is only
applicable if the requesting State Party intends to compensate the victims or to return
the proceeds to their legitimate owners. While it relatively easy to obtain repatriation
where assets have been directly diverted from State resources, the situation is less
clear with regard to the proceeds of corruption. In these cases, the interests at stake for
the victim state are less clear unless it suffers damage directly linked to the payment
of the bribe. Where the requesting state can not show that the funds are actually
owned by the state, the requested state may still confiscate the funds as criminal
proceeds and keep it for themselves.
D. Technical Capacities
One of the most important obstacles to seeking out illegal funds and securing their
repatriation is lack of capacity in the requesting and in the requested country. The
recovery of assets that have been diverted through corrupt practices is extremely
complex and consequently requires top-level technical capacities. Tasks necessary to
successfully mount a repatriation effort include the conduct of financial
investigations, forensic accounting, requests for mutual legal assistance and a solid
understanding of the legal requirements of the States where the assets have been
located. There are few practitioners in either public or private practice with
experience in this type of work, and in many jurisdictions, there are none at all.
In states where corruption is rampant, these capacities are often not available and it is
probable that a lack of state capacity helped create the conditions that facilitated the
corruption in the first place. Shortcomings in judicial, administrative and/or
investigative capacity, however, seriously impede the degree to which a country can
undertake such a case successfully. Necessary technical expertise is available at very
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high costs. Countries that have been looted by their former leaders are typically
finding themselves in substantial budgetary crisis. Spending money on private
lawyers based on the uncertain hope of actually being able to recover these costs may
often not be an option. Also, the private sector generally has no interest in educating
the national authorities so that they will be able to conduct future recovery efforts
without the help from outsiders. Consequently the lack of expertise remains
unchanged.
E. Resources
The recovery of assets can be costly. Much of what can be done in relation to the
repatriation of assets depends on the resources available to fund the case. Cases will
almost certainly last for several years, and parties to the action are likely to be
determined by their ability to fund litigation. In the case of criminal recovery, this
might less be an obstacle. Also, offenders that have been looting their respective
countries over a long period of time do not face the same resource problems as the
victims trying to recover the assets. They can employ armies of lawyers ready to
jeopardize and delay the successful recovery with all legal means available. The issue
of justice being done becomes a question of how long offenders and victims are able
to sustain the battle.
F. Prevention of future victimization
States that have been victimized often do too little to prevent future diversion of
assets. This leads not only to repeated victimization, but it also affects negatively the
repatriation of such funds that have already been diverted. It is understandable when
some countries may be hesitant to collaborate in the repatriation of assets when they
must fear that the assets returned most likely will become prey to corrupt practices
again. Therefore, countries embarking on a recovery effort should consider
committing a certain percentage of the assets recovered in form of a “Governance
Premium” to the strengthening of the national institutional and legal anti-corruption
framework.
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XI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION
A. Introduction78
Although not as newsworthy as grand corruption, petty corruption and system leakage
make a favorable environment for grand corruption. From the perspective of public
service users, inefficiencies and inequities of public services are a misuse of public
power. They “leak” resources from the system that should serve the public.
Petty corruption and system leakage passes along the costs of services to the public,
increasing costs without increasing — and often decreasing —efficacy. Stakeholders
lose time waiting in queues, going through a proliferating number of gatekeepers who
live off of providing these services, paying additional user fees and receiving inferior
and ineffective services. In the same way, reducing system leakage makes good sense
because more resources are available for service provision, the quality of services
usually improves, and an ethos of accountability and service to the public is
strengthened. At the same time, a more efficient system of service provision can help
to build an unfriendly environment for grand corruption.
Service Delivery Surveys (SDS) combine systematic modern measurement sciences
with opinion polls and anthropology. Focus groups and systematic discussions with
community leaders are used to enrich hard data with cultural and experiential insights.
Rigorous epidemiological analysis identifies the risk and resilience factors that point
toward corrective action, and helps to predict the dividends likely to be gained from
potential corrective action.
Service Delivery Surveys basically help to reduce the system leakage caused by
corruption and a lack of results orientation by correcting for information asymmetries
and by bringing service providers and users closer together.
B. Why Bother to Measure?
Corruption represents a “leakage” of resources from institutions that are supposed to
be using them for social objectives. It is not only the large-scale larceny of contract
rigging, kickbacks, and misuse or simply misappropriation of public funds that
represent leakage. This leakage can be in the form of unofficial user fees, kickbacks,
grease payments or even free time from services not performed. Under-the-table user
charges, absenteeism, the sale of drugs or fertilizers that should be dispensed free of
charge, or sale of examination papers — all of these examples represent the misuse of
public funds for private profit.
The results of this leakage creates an environment propitious for grand corruption,
diverting already scarce public service resources, and it “double taxes” the public.
Validation of the fact that corruption reduces service effectiveness is shown by
corruption surveys done in Uganda and Tanzania. In Uganda, peasants subjected to
corrupt agricultural extension agents had to pay more for fertilizers and pesticides
than those in areas outside the reach of the project. They also had lower levels of
production. In Tanzania, households who had to pay bribes for police assistance and
for land transfers often found their problems were not resolved by the payment. And
to make matters worse, sometimes these police and land officials also accepted bribes

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Neil Andersson
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from the other side of the conflict, thus often leaving the issue effectively unresolved
(or resolved in favor of whoever paid the most). Surveys can uncover these facts.
Another reason to measure is because resources may not be used to the maximum due
to information asymmetries and constraints. The first reasons for this asymmetry is
the introspective nature of institutional information systems. Public service providers
in virtually all countries have recourse to data generated by routine information
systems. However, even in the best of cases, these data tend to be introspective,
concerned with the perspective of the institution (the school, the clinic or the police
station) rather than the users of the services (the public). Many "users" are not even in
contact with the services and thus their opinions can not be registered in a service-
based information system. Further, conventional planning of public services, since it
begins with the institutions rather than with the public, often does not contemplate key
concerns like coverage or impact of services — much less the question of system
leakage.
The second asymmetry concerns the lack of information from which to form
expectations. Very often public service users have little idea of what services their
money should be buying and are thus subjected to local market dynamics. As they
have no way to know whether a particular shortfall in services is due to the service
worker, under-investment on public services, or any of a dozens of causes of system
leakage, the formation of expectations becomes rather difficult.
Reform might further aggravate the information constraints that they try to correct. It
is true that managers often have an accurate “big picture” of the reforms which are
necessary to improve equity, effectiveness, efficiency and deal with system leakage.
Streamlining, downsizing, and refocusing service objectives are some examples of
these reforms. Yet, the promise of increased responsiveness and improvement in
quality often does not materialize because this streamlining often reduces the
institutional ability to measure coverage and impact of services (as well as system
leakage).
In public service provision, there are a number of questions that managers of public
services need the answers to if they are to overcome information constraints. The first
set of questions address the issue of what needs reform. What can be changed? What
should be changed first? How much is gained from each of the actions taken? How
does one measure progress? What is the confidence level of the answers obtained? A
second set of questions deals with the focus of the actions. Some of these questions
include the following. Should we focus on particular service providers? Are there any
special groups of service users (ethnic, generational and gender divisions are typical
stratifications) especially harmed by system leakage? Are there any multiplier effects
or combinations of actions that produce more than the sum of their individual effects?
A third set of questions deals with the financial and political costs of reducing system
leakage. How much will this stakeholder information system cost to implement? How
long do we have to wait for the returns? What evidence is there of a community or
constituency acceptance or a public mandate for change? What is the level of
institutional acceptance from the service delivery agencies?
The solution to these information asymmetries and constraints requires a
measurement interface between services and users — a process whereby the
community voice can be built into planning. Service Delivery Surveys have been
designed and implemented in a number of countries with the goal of providing this
measurement interface.
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C. Service Delivery Surveys (SDS)
Service delivery surveys originate from a community-based action-research process
developed in Latin America in the mid-1980s, known as Sentinel Community
Surveillance (SCS). Since then, these stakeholder information systems have been
implemented with World Bank support in Nicaragua, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda and
Bosnia. With the help of UNICEF and UNDP, they have been established in Pakistan,
Nepal, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica and Bolivia.
The scheme was originally conceived to build capacities while producing accurate,
detailed and “actionable” data rapidly and at low cost. Ordinarily, SDS’s focus on the
generation and communication of evidence for planning purposes. This may be at the
level of a municipality, a city, a state, a number of provinces or an entire country. In
each of these settings, a representative sample of communities is selected to represent
the full spread of conditions in the country (or district). The approach permits
community-based fact-finding through a reiterative process, addressing one set of
issues at a time.
The SDS process starts with a baseline of service coverage, impact and costs in a
representative panel of communities across the country (or district). This involves a
household survey, where local interviewers are trained to knock on doors and ask a
limited number of well-focused questions about use of services, levels of satisfaction,
bribes paid and suggestions for change. These data, and the institutional review from
the same communities, are discussed in each community with the service workers and
community leaders. The quantitative aspects are used for bench-marking progress
with subsequent reiterations of the survey. Logistics of the SCS focus on repeated
measurement in the same sites, reducing sampling error and making impact estimation
straightforward. The qualitative dimensions reveal what should be done about the
problem.
Central to SCS is interaction with the research partners — the communities. The
product is therefore the aggregation of data from the epidemiological analysis distilled
through interaction with communities.79 By feeding information back to the
communities, dialogue for action is stimulated within households, in communities,
and between communities and local authorities. The resulting mobilization to resolve
specific problems also serves as a basis for empowerment. This involves initiation of
cycles that follow a fairly constant rhythm, independent of the subject. Experience
over more than a decade of implementation in 40 countries has shown that ownership
and commitment on the part of the client is vital to successful development projects.
The greater the intensity of participation (in terms of information sharing,
consultation, decision-making and initiating action), the greater the sustainability.
The method has been used to measure impact, coverage and cost of land mines,
economic sanctions, environmental interventions, urban transport, agricultural
extension, health services, judiciary and institutional restructuring. It has proved
useful in generating community-designed strategies to combat corruption in the public
services in several countries. Actionable results are provided in a short time and at
low cost. Typically, the duration of a whole cycle, from the design stage to the report
writing, is six to eight weeks.

79
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines “epidemiology” as: i) a branch of medical science that
deals with the incidence, distribution, and control of disease in a population, ii) the sum of factors
controlling the presence or absence of a disease or pathogen.
92
D. Some results of the SDS
Corruption (almost by definition) represents a separation between leaders and their
constituencies and separation between public servants and the public. The first
contribution of a SDS in overcoming this separation is that all segments of the public
are reflected in the collected data. This data gives a voice to the urban and rural, male
and female, rich and poor, young and old — even those who do not have access to
certain public services for either physical or social reasons. Stratified focus groups are
assembled to identify potential solutions so that each group is enabled to voice their
opinions and solutions.
But simply to be included in the sample as people who give opinions on the services
is a fragile representation of the community voice. The second way SDS’s reduce this
separation is that it involves stakeholders actively in the social audit process.
Feedback of the data to the communities (such as in Uganda and Tanzania) and
systematic use of data to build solutions adds another dimension to the community
voice in planning. In these examples, the participants of the focus groups were invited
to meetings with the local community leaders to discuss the feasibility and
implications of the solutions.
The third way SDS’s close this gap is by providing feedback in a positive way using
results to reveal options for the achievement of goals rather than underscoring
deficiencies. Communities or districts with the poorest indicators are shown how
certain reforms can improve their situation. Further, having a voice in the
interpretation and analysis of the resulting data helps to build confidence among the
stakeholders and provides a favorable climate for community mobilization.
The fourth way SDS’s can help to bring the governed and governing together is by
using results to manage a change process. This process starts with a necessary
commitment to communicate results from the government. The results of each cycle
are then communicated to public service providers through a series of "change
management" workshops. In Tanzania, the results were discussed in a Cabinet retreat,
where a national policy against corruption was formulated. In Uganda, the results
were presented at a parliamentarian’s retreat. Media workshops in both countries
familiarized journalists with the data and the correct management of positive
examples. In this way, these change management workshops help build a sense of
accountability, transparency and open government.
SDS’s also provide data necessary for results-oriented development planning. It is a
fact that most local governments in developing countries are characterized by poor
fiscal outcomes. A results-oriented approach can help improve these outcomes.
However, results-oriented management needs detailed “actionable” quantitative data.
For a government or municipal authority to act on behalf of a vulnerable subgroup,
hard data are required to identify the subgroup concerned and to act as a benchmark to
measure progress. Complementary qualitative data are also needed to indicate the
cultural and gender constraints and opportunities as well as to confirm the analysis
given to the quantitative data.
E. Different Types of Monitoring at the international level
At least three types of monitoring mechanisms are currently in use as part of anti-
corruption programmes: (i) those based on international instruments, (ii) those based
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on national instruments and (iii) those of a more general nature80. The advantage of
instruments-based mechanisms is that the legal framework is clear: the monitoring
focuses on the implementation and impact of the various provisions of these
instruments. Examples of this type of monitoring are the mechanisms relating to the
OECD-Convention on combating bribery of officials in international business
transactions, the GRECO-Programme of the Council of Europe and the various
monitoring exercises within the European Union (it is expected that the future UN-
instrument against Corruption will also contain a provision on monitoring).
However, even without this sort of formal framework, monitoring effectiveness of
national strategies has been accomplished via the use of surveys. An example of this
is the recently established monitoring mechanism used in Romania, Lithuania and
Poland. Instead of being based on a legal instrument, monitoring takes place on the
basis of questionnaires, listing relevant questions on national policies and legislation.
Two other examples include the perception indices developed by Transparency
International as well as the annual independent survey conducted by ICAC in Hong
Kong which measures, among other things, the trust level between ICAC and the
public, prosecution rate, as well as levels, types, location and causes of corruption.
The UN is currently testing a method in two pilot countries using a so-called country
assessment based on both facts and perceptions using hard facts, surveys, focus
groups and case studies.
F. Challenges measuring the impact of anti-corruption strategies
There are certainly many challenges to accurately measuring the impact of anti-
corruption strategies, policies and measures.
First, collected data must be analysed by a competent and independent institution
capable of extracting the true essence of the data collected which can then be analysed
highlighting differences and identifying so-called "best practices". To do this in a
credible manner, availability of resources will always be an issue. This holds true
even for monitoring mechanisms based on international instruments, since it is not
always evident that the Secretariats of the organisations concerned have the necessary
resources to ensure effective support and analysis of these mechanisms.
Second, current international monitoring mechanisms are unevenly distributed
throughout the world. In some regions, countries tend to participate in more than one
monitoring exercise, while in other parts of the world there are no operational
monitoring mechanisms at all, as, for example, in most parts of Asia. Of course, the
other extreme involves instances where there are multiple mechanisms applicable to the
same region, and the challenge arises as to how to avoid duplication of effort.
Third, monitoring can never be an end in itself. Rather, it should be an effective tool
to bring about changes in international and national policies and improve the quality
of decision making. If the monitoring exercise is linked to an international instrument,
the primary objective should be to first ensure proper implementation of the technical
aspects of the instrument and then the practical impact of its implementation.
Monitoring can thus serve two immediate purposes. It helps to reveal any differences
in interpretation of the instruments concerned and it can stimulate swift and effective
translation of the provisions of these instruments into national policies and legislation.
If it is determined that incomplete or ineffective implementation has occurred,

80
Petter, Langseth; (2001) Helping Member Countries Build Integrity to Prevent Corruption;
94
sanctions can be imposed to motivate stronger efforts at success. Therefore, accurate
monitoring is critical with respect to launching any successful anti-corruption
initiative.
In the case of the OECD-Convention, for example, a built-in sanction requires that
reports of the discussions on implementation be made available to the public. Such
publicity can be an important mechanism in helping promote more effective
measures. Reference can be made in this regard to the publicity surrounding the
perception indices of Transparency International. Even though these indices simply
register the perceived level of corruption as seen by primarily the international private
sector, they gain wide publicity. However, inasmuch as the TI indexes are somewhat
useful, a distinct disadvantage is that they: (i) do not always reflect the real situation,
(ii) do not involve the victims of corruption in the countries surveyed; (iii) offer little
or no guidance of what could be done to address the problem, and (iii) can discourage
countries from taking serious measures when their anti-corruption programme efforts
are not seen as being successful by an improved score against the TI-Index.
Fourth, monitoring exercises cannot be separated from the issue of technical
assistance and it is critical that monitoring not only addresses levels of corruption, but
also its location, cost, cause and the potential impact of different remedies.
Furthermore, since the trust level between the pubic and anti-corruption agencies is
critical for the success of anti-corruption efforts, public trust levels should also be
monitored.
It may be the case that participating countries agree on the need for implementing the
measures identified as "best practices", but lack financial, human or technical
resources to implement them. Under those circumstances, monitoring exercises would
be much more effective if they were accompanied by targeted assistance programmes.
It should be added, however, that not all measures require major resources, especially
in the context of preventative measures where much can be done at relatively low
cost.
Most of the data collection done by the traditional development institutions is based
on an approach that can be described as “data collection by outsiders for outside use”.
Generally conducted by external experts, international surveys tend to be done for
external research purposes. International surveys help spark debate about those
countries which fare badly. Such surveys help to place issues on the national agenda
and keep it at the forefront of public debate. However, international surveys are
comparative and fraught with statistical difficulties.
One value, however, has been that they have highlighted the need for national
surveys, and these are now being undertaken with increasing thoroughness. With
public awareness of levels, types, causes and remedies of corruption dramatically
improved over the last 5 years, the utility of collecting data about corruption is to
increase the accountability of the state towards its public by establishing measurable
performance indicators that are transparently and independently monitored over time
G. Integrated Country Assessments
The approach pilot tested under the framework of the UN Global Programme against
Corruption (GPAC) by the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) in
collaboration with the United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research
95
Institute (UNICRI)81 is an integrated approach where national or sub-national surveys
are ideally conducted by locals (in some cases helped by outsiders) for local
objectives. An important outcome of this process is that citizens have a voice in their
own government and ultimately demand that government become more accountable
and transparent.
With GPAC’s integrated approach, data collection should be an important but small
proportion of entire initiative. The majority of effort should be to use the data for
evidence-based planning and decision-making, as well as for transparent impact
monitoring. .
Often a larger sample size is required in the integrated approach than that which is
necessary according to surveys done by external institutions for external use. This is
partly because the data is used to compare corruption sub-nationally across districts or
provinces within a recipient country. In addition, the data collection itself is not
merely for gathering data, but also to raise awareness and empower citizens by asking
pertinent questions that might impact directly on their lives. With a sample size of
18,412 households in Uganda82, more than 100,000 citizens were directly involved in
the data collection and the related 350 focus groups involved another 5,000 citizens in
the process. The data collection process itself could almost be seen as an
empowerment process or as pilot run of a functioning democracy.83
The country assessment is conducted with the co-operation of different national and
international partners (e.g. In Hungary: UNICRI, Gallup). It is primarily a locally
requested tool that will among other things, be used by the civil society to hold
government accountable. Important elements of the assessment are:
(i) A desk review aimed at compiling all relevant anti-corruption information.
(j) The public opinion surveys based on the SDS methodology described above,
sufficiently representative to indicate corruption levels, types and coverage across
sub-national units and key institutions.84. One important variable to survey
regularly is the public confidence across all institutions and stakeholder groups
involved in the fight against corruption including.
(k) The focus groups, also based on the SDS methodology, to promote in-depth
discussion with opinion makers or targeted interest groups in government and
society. Using this technique detailed information can be gathered about
perceptions of corruption, what they see as the causes and what the government
needs to do in order to fight it.
(l) The case study, as elaborated by local experts, to describe typical corruption cases
in great detail as a means of facilitating a better understanding of how corruption
actually occurs. Well-documented practical case studies are expected to help anti-

81
UNICRI is the organization that conducts the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS), one
of the studies used by Transparency International in their annual Corruption Perceptions Index.
82
CIETinternational, 1997
83
Petter Langseth, (1999). Update on Uganda; Staying the Course, World Bank PREM NEWS, June
1999.
84
.As an example in Uganda each of the 46 districts would have survey data
comparing their district with the national average. This type of survey was requested
by the Government Inspector-General, who argued that the only way he can fight
corruption is to have information about corruption levels across sub-national units.

96
corruption agencies fine-tune their measurement as well as to make the public and
potential whistleblowers more aware.
(m) The Legal Assessment to assess existing laws and regulations, e.g. what
constitutes a corrupt action and what are the sanctions; to analyze in detail where
legal gaps are and inconsistencies exist85; to examine how these laws and
regulations are implemented and enforced, whether the are taken seriously, and
whether sufficient resources have been invested in their execution.
(n) General assessment of official oversight bodies to hold governmental officials and
agencies accountable for their actions. Examples could be Inspector-General of
Government, Ombudsman and/or Auditor General.
(o) The institutional assessment to inventory what judiciary, executive and legislative
bodies are already doing to fight and prevent corruption as well as public
confidence. It is important to go into greater depth with some of these anti-
corruption agencies to identify where there are specific problems. To accomplish
this, the Global Programme will use different techniques including “process
mapping” to analyze the functions, procedures, reporting relationships, access to
information and incentives in anti-corruption agencies across all three branches of
government. The mapping specifies how an organization does its business; what it
does efficiently and inefficiently, identifies where there are conflicts of interest
and where there are excessive opportunities for extortion (bribe taking) and bribe
giving.
(p) The assessment of civil society and the media and their capacities to hold the
government accountable as evidenced by their access to information and the
freedom and independence of press. Different techniques can be used to assess
the quality and the vigilance of the media reporting on corruption cases. This
would range from: (i) systematic content analysis, (ii) the impact of different
media types; (iii) the review of who owns and controls the media. Regarding the
access to information the country assessment is not only going to assess laws on
the books but also to what extent a journalist or a citizen actually can access
certain information in a timely and free fashion.

85
.Certainly anti corruption provisions can appear in many different laws- criminal and penal codes,
civil service laws, standing orders, public procurement regulations and many others. These should be
consistent
97
PART 3:
CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
99
XII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Introduction
Contextualising the problem of corruption and recognizing that corruption exists must
not be the end of the analysis. Demoralization, cynicism and fatalism are not the
solution. No one claims that corruption or crime can be eliminated. They can and
must, however, be reduced. Their most serious consequences must be countered. The
causes of the gravest forms of corruption ought to be addressed. Many are tempted to
think that the omnipresence of this problem means that it is unsolvable or that nothing
much can be done about. Nothing is more removed from the truth. The cases of
Singapore, Botswana and Hong Kong can highlight how determined administrations,
continuous commitment and wide alliances between government agencies, the public,
the press and the private sector can make a huge difference. These administrations not
only had leaders who were whole-heartedly committed to fight corruption, but also
understood well the root causes of the problem.
A complete theory and understanding of the causes of corruption must include
accounts of opportunities to engage in corrupt activities; motives or incentives to take
advantage of available opportunities; and control weaknesses to allow corrupt
practices to go on undetected or unsanctioned. Therefore, attempts to fight corruption
that do not address all three areas are unlikely to succeed. Anti-corruption efforts must
be continuous, whole-hearted, transparent, evidence based, integrated, broad based
and full-scale.
Perhaps the two most significant achievement in the “governance area” over the last
10 years have been the:
(a) shattering of a taboo that shrouded corruption from discussion,
particularly in diplomatic circles and intergovernmental institutions. The topic
is now out in the open and a potentially powerful coalition has emerged from
this debate. Interest groups that never collaborated previously in preventing
corruption now recognise that governments alone cannot hope to contain
corruption86,
(b) increased public awareness of the scope of money laundering as a
problem much larger than the aid industry, its link to political corruption and
the emerging willingness of international organisations and governments to
address the issue of repatriation of funds looted by former dictators.
The support and participation of an active but independent civil society must be
attained. Governments must allow new checks and balances to be established
including:
• Timely, broader and easier access to information;
• an independent judiciary with integrity87;
• a legislative that represents the public and provides the correct role model;

86
Jeremy. Pope, Transparency International Source Book, 3 edition, Berlin 2000
87
Petter, Langseth,.& Oliver, Stolpe, (2001), Strengthen the Judiciary against Corruption. International
Yearbook for Judges, Australia, 2001
100
• a result-oriented and clean executive; and a strong civil society empowered by a
free, clean and independent media
B. History has revealed the following valuable facts
1. Economic growth is not enough to reduce poverty. Poverty alleviation will not
occur without a broader, integrated and comprehensive strategy for change
2. The misuse of power for private gain seems to be endemic
3. Curbing systemic corruption requires stronger measures, more resources and a
longer time horizon than most politicians and corruption fighters will admit or can
afford.
4. Left unchecked, corruption will increase and make the poorest and least educated
poorer. Where personal risk and punishment are minimal, the risk of corruption
naturally increases.
5. Raising awareness without adequate and visible enforcement will lead to cynicism
among citizenry and possibly increase the incidence of corruption.
6. Recent corruption cases exposed at the World Bank, the UN and other multilateral
and bilateral organisations have shown that the misuse of public power for private
gain can occur in any society or organization, even where there are well-laid checks
and balances.
7. A country’s national institutions do not work in isolation. Where they do, they will
fail in their totality. A transparent and integrated system of checks and balances,
designed to achieve accountability among the various arms and agencies of
government, disperses power and limits opportunities for conflicts of interest
8. Public trust in government, anti-corruption agencies and anti-corruption policies
and measures is key when a country invites the public to take an active role in
monitoring the performance of its government. For example, in Hong Kong,
according to a 1999 community opinion survey, 99% of the population said they
supported its Independent Commission Against Corruption, 66 % of the population
said they were willing to file a complaint or blow the whistle on a corrupt official or
colleague, and 75% of those people said they were willing to also identify themselves
when reporting suspected corruption Without public confidence in anti-corruption
policies and measures, complaint systems will fail, investigative media reports will
remain officially unfounded and anti-corruption trials will be viewed as mere political
show-casing.
9. It takes Integrity to Fight Corruption. Any successful anti-corruption effort must be
based on integrity and credibility. Where there is no integrity in the very system
designed to combat corruption, the risk of detection and punishment to a corrupt
regime will not be meaningfully increased. Complainants will likely not come
forward if they perceive that reporting corrupt activity will have no effect.
10. Building integrity and credibility takes time and consistency. The belief that
corruption can be eradicated quickly and permanently inevitably leads to false
expectations that result in disappointment and distrust. It must be understood that
curbing corruption requires political will, public confidence, adequate time, resources,
dedication and integrity. Moreover, efforts can not stop once corruption has been
identified and controlled. Localities will have to continue to build integrity and to
101
maintain vigilance. Thus, fighting corruption will become a permanent item of public
expenditure.
11. The close link between money laundering and corruption makes it essential to
launch national and international efforts in at least in three areas:
a. curb opportunities for corrupt leaders to loot national integrity strategies and
anti- corruption action plans have to reduce the opportunities for corrupt
leaders to send large amounts of money abroad. According to Financial
Times, more than US$ 250 Billion (10 annual budgets of the World Bank)
have over the last 15 years been looted and transferred abroad by Nigeria and
Russia alone,
b. curb opportunities for corrupt leaders to deposit their illicit assets abroad
c. increase the chances to repatriate the illicit funds already looted by former and
current officials. Parts of the recovered funds should be invested building
national integrity, public awareness, rule of law and strong checks and
balances to prevent future looting by corrupt leaders.
C. Overriding Lessons
Perhaps the overriding lesson is that we still have much to learn. Success stories are
few, and it is not enough to point to Singapore, Botswana and/or Hong Kong. These
are small areas with governance practices and values that would not necessarily work
or be accepted in other environments. We have learned much about failure, and these
lessons are valuable because they can help reformers and the civil society to avoid
repeating discredited approaches.
The belief that corruption can be eradicated quickly and permanently inevitably leads
to false expectations that result in disappointment and distrust. It must be understood
that curbing corruption requires adequate time, resources, dedication and integrity.
Moreover, efforts can not stop once corruption has been identified and controlled.
Localities will have to continue to build integrity and to maintain vigilance. Thus,
fighting corruption will become a permanent item of public expenditure.
Corruption has debilitating effects upon society. It undermines the efficient allocation
of financial resources for economic development and alters the composition of public
expenditure. In addition to the detrimental effects on economic growth, corruption
jeopardises free trade, distorts competitiveness and undermines the stability upon
which the free market system is based. Corruption further jeopardises the credibility
of governments and their institutions and provides a breeding ground for organised
crime to flourish. Moreover, it is a phenomenon that transcends national boundaries,
affecting the public and private sector, and businesses and public officials can be
either the perpetrators or the victims of corrupt practices.
Strategies to fight corruption do not reside solely with criminal justice but rather
should also be co-ordinated with economic and social policies and the development of
civic political culture. Because it is a process and a relationship, the state, its public
administration and the citizens all share a responsibility in preventing and controlling
it.
A number of mechanisms exist to fight corruption at various levels (local, national,
transnational) within both the public and private sectors. International instruments, in
the form of declarations, conventions and codes promote transnational co-operation
and delineate prohibited and punishable offences. These instruments, however, are
102
limited and legal loopholes must are filled with national legislation. In spite of limited
success stories, widespread implementation of anti-corruption measures and
monitoring mechanisms has been scarce. This fact supports the need for a
comprehensive UN convention addressing corruption.
D. Recommendations
1. It is important to involve the victims of corruption.
Very few initiatives involve the people suffering from the effects of corruption. It is
therefore critical to do more of what ICAC in Hong Kong has done over the past 25
years. The ICAC interfaces directly (face to face in awareness raising workshops)
with almost 1 % of the population every year. In an environment where the public can
trust the anti-corruption agency, they can be a major source of intelligence whose
“eyes and ears” can aid tremendously in identifying and thereby curbing corruption.
To play this role the public must be protected. Also, they need to be given tools to
assist in identifying factors precipitating corruption, should be solicited to suggest
remedies and should be encouraged to monitor the impact of anti-corruption strategies
and action plans. A well-informed and protected public can hold the government and
its civil servants accountable and thereby increases the risk and uncertainty for civil
servants abusing its public powers for private gains.
2. Sequencing of Reform
Working out precisely where to start the reform process is important as it will dictate
much of the path ahead. It is in this context that the “national integrity system
workshop” can be most effective, providing an opportunity for all stakeholders to
participate in a process. Probably as important is the combination and sequencing of
different anti-corruption tools. Some tools are not going to effective unless they are
used in combination with other tools. For example a hotline is not going to result in
cub corruption unless the hot-line is broadly presented to as many citizens as possible
as credible and trust worthy tool that will be followed up by a strong anti-corruption
agency.
3. Strength and Credibility of Anti-Corruption Watchdog Agencies
The strength and credibility of enforcement and watchdog agencies is crucial to the
building of public trust and confidence. Credible agencies will attract public co-
operation, both as complainants and as witnesses. An institution lacking in trust will
not. And at the heart of credible institutions lies their manifest and popularly accepted
integrity. Their leaders must role model conduct of the highest kind.
4. Strategic Partnerships
Strategic partnerships and increased information sharing at the international, national
and sub national level is essential. A particular challenge for bi- and multilateral
donor agencies that assist Member States in their fight against corruption as outsiders
is to identify the right partners. This dictates a special role for civil society in a
country from the very outset so as to ensure that the reform process is fostered with
the right “champions”.
103
5. Partnerships to Facilitate Recovery of Illicit Assets
In order to succeed to prevent illegal transfers of corruption proceeds and to repatriate
such proceeds, the criminal justice systems in the North and the South, international
donor agencies and regulatory bodies need to establish stronger partnerships to
develop an adequate legal and institutional framework.
6. Partnership to Strengthen Checks and Balances
A large percentage of national corruption is taking place within the public sector. In
order to curb public sector corruption, whether at political, administrative or street
levels, there is a need to establish stronger checks and balances. Stronger checks and
balances require new and stronger partnerships including and empowering all key
stakeholder such as the victims of corruption, media, private sector, religious
organisations, youth, legislative, judiciary and the executive at the national and
municipal level. In order for such broad coalitions to work it is critical that the
partnership is based on trust. Based on experiences from Hong Kong as reported by
the ICAC, public confidence in the state must be earned and thereafter requires
consistent awareness raising, information sharing and hard work.
7. Partnerships to implement existing International Legal Instruments
Corruption and the laundering of corruption proceeds are addressed by a variety of
international and regional legal instruments. Successful implementation of these
instruments requires strong collaboration between the Member States. If there are no
working partnerships and little or no political will, such legal instruments are not
going to help countries to prevent and control corruption as well as prevent the illegal
transfer of corruption proceeds and the repatriation of such proceeds.
8. Partnerships to develop a legal instrument against corruption
Partnerships are also crucial in the process of developing legal instruments against
corruption both at the national and international level. The process should involve a
broad group of stakeholders including, government authorities, the private sector – in
particular the banks -, the victims, NGO’s and the media.
9. Identifying and recovering stolen assets is not enough.
According to the New York Times, as much as $1trillion in criminal proceeds is
laundered through financial system world-wide each year with about half flowing
through US banks. In developing countries such as Nigeria, this can be translated into
US$ 100 Billion stolen by corrupt regimes over the last 15 years. Even if Nigeria
receives the necessary help to recover its stolen assets, reasonable people would be
hard-pressed to advocate its return back into a systemically corrupt environment
without trying to first increase the risk, cost and uncertainty to corrupt politicians who
would most likely again abuse their power to loot the national treasury.
10. Increased enforcement of Money Laundering Legislation and Regulations
Governments must improve and enforce money-laundering statutes to reduce the
opportunities for corruption. Money laundering and corruption seem to be treated as
different problems. The media frequently links money laundering’ to illicit drug sales,
tax evasion, gambling and other criminal activity. When politicians accept the idea
that lack of opportunity and deterrence are major factors helping to reduce corruption,
104
it follows that when ill-gotten gains are difficult to hide, the level of deterrence is
raised and the risk of corruption is reduced.
105
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Publication Series

The Anti-Corruption publication series may be accessed on:
http://www.odccp.org/corruption.html
No. Titles Category Date
CICP. 1
Involving the Public in Curbing Corruption: The Use of Surveys to Empower the
Citizens to Monitor State Performance, paper presented by Petter Langseth at the
launching of Transparency International, GPAC, Oslo.
Conference
Series October 1999
CICP. 2
Prevention: An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption, paper presented by Petter
Langseth, GPAC, ISPAC Conference on Responding to the Challenge of
Corruption, Milan.
Conference
Series December 1999
CICP. 3
Measuring Corruption at the Village Level: Experience from an Integrated
Process in Uganda, prepared by Petter Langseth, GPAC.

Field-Level
Activities December 1999
CICP. 4 Helping Countries Fight Corruption, paper presented by Petter Langseth, GPAC;
UN/CEFACT, Delivering Solutions for Tomorrows World, Geneva.
Conference
Series March 2000
CICP. 5 Preliminary Assessment and Feedback on the Corruption Pilot Study in Hungary,
GPAC
Field-Level
Activities March 2000
CICP. 6
Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, prepared by Justice Michael
Kirby and Dr. G. di Gennaro, Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Vienna
Conference
Series April 2000
CICP. 7 Integrated versus Quantitative Methods: Lessons Learned, prepared by Petter
Langseth, GPAC; NORAD Research Conference, Oslo
Technical
Guide May 2000
CICP. 8
Helping Countries Help themselves Fight Corruption, paper presented by Petter
Langseth, GPAC; 2nd International Conference on Corruption-related Crime,
Interpol, Lyon
Conference
Series May 2000
CICP. 9 Report of the International Anti-Corruption Expert Round Table, Pretoria Technical
Guide June 2000
CICP. 10 Strengthening Judicial Integrity Against Corruption, prepared by Petter Langseth
and Oliver Stolpe, GPAC
Technical
Guide December 2000
CICP. 11
Value Added of Partnership in the Fight against Corruption, paper presented by
Petter Langseth, Third Annual Meeting of the Anti-Corruption Network of
Transition Economies in Europe, Istanbul
Conference
Series March 2001
CICP. 12
An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts, by
Edgardo Buscaglia, GPAC
Research and
Scientific
Series
May 2001
CICP. 13
Investigation the links between Access to Justice and Governance Factors: An
Objective Indicators’ Approach, by Edgardo Buscaglia, GPAC
Research and
Scientific
Series
May 2001
CICP. 14 Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic
Consequences, by Edgardo Buscaglia, GPAC
Technical
Guide May 2001
CICP. 15 draft United Nations Anti Corruption Tool Kit Technical
Guide June 2001
CICP. 16
draft United Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy United
Nations
Policy
June 2001
Global Trends in Governance and Justice Forthcoming
Forum on Crime and Society United Nations Sales Publication

The Global Programme Against Corruption(GPAC), launched by
the Center for International Crime Prevention (CICP) in l999,
provides technical advice to Governments, upon request, on anti-
corruption policies and measures. More than twenty countries
have requested support and GPAC is currently working in 8 pilot
countries. GPAC aims to upgrade and enhance the capabilities of
Governments and civil society in their fight against corruption. It
helps design and implement National Integrity Strategies and anti-
corruption action plans. GPAC has developed an evidenced-
based inclusive, non-partisan, comprehensive and impact-
oriented approach to its advisory services. It promotes wide usage
of the United Nations Manual for Anti Corruption Policyand the
United Nations Anti-Corruption Toolkit–two instruments aimed at
guiding policy-makers and practitioners at the national and
municipal level. GPAC conducts pilot projects, research and
studies, monitors trends, and disseminates its material in a
publication series (research and scientific studies; conferences;
policy papers, technical guides; and field-level impact) and using
the Website. GPAC will issue an annual Global Corruption Trends
Report.
Forum on Crime and Society, a new United Nations Sales
Publication, is issued twice each year in all six United Nations
languages.

All inquiries may be addressed to:
Petter.Langseth@cicp.un.or.at

http://www.odccp.org/corruption.html

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